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SUMMARY

ISSUE
California law is currently in substantial conformance with
federal income tax law although there are major areas of
difference. As each federal law change is made, the
Legislature revises state law only as iti deems appropriate.
Some state laws are enacted to suit particular state needs
and have no federal counterpart.
Should California adopt federal income tax law with automatic
conformity to future federal law changes?
QUESTIONS
1.

What are the major areas of non-conformity?

2. To what degree would automatic conformity simplify
state law and ease compliance for the average taxpayer?
3. Which taxpayers stand to gain the greatest tax
savings from full conformity?
4. What are the state revenue implications of full
conformity? What is the impact on future budgeting and
revenue stability?
5. What nature of tax shifts might result from the
various degrees of full conformity?
6. To what extent would state control over tax and
economic policy be reduced under conformity?
7. Does automatic conformity require a constitutional
amendment?
8.
Is the federal collection of state taxes a desireable
option under full conformity?
LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
1. Retain current practice of "selective" or "piecemeal"
conformity.
2.

Modify current practice to do one or more of the follow-

ing:
a.

Formalize Conformity Task Force(staff-agency group)

b.

Require introduction of bills embodying federal
changes where comparable state law exists.

i

c.

3.

Require FTB regulations to be identical to IRS
regulations where both state and federal law
are the same.

Adopt a form of automatic conformity at the level of:
a.
b.
c.

Federal adjusted gross income
Federal taxable income
Federal tax liability ("piggyback")

These proposals may be adopted with or without
special state and adjustments and with or without federal collection, auditing, enforcement and appeals.
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PREFACE
This report is designed to provide committee members and
witnesses with a comprehensive background on the issue of
California conformity of the personal income tax to federal
individual income tax law.*
During the 1979-80 legislative session, six separate
measures proposing automatic conformity were considered by the
Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee. A major review of
automatic conformity has not been undertaken by the committee
since 1964, so it was resolved to study all measures at one time
a special interim hearing.
Organization of this report is as follows:
White Pages

An overview of the concept of
automatic conformity, and the
pros and cons of various approaches
compared to current practice
Summary comparison of major
differences between state and
federal law, and detailed analyses
of individual provisions

*Bank and Corporation Tax provisions are not considered in this
report.
"Conformity" is usually associated only with the Personal
Income Tax, and this was the focus of legislation before the
committee. Further, the committee conducted interim hearings last
fall on the four major areas of non-conformity in the Bank and
Corporation Tax (Assembly Publication #751, Federal Conformity Issues:
Bank and corporation Tax, Vol. I, Novemberl979) .

......

Blue Pages

Basic income tax data, State
and Federal law

Green Pages

Legal analyses of whether or not
automatic conformity must be
accomplished by constitutional
amendment

Pink Pages

Text of measures proposing
automatic conformity

Tan Pages

Federal statutes allowing IRS
collection of state income taxes

Buff Pages

Withholding exemptions issue,
FTB regulation

This report was prepared by Bob Leland, consultant to
the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee, with contributions
by David Doerr, Ellen Worcester and Gil Oster,committee consultants;
Jim Patterson of the Assembly Office of Research; and Larry Counts,
Jack Gordon, Paul Petrozzi, Marvin Hanely, Tom Margetich and Al
Desin of the Franchise Tax Board staff.
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What is Conformity?
"Conformity" is tax jargon for the patterning of California
Personal Income Tax law after the federal Internal Revenue Code.
To many, the term "conformity" is synonomous with "automatic
conformity", which can be achieved to a greater or lesser extent
by a number of procedural approaches, three of which are examined

•

in this report •
California law is already largely in conformity with federal
law, but not as the result of an automatic procedure.

The

current degree of conformity is a consequence of a determined
effort by the Legislature since the mid-sixties to review federal
law revisions as they occur and to make changes in comparable state
codes as deemed appropriate.
This approach to conformity is known as "selective conformity"
(to its proponents} or "piecemeal conformity" (to its detractors) •

Selective/Piecemeal Conformity
Although this practice has been followed since the initial
enactment of the California personal income tax law, it was
formalized as a policy after extensive studies were conducted by
the Revenue and Taxation Committees of both houses during the
1960's.

Table 1 summarizes major state conformity studies of

the past 20 years and their conclusions.
Under selective/piecemeal conformity, the Legislature attempts
to achieve the highest degree of conformity to the extent
practicable and desirable, but exercies its authority to modify

6

TABLE 1
PUBLISHED STATE STUDIES ON
FEDERAL CONFORMITY
Year

Recommendation

1961

Report of Senate Fact
Finding Committee on
Revenue and Taxation:
Conformity of California
Personal Income and Bank
Corporation Franchise
Taxes with the Federal
Internal Revenue Code

Adopt policy that conformity
be achieved wherever
practicable and desirable.
(Pg. 233)

1961-63

Final Report of the
Assembly Interim Committee on Revenue and
Taxation

Continue policy of attempting
to achieve highest degree
of conformity between federal
and state laws as may be
practical and desirable.
(pg. 56)

1964

Dr. Corrine Lathrop
Gilb's Report for the
Assembly Interim
Committee on Revenue
and Taxation: Conformity
of State Personal Income
Tax Laws to Federal
Personal Income Tax
Laws

Adopt method which provides
the maximum conformity for
the convenience of the taxpayer consistent with needs
for predictability and
control over revenue by the
state.
(Vol. 4, No. 10,
Part 3, pg. 8)

1968-69

California Advisory
Commission on Tax Reform (Flournoy Commission)

No specific recommendation
but opposed blind conformity
as optimum objective.
(Vol. I, pg. 6)

1969

Staff Report to Senate
Committee on Revenue and
Taxation on Bills and
Constitutional Amendments Referred in 1968
to the Committee for
Study

Continue policy recommended
in 1961 report.

1969

Preliminary Report of
the Legislative-Executive Tax Study Group

Full conformity contains
"grave flaws" (pgs. 102-104)

1975

Franchise Tax Board
staff report: Should
California Abandon its
Current Selective Conformity Policy for
Automatic Conformity?

Continue policy of selective
conformity while seeking
simplification of state law
and promoting greater tax
equity (pg. 11)

1979

Final Report of the
Commission on Governmental Reform (Post
Commission)

Opposed full "piggybacking"
but recommended "use of a
modified form of piggybacking ..• by specific adjustments to the "adjusted
gross income" reported to
the U.S." (Pg. 60)
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or reject federal changes through the regular legislative process.
In addition, the Legislature maintains the freedom to adopt
provisions which have no federal counterpart in order to meet
special state needs.
This state action necessarily follows federal action
and considers provisions on an individual basis.

In years past,

a time lag of 1-3 years often ensued between federal change and

•

state reaction.

Since 1976, however, a task force of legislative

and agency staff operating under the auspices of the Assembly
Revenue and Taxation Committee has immediately reviewed federal
changes to laws with a state counterpart and recommended to the
Committee full, partial or no conformity.
This procedure has improved response time and provided a
forum for review of all changes, but the decision on whether or
not to amend the state code still rests with the Legislature.

Automatic Conformity Proposals
Automatic conformity has been under active discussion in
California since 1959, and at least one legislative proposal
I

in this area has been made in every legislative session from
that year through the present.
There are three basic approaches to automatic conformity:
1.

Adopt Federal Adjusted Gross Income.

This approach

adopts by reference the current definition of federal
"adjusted gross income" {AGI) , and automatically incorporates all future changes affecting the federal AGI
definition for California income tax purposes.

8

Table 2

TABLE 2
PRESENT DETERMINATION OF CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX

MINUS

Social ecurity and
Public assistance
Bequests and gifts

ailroad

EXEMPT INCOME
etirement

Insurance proceeds
Interest on government obligations
Scholarships and fellowships

EQUALS

GROSS INCOME
Dindends
Interest
Capita 1 Gains

Salaries & wages
Partnership income
Estates & trusts

Proprietorship income
Rents & royalties
Annuities & pensions

MINUS

ADJUSTMENTS TO GROSS INCOME
Employee business expenses
Military exclusion
Moving expenses & sick pay
Forfeited interest

Retirement plans
Alimony

EQUALS

MINUS

DEDUCTIONS-Standard or itemized
Med~cal expenses
Contributions
Interest
Bad debts
Property/Gas Taxes
Child adoption expenses
Casualty losses & thefts

EQUALS

'~+~

TIMES APPROPRIATE
TAX RATE, OR BY
REFERENCE TO
TAX TABLES, EQUALS

MINUS

TAX CREDITS
Personal
Low income
Net income taxes paid
other states

Income Averaging

Blind
Solar energy
Conservation
Dependents
Child Care

EQUALS

'

TAX LIABILITY
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Adapted from Franchise Tax
Board chart, p. 10 of 1978

shows the basic items of income determination which would
be the same for both federal and state law.

The state

would be left with its own set of itemized deductions, tax
credits, and tax rates.
In its "pure" form, such AGI conformity would be total,
but this approach does leave open the possibility for various
adjustments to be made by the state.

Of course, the more

adjustments, the greater the complexity.
In the past legislative session, there was no measure
which specifically provided for this approach, although this
option could have been chosen under SCA 31 (Mills) •

The text

of that SCA is contained in Appendix J.
2.

Adopt Federal Taxable Income.

The effect of the

"taxable income" {TI) approach is similar to automatic AGI
conformity, except that it goes one step further.

As Table 2

shows, TI conformity provides that itemized deductions would
also be the same for state and federal law.

The state would

retain its own tax rates and credits.
As with the AGI approach, adjustments can be made.
AB 3209 (Naylor) and SB 1931 (M. Garcia) , identical
measures from the last legislative session, both provided
6 separate adjustments to federal TI.

The resulting process

of computing the state tax is illustrated by Table 3 •
Again, the more adjustments, the greater the re-introduction of
complexity into the state income tax.

3.

Piggyback Conformity.

Here, the state tax becomes simply

a percentage of the federal income tax liability as determined
10

TABLE 3
TAXPAYER'S CALCULATION OF CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX
UNDER AB 3902/SB 1931

Federal Taxable Income

minus
add
Interest on U.S. Gov't Bonds
Other (i.e., previously taxed
income)

itemizers

l
Tax Tables
to
Determine Tax

...

minus
Credits

1

I

Test if Federal
Deduductions are
Less than Calif.
Standard Deduction.
If so, Deduct
Additional Amount.

l
California
Tax

State Income Tax
Deducted

I
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by the state (either
rate

schedul~

•

at a single fixed rate or a graduated

"Piggybacking" is the simplist approach from

the taxpayer's perspective, and is what most lay persons have
in mind when they refer to "conformity" to federal income
tax law.
If the state chose, it could still tack on credits to
give further tax reductions for various taxpayer attributes
or behavior, although the federal tax liability is already
net of exemptions and credits offered by federal law.
SCA 31 (Mills) was broad enough in drafting to include
this option, as well as the AGI or TI approaches.

ACA 42

(Naylor) also appeared to embrace this approach.

Practice In Other States
As noted above, the term "conformity" describes a wide
range of possible relationships between state and federal income
tax laws.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR)
considers states to be in some degree of conformance with federal
income tax laws if they refer by statute to the Internal Revenue
Code as a starting point for computing the state's income tax.
Table 4 classifies the 42 states (including District of
Columbia) which presently have a broad-based income tax according
to the extent to which they conform by reference to federal
income tax laws (as of October 1, 1978).

The table also shows

the level and significance of the income tax collections of these
states as a percentage of general revenues.
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TABLE 4

Current Federal Conformity Status and Income Tax Collections
States With Broad-Based Income Tax
1977-78 Income Tax Collections
Currenta
Percent of
Conformity to
Amount
General
Federal Law
(Millians) Rank
Revenues Rank
Alabama
ask a
zona
Arkansas
ifornia
Colorado
aware
District of Columbia
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
I 11 i noi s
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
ouisiana
ne
Mary1 and
Massachusetts
ichigan
innesota
ississippi
M ssouri
Montana
Nebraska
Jersey
New Mexico
York
Carolina
Dakota

318
145
223
203
4,632
375
190
220
643
227
138
1,594
538
490
241
390
192
103
884
1,433
1,696
1,075
158
439
124
173

No

$

TI

No
No
No
AGI
AGI
No
AGI
TI
TI

AGI
AGI
AGI
AGI
AGI
AGI
AGI
AGI
AGI
AGI
AGI
No
AGI
AGI
TAX
No

779

46
4,506
848
69

TI

AGI
No
TI

AGI

775

252
686
1,328

TI
TI

22
35
26
28
1
20
30

27
15
25
36
4
16
17
24
19
29
39
9
5
3

8
34
18
37
31
12
42
2
11
40
13
23
14

20%
26
17

22
31
31
42
26
29
30
33
28
22
35
23
21
10
20
37
43
32
39
14
25
37
46
23
6

41
33
22
19
19

35
24
39
31
17
16
5
22
19
18
13
21
30
11

28
33

41
34

10
4

14
7

40
25
9

2
27

42
6
12
29
38
37

59 .
1
gon
32
21
6
No
Pennsylvania
26
24
112
38
TAX
Rhode Island
23
351
26
21
No
Carolina
31
15
189
31
TI
ah
28
20
66
41
TAX
Vermont
8
37
875
10
Virginia
AGI
36
19
183
32
AGI
West Virginia
43
3
1,325
7
AGI
sconsin
Sources: Current conformity--Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR), Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1976-77
Edition; Income tax collections--U.S. Department of Commerce, State
Government Tax Collections in 1978.
cli'TI" signifies conformance at level of federal taxable income, 11 AGI" at level
federal adjusted gross income, and "TAX 11 at level of federal tax.
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California is one of 10 states which is not considered to
be in substantial conformance with federal income tax law.

Of the

remaining 32 states, 21 conform to federal AGI, eight conform to
federal TI, and only three (Nebraska, Rhode Island and Vermont)
base their state tax on a percentage of the federal tax
("piggyback") .

However, what Table 4 does not show, and which

is of great importance, is the number and magnitude of state
adjustments to federal AGI or TI.

•

For example, New York has some

30 adjustments, and at that level it could be argued that these
adjustments defeat the entire purpose of simplicity as advocated
by conformity proponents.
Further, during the past several years about one-third of the
32 states have "frozen" the federal law as of a specific date for
purposes.

Ten states* now "freeze" the federal law as of a

ific date and require legislative action for the adoption
new federal changes.

The "freezing" approach is not unlike

ifornia's "selective conformity" approach, in that new federal
changes are made subject to legislative review to determine their
impact on tax policy, tax shifts and state revenues.

Rationale for Automatic Conformity
The main organized push for automatic conformity has been
from the legal and accounting professions, which express dissatisfaction with the end product of the current "selective/piecemeal"
*Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North
Dakota, Oregon, Utah, and West Virginia. Also, Michigan and
Wisconsin allow their taxpayers to elect being taxed on the basis
of the federal law in effect for the current year or earlier law.
Alaska, which until 1975 based its tax as a percentage of the federal
tax, used the federal tax rates as of December 31, 1963. (Information
as of Fall, 1975 -- does not reflect subsequent law changes.)

14

conformity approach.

Their dissatisfaction may be summarized

as follows:
1.

The current approach does not result in total conformity,

and the differences between the two tax laws cause increased
complexity and compliance costs for taxpayers and tax
practioners.

Total conformity would allow the taxpayer,

at the extreme of piggybacking, to file an IBM card for a
state tax return.

Even at AGI or TI conformity, the state

return could be reduced to only 1 to 4 pages or so.
2.
~

Even when conformity is forthcoming, there is the time
between federal action and state reaction.

This is es-

pecially burdensome when it results in different cost bases
under state versus federal law, for depreciation or capital gains.
3.

Taxpayers pay more state taxes now than they would under

total conformity, because the federal law is far more lenient
in the aggregate than is current state law.
4.

The current extent of non-conformity requires separate

administrative procedures which entail greater administrative
time and expense for the state than would be the case under
total conformity.
In the abstract, these points would appear to advance a
good case for automatic conformity.

Why then, when the voters

had the opportunity to approve automatic conformity by constitutional amendment in 1966 and again in 1968, did they reject it
both times, and by a larger margin on the second occasion?*
*Proposition 14 of 1966 failed by a vote of 2,536,770 to 2,709,071
(48.4% - 51.6%) and Proposition 4 of 1968 went down by a margin of
2,881,249 - 3,190,542 (47.4% - 52.6%).
The ballot arguments and
text for each are included in Appendix I.
15

There were, in fact, a range of concerns raised in those
two campaigns, and if anything they are more valid today, as more
revenue is at stake.

These concerns are discussed generally

below and their varied application to the three different automatic conformity approaches is noted.

Increased Taxpayer Simplicity: A Matter of Degree
Simplicity is the cornerstone of the case for automatic
conformity.
A distinction must be made here, however.

No one is

suggesting that the federal law itself is simple.

Hardly.

Rather,

proponents of automatic conformity argue that simplification is
promoted by reduced paperwork and by having to learn only

~

tax law, rather than two, even if that one tax law is as complicated
as is the federal Internal Revenue Code.
Obviously, simplicitycould be promoted just as easily by
virtue of a state tax that conformed to federal gross income only,
with no further deductions, exclusions, exemptions or credits.

With

much lower rate structure this approach would allow, many taxpayers would still have lower taxes, although the taxes on upperincome individuals would be greatly increased.

Such a plan has

virtually no likelihood of passage, despite its ultimate simplicity,
because of a basic tenet of taxation: When forced to choose,
taxpayers don't want simple taxes; they want lower taxes.
Well then, to what extent will reduced paperwork and one tax
law simplify life for the average California taxpayer?
not very much, for the following reasons:

16

Probably

•

One-third of California returns were already of the
single page variety in the 1978 taxable year.

About

60 percent of all taxpayers take the standard deduction,
instead of itemizing.

The compliance effort required

of these taxpayers is minimal at present.

This is

especially the case since these taxpayers will have first
filled out their federal return, and must only transfer
previously-computed figures to the state return.
•

The only two differences in deductions affecting the bulk
of the 40 percent who do itemize are the deduction for
gas taxes allowed only by the state, and the deduction for
state income taxes allowed only by the feds.

Both of

these provisions are straight forward.
•

In addition,there is the difference of the zero-braket
amount and tax computation procedures, but these simply
involve additional arithmatic manipulation of the same
basic figures on the federal return; the present state
return actually involves fewer computations.

•

The more esoteric differences are contained in provisions
of law that generally affect relatively few taxpayers.
The "typical" taxpayer is not affected.

For example,

the percentages of returns involving the more complex
areas of income are:
trusts (1.0%), farms

partnerships (4.8%), estates and
(1.2%), rents and royalties (10.1%),

employee business expenses (8.3%), sick-pay (0.3%}, IRA s
(2.5%), capital gains and losses (10.8%), dividend
exclusion

(14.~/o}.
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•

The biggest complexities are in provisions that affect
primarily high-income taxpayers, who are already putting
up with the complexities of the federal law.

Wealthy

taxpayers are more savvy on tax matters, and have money
to hire accountants or tax attorneys to assist them.
These persons will continue to retain professional tax
assistance even under full conformity, in order to figure
out the federal law.
Some tax preparation savings may well accrue to
California taxpayers from conformity, but it will be
concentrated among those high income taxpayers whose
accounting involves elaborate tax preference items, not
the middle-income taxpayer who has his/her taxes done by
one of the large tax services largely as a matter of
convenience, because the same law will generally apply to
this latter group both before and after full conformity.
•

Whether professional tax preparers are used or not,
the taxpayer must assemble the same materials he/she
does at present for the federal return, even under
conformity.

In some cases alternate cost basis figures

can be dropped, which is certainly a relief to those
taxpayers involved, but again, this group of taxpayers
is quite limited in size.
•

To the extent adjustments are made to a TI or AGI conformity scheme, taxpayers may have the current, familiar

18

complexity, replaced by a different, unfamiliar
complexity.

This has been demonstrated every time the

state returns are modified to improve simplicity:
initially at least, many taxpayers get confused.

Further,

to the extent that the present credits present complexity,
neither the AGI or TI plans will reduce such complexity,
as both retain present credits.
•

The TI plan presents some element of confusion not
inherent in the AGI approach, because the federal 1040
form has no "taxable income" designation, whereas
"adjusted gross income" does appear on line 31.

"Taxable

income" does appear on line 3 of Schedule TC (Tax Computation)

1

but this schedule may be used by only certain

taxpayers (e.g. those with incomes in excess of the tax
table amounts)

1

thus leaving the others in limbo.

Table 5 below graphically illustrates

the comparative rankings

of all four conformity approaches in terms of simplicity.

(In this

and all subsequent such tables "High" rankings are deemed desired
characteristics; rankings are subjective, but do illustrate magnitude.)

TABLE 5
Approach Maximizes Taxpayer Simplicity to a ...
Low Degree
High Degree
Selective/Piecemeal
AGI
TI
Piggyback
19

The question raised by the next four sections is whether
the value of the degree ofsimplicityobtainable from automatic
conformity offsets the attendent drawbacks of such a procedure.

Loss of State Control Over Tax Policy
Often referred to as the "State Sovereignty" issue, the
concern raised is that the state is surrendering its control
over tax policy to the U.S. Congress and IRS.

It was this reason

that led the Post Commission to recommend against full piggybacking.
The significance of this factor of course depends on the extent
to which the income tax is considered to be an important state
policy tool--i.e., for purposes of stimulating certain activities,
subsidizing particular groups, or redistributing income--and not
just a source of revenue.
Adoption of conformity with the present

u.s.

Internal

Revenue Code would imply that all of the present features of the
federal income tax structure are desirable and equitable for
California's economy and its taxpayers.

This may not in fact be

true with respect to the present structure, because Congress does

•

not legislate with only California's unique interests in mind .
What is good for the nation is not necessarily good for
California on an individual basis.
Conformity would also centralize income tax decisionmaking in Washington D.C., and make it more difficult for the
individual California taxpayer to make his/her voice heard on
these matters.
There are a number of policy decisions that ordinarily go
into a state's determination of what should constitute
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taxable income.

Prof. Schwartz of UCLA Law School* cites four

such decisions:
•

"Pure tax logic", as described by Prof. Schwartz, is
illustrated by capital gains.

For various reasons,

long-term gains are accorded preferential tax treatment.
But while federal law provides that one year of ownership
of capital gain for special long-term treatment, California lawmakers have concluded that five years of
ownership should be required to merit full long-term
treatment.

Likewise, California has not adopted any

provisions relative to net operating loss carryover/backs,
asset depreciation range, and DISC, to name a few.
California's opportunity to render its own decisions on
pure tax matters of this sort would be eliminated if it
opted for complete conformity.
•

"Economic stimulus" or "macroeconomic planning" is best
and most frequently undertaken at the federal level.

But

a state's perspective on the control of the general
economy may well be different from that of the federal
perspective, and if that state accepts complete conformity,
it would be depriving (or limiting) itself of the
opportunity of influencing macroeconomic policy within its
own boundaries by way of many state income tax rules it
might otherwise enact or amend.
•

"Tax expenditure policy" will be subject to limitations.
Although the state is of course free to continue to

*See report in green pages, Appendix H
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enact credits, it no longer could make independent
determinations relative to deductions and non-taxability
of certain forms of income.
for credits.

There are even ramifications

For example, .both state and federal law

provide for a solar tax credit.

But suppose the state

wishes to require adjustment in basis for the amount of
credit taken, and that either a deduction or credit be
taken (but not both).

If federal law is to the contrary,

then California's opportunity to make up its own mind on
matters of this sort would be eliminated by a complete
conformity policy.
•

State law deviates from federal law for many "equity
considerations", relative to deductions and non-taxability
of income (e.g., the adoption deduction, military pay
exclusion, and non-taxability of unemployment compensat
A major equity item is indexing.

This is an area of non-

conformity where California law is far more equitable than
federal law.

California's opportunity to render equity

judgments of this sort would be expunged were it to
elect full conformity, especially under the "piggyback"
approach.
None of the automatic conformity proposals preclude the state
from enacting additional credits designed to promote taxpayer
equity or certain behavior in the marketplace.

As previously

noted, however, under a piggyback approach it wouldn't make sense
to re-enact credits comparable to existing federal provisions which

2/

are already embraced within the state's piggyback tax.

Table6

ranks the four proposals in terms of state control over tax
policy.
TABLE 6
Approach Maximiz
Selective/Piecemeal
AGI
TI
Piggyback

Significant Shifts in Tax Burden
It is unavoidable that under total conformity there will
be tax shifts, some of them substantial.

The severity of shift

can be mitigated by the approach to automatic conformity chosen,
as will be discussed later.

But whatever approach is taken,

many Californians will pay increased state taxes, even if the
majority pay less.
A number of tax shifts can ensue under total conformity,
chief among them:
•

A shift from higher-income taxpayers to lower-income
taxpayers.

This shift occurs because the state tax is

considerably more progressive than the federal tax for
most state taxpayers.
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•

A shift from single to married taxpayers.

This

is due to the "marriage penalty" which is imposed
federal law but not at the state level.
•

A shift from taxpayers claiming the standard deduction
to those itemizing deductions.

This shift occurs

the federal "zero bracket" is much larger

the

equivalent, the standard
•

A shift from taxpayers claiming more dependents to those
claiming fewer.

This shift results from

the $1,000 federal personal exemption for the state'
constant dependent tax credit ($9 in 1979).
It is important to note that these

fts are

piggyback approach, and most can be

al

eliminated by utilizing AGI or TI
However, whatever approach is used,

1

the greatest benefits to upper-income taxpayers.
Table 7 on the following page shows the e
effect of full conformity, by AGI c
I

s.

The bulk of

relief goes to taxpayers with an AGI in excess of $30,000
Whi

the average tax reduction is $159

tax return,

the 125,000 taxpayers with $100,000 AGI or
a tax savings of $3,336, and the
excess of $50,000 AGI is $1,243.

for all
By contrast, the aver-

age relief for all taxpayers under $20,000 AGI is only
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41.

TABLE 7
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
EFFECT OF CONFORMITY BY INCOME CLASS
1981 INCOME YEAR
(data in Millions)
Adjusted Gross
Income Class
At
But Less
Least
Than

$10,000
20,000
$10,000 20,000 30,000
30,000 - 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 and Over
Totals

Tax Model
Items

Non
Tax Model
Items

Net Revenue
Chan8e

$9
-68
-172
-379
-366
-383
-$1,359

-$10
-21
-9
-18
-24
-34
-$116

-$1
-89
-181
-397
-390
-417
-$1,475

*The Franchise Tax Board has constructed a "Tax Model"
which simulates impacts on state revenues and taxpayers
from given changes in the state tax laws. The FTB Tax
Model includes all major interactions between state and
federal· law except (1) net operating loss carryover/back,
(2} Subchapter S, (3) mutual fund dividend taxation, and
(4) elderly tax credits.
Source: Franchise Tax Board
Research & Statistics
10/3/80
Even within each AGI class, there are "winners" and
"losers".

Table 8A shows the tax impact by AGI class,

type of return and by net tax decrease versus net tax
increases, with respect to the tax model provisions only
(see footnote to Table 7).

In summary, 6,683,000 tax

returns will collectively realize $1.41 billion in tax
savings ($211 average decrease) and 2,583,000 tax returns
will pay an increase of $50.2 million ($19 average increase).
Table 8A assumes that under full conformity a deduction
will be allowed for the state income taxes paid.

However,

if such a deduction is not allowed, Table 8B shows the same
tax impact without the deduction.
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That table shows that

TABLE 8A
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
FULL CONFORMITY
(Deduction Allowed for State PIT)
Class
But Less
Than

Tax Decrease
No. of .
Amount of
Returns
Change
(

t

Tax Increase
No. of
Amount of
Returns
,; Change
h

o

u

s

a

n

d

s

)

Single Taxpayers and Married Filing Separate
,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
l'tO,OOO

50,000
- 100,000

2
735
1,257
486
123
38
42
12
2,696

517
404
44
3

$29
11,230
77,445
76,030
42,958
21,368
41,708
44,395
$315,163

*
*
*
*
968

$4,420
3,277
911
35
39
209
338
12

--

Joint Taxpayers and Surviving Spouse
,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
100,000
and Over

1
1
471
1,207
964
506
468
109
3, 727

26
294
646
88
9
2
4

$8
8

11,363
86,927
151,913
148,609
318,558
331,591
$1,048,976

052
5,556
13,501
2,399
517
158
1,518

1

1,070

Unmarried Head of Household
$5,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
- 100,000
and Over

0
0

0
0

82
121
36

$2,301
11,669
10,910
4,150
7,462
8 999

9
9
3

17
219
301
7

*
*
1
*
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$100
5,976
9,028
161
7

*

121
1

545

-All Taxpayers

,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
100,000
and Over
Totals

4
736
1,809
1,814
1,123
554
519
124
6,683

$38
11,237
91,110
174,626
205,781
174,127
367,728
384,985
$1,409,631

561

917
992

98
9
2
5
1

2,583

FTB R&S

than 500

26

,573
14,810
23,447
2,595
563

367
1,977
848

TABLE 8B
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
FULL CONFORMITY
(No Deduction for State PIT)
AGI Class
But Less
Than
~east

At

Tax Increase
No. of
fomount of
Returns
Change

Tax Decrease
No. of
Amount of
Returns
Change
(

t

h

o

u

s

a

n

d

s

Net Tax
Change

)

Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate
$5' 000
$5,000 - 10,000
10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 30,000
30,000 - 40,000
40,000 - 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
.00,
and Over
Totals

2

734
1,236
484
123
38
42
12
2,672

$29
11,225
74,339
58,945
24", 848
11,523
19,915
18,047
$218,871

518
405
61
4

*
*1
*
989

$4,421
3,303
1,065
66
57
236
374
37
$9,559

$4,391
-7,922
-73,274
-58,879
-24,791
-11,287
-19,541
-18,010
-$209,312

Joint Taxpayers and Surviving Spouse
$5,000
10,000
10,
20,000
20,
30,000
30,000 - 40,000
40,000 - 50,000
50
- 100,000
100
and Over
Toto.ls
-

1
1
463
1,178
959
506
467
109
3,684

$8
7

11,118
76,951
119,642
104,577
185,613
139,754
$637,670

$1,052
5,557
13,756
2,699
597
177
1,806
1,384
$27,028

$1,044
5,550
2,638
-74,251
-119,045
-104,400
-183,807
-138,370
-$610,642

17
219
306
7

$100
5,976
9,124
173

*
*
1
*

8

148
15
$15,545

$100
5,976
7,072
-8,743
-7,490
-2,320
-3,622
-3,448
-$12,473

$5,573
14,836
23,945
2,938
661
413
2,328
1,437
$52,132

$5,536
3,604
-63,564
-141,873
-151,326
-118,007
-206,970
-159,827
-$832,427

26
294
655
112
13
2

4
1
1,108

Unmarried Head of Household
-

$5,000
10,000
10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 30,000
30,000 - 40,000
40,000 - 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 and Over
Totals

0
0
77
120
36
9
9

3

253

0
0

$2,052
8,915
7,498
2,320
3, 770
3,463
$28,018

=

*

All Taxpayers
- $5,'000
$5,000 - 10,000
10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 30,000
30,000 - 40,000
40,000 - 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 and Over
Totals
than 500

4
735
1, 776
1,782
1,117
553
518
123
6,609

$37
11,232
87,509
144,810
151,988
118,420
209,298
161,264
$884,559
27

561
918
1,022
123
13
3
6

2

2,647

FTB R&S 10/3/80

while slightly fewer returns share $525 million less
net savings, slightly more persons pay $2 million more
in taxes.

The tax benefit from deducting state income

taxes is obviously centered on the higher-

tax-

payers.
Finally, there are varying degrees of tax savings
increases among the "winner" and "loser" categories.
Table 9 is based on aTax Model run made earlier this year on
AB 3209, and shows that while the bulk of taxpayers would
have little or no change under that bill (plus or minus $50)
thousands of taxpayers would have experienced tax cuts
or increases of up to $1,000 or more.
TABLE 9
Distribution of Absolute Change in Tax Liability
All Returns
Returns

Aggregate
Tax Change

Ave. Tax
Change

Total Increases

2,626,114

$27,012,244

$

$ +1000 or more

904

2,293,601

2,538

Number of

r--

I

10

Gl

+ 500 - 1000

1,143

918,339

803

Gl

+ 250 -

500

2,299

828,076

360

c

+ 100 -

250

5,021

754,606

150

~

+

50 -

100

20,161

1,312,452

65

+

0 -

50

2,596,586

20,905,170

- - - - - 4,386,898

0

Ill
Ill
Ill
~

0

H

Eo<

No Change

0 -

50

2,886,675

($14 ,540, 389}

50 -

100

173,194

12,542,806)

- 100 -

250

208,437

34,116, 553)

164)

- 250 -

500

70,929

24,750,036)

349)

500 - 1000

40,554

27 ,833,329) {

686)

-lOOOor more

20,092

53,826,411}

3,399,881

($167,609,524)

($

49)

10,412,893 ($140,597,280)

($

14)

$ -

><

Ill

Eo<

L

-

Total Decreases
GRAND TOTALS ,

ALL RETURNS
source:
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($

2 ,679)

~

_jE-<

FTB Tax Model. Tax change 2xcludes
effect of all non-TA:c EODEL
Based on ear
data avai

Based on the foregoing points, Table 10 illustrates the
approximate rankings of the 4 approaches in terms of inherent
tax shifts.
TABLE 10
Approach Minimizes Tax Shifts to a •.•
Low Degree

High Degree

Selective/Piecemeal
AGI
TI
Piggyback

State Budget and Revenue Instability
With state conformity to federal law, major federal law
changes could have a substantial impact on state income tax
revenues, especially if such changes v!ere enacted very late in the
year, thereby precluding offsetting state tax rate adjustments.
Concern about the lateness of federal action appears warranted:
two of the last three major tax revisions--the Tax Reform Act of
1976 and the Revenue Act of 1978--were enacted on October 4 and
October 14, respectively.

Both dates fall beyond the close of the

state legislative session.
The implications of such revenue disruptions depend on the
state's fiscal condition, i.e., whether or not a surplus of adequate proportions exists at the time to preclude the state falling
into a budget deficit situation, which is prohibited by the
California Constitution.
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States that have a large degree of conformity are
constantly faced with the prospect of raising their income tax
rate to compensate for the shrunken tax base resulting from the
federal action.
The most"celebrated 11 case is that of Oregon, which had adopted
automatic conformity in 1969 only to encounter immediate budgetary
problems when the federal Tax Reform Act of 1969 was enacted on
December 30, 1969.

The problems were solved by the Governor reducing

state expenditures and adjusting liquor prices to balance the
68-70 budget.

After drastically adjusting its 1971-73 budget

because of expected revenue reductions stemming from the '69 Act,
experienced a problem of even greater magnitude when the
federal Revenue Act of 1971 was enacted.

The Legislature was

led into special session to resolve the crisis which
culminated in reduced programs and increased cigarette taxes.
remaining deficit was overcome by modifying its automatic
conformity.
A more recent illustration is the experience of Utah
Nebraska, both of which were forced to increase tax rates in 1975
to cope with reduced collections due to federal changes.
Automatic conformity proponents have pointed to the fact that
over 30 states out of 42 income tax states have adopted a form
of conformity, and they have been able to cope with the budgetary
and fiscal problems.
to maintain

The primary reason these states have been

budget~ry

and fiscal stability in the past has

been because the federal law was relatively stable until 1968.
Since 1968, however, seven massive federal changes have occurred
at accelerated pace.
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Another reason some states have been able to cope with
these changes is that their tax rates can be easily changed.

In

Nebraska, for example, the Board of Equalization can recommend
rate changes within 30 days of any reform.
The task is not so easy in states where the Legislature must
vote on rate increases, which is both inconvenient and politically
difficult.

In California there are additional limitations

to recouping revenues lost via federal law changes, because any
increase in rates or decrease in credits under Proposition 13
requires a 2/3 legislative vote.
Further, the experiences of other states with automatic
conformity suggest that rate or other adjustments may be preceived
by taxpayers as tax increases, even though such rate changes are
intended only to avoid a state revenue loss.
Even timely rate adjustments may not fully offset the effect
of federal changes, as there is presently a very limited ability,
at the federal or state level, to estimate accurately the revenue
effects of major federal tax changes.

This is primarily due to

such factors as basic data limitations, the interaction of complex
tax provisions, and the unknown "secondary" economic and behavioral
effects of tax law changes.
Finally, there are significant administrative costs and limitations associated with late-year income tax rate changes.

For

example, the Franchise Tax Board typically completes the process
of designing and printing tax return forms well in advance of
mailing these forms in December.

Thus, changes near the end of

the year likely would involve substantial administrative duplication and delays.

In general, it is expected that state revenues from a tax
based on federal TI would tend to be less affected by federal
tax law changes that would piggyback revenues based on a f
percentage of the net federal tax.

This is because across-the-

board federal tax rate or credit revisions (neither of which af
the taxable income base) are used more often for economic policy
and stablization purposes than are specific changes in federal

•

deductions, exclusions and exemptions.

These latter changes

typically are intended to further tax equity and distributional
goals.
Table 11 shows an estimate by the Assembly Office of Research
rate

comparative revenue effects on the state under both a f
piggyback and TI conformity plan (no AGI estiamte was made)

1976 through 1978 federal acts:

PROJECTED 1980-81 CALIFORNIA
REVENUE EFFECT OF
FEDERAL LAW CHANGES
(in millions)

1 Act
Revenue Act of
1978 (P.L. 95-600)

Piggyback Conformity
% of
General Fund
Revenues
Amount

$-280

-1.5%

TI Conformity
Amount

$-375

% of
General
Revenues

•

9 9-

Tax Reduction and
Simplification
Act of 1977
(P.L. 95-30)

-530

-2.8

-260

-1.4

Tax Reform Act of
1976 (P.L. 94-455)

-525

-2.7

-130

-0.7

SOURCE:

0

Assembly Office of Research: An Analysis
of the Tax Burden and Revenue Effects of
California's Personal Income

However, the 1978 federal act--where the impact under TI
was greater than for piggyback--may represent a change in the
trend of recent years, as the 78 Act did place reliance on taxable
income changes to achieve economic stimulus.

Recent debate in

Congress has also included proposed massive cuts in capital gains
taxes, which under conformity would have a negative effect on state
revenues.

And the just-enacted Windfall Oil P

ts Tax Bill expanded

the dividend/interest exemption, which affects taxable income.
On this basis, Table 12ranks the four approaches for their
impact on revenue instability.

TABLE 12
Approach Minimizes Budget/Revenue I
Low Degree

lity to a ••.
High Degree

Selective/Piecemeal
AGI
TI
Piggyback

Revenue Loss To The State
Full conformity, in addition to bringing instability to the
state's budgetary process and revenue structure, necessarily
results in a net state revenue loss under the present state tax
structure.

This is due to the greater level of tax preferences

within the federal tax base.

This revenue loss will vary depending

on the approach to automatic conformity chosen.

If tax rates are

increased, however, the revenue loss could be reduced or offset
completely.
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However, as tax rates are increased the tax shifts
previously noted will be exacerbated.

Also, as rates go

many persons with initial net tax reductions will move
to tax increases.
The Franchise Tax Board estimates the state revenue
from full conformity (including deductibility of the
state tax against itself) of $1.475 billion.

•

This impact,

net of interaction, is shown in Table l3on the following page.
The total impact of conformity, including tax credit
and structural changes, is about $2.9 billion.

However, if

indexing were first totally eliminated and the brackets
led back to 1977 levels, there would be an offsetting
savings of $2.9 billion.

Although this appears to be a net

wash of revenues, at the higher tax rates

the revenue losses

be magnified, creating a new imbalance.

Further,

would be a large shift in tax burden from upper-income
middle-income taxpayers (see discussion of indexing on
s 168-175).
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TABLE 13
Tax Model Provisions
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Revenue Effect
(in millions)

Capital Gains Liberalized
Dividend/Interest Exclusion
$10,000 Preference Tax Exclusion
Military Exclusion Disallowed
State PIT Deductible
Personal/Dependent Credits to $1000
Exemption
Standard Deduction Increased
Charitable Contribution Limit Increased
Political Contribution Deduction
to Credit
Gas Tax Deduction Disallowed
Federal Income Averaging Used
Low Income Credit Disallowed
No Other Changes Made to Credits

-$204
77
20
+
4
- 582
- 429
- 110
25
12
29
26

+
+

•5

Total Tax Model Provisions
Inter action

-$1,451. 5
+
92.5

Net Tax Model Effect

-$1,359.0

Additional Provisions
1.
2.
3.
4.

20
20
50
23

Mutual Fund Dividends
Subchapter S
Net Operating Loss
Federal Age Exemption
Total Additional Provisions
Interaction

-$

113

Net Effect of Full Conformity

-$1,475

3

Source: Franchise Tax Board
10/6/80
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None of the 6 proposals heard by this committee in
1979-80 specifically proposed modifying state tax rates
to offset revenue losses from conformity.

Three measures

were too general in nature to cost out; the other 3
received cost estimates as shown in Table 14.

The Naylor

or M. Garcia measures stopped short of modifying tax
credits and the tax rate structure, so the loss was not as

•

great as shown previously in Table 13.
TABLE 14
Revenue Loss
(in millions}
Measure (Version)

1981~81

1980-81

1982~82

1983-84

(a)

AB 1445-Naylor
(3/29/79)

----------- undetermined -----------------

(b)

AB 3209-Naylor
(4/14/80)

$-350

$-420

n.a.

n a.

-350

-420

n.a.

n.a.

-340

$ -355

$ -410

(b)

SB 1931-M. Garcia
(6/25/80)
(c)

AB 3209-Naylor
(proposed revision)
(d)

ACA 42-Naylor
(3/29/79)

----------- undetermined -------------------

SCA 31-Mills
(1/23/80)

----------- undetermined -------------------

(d)

n.a.
(a)
(b)
{c)
(d)

Estimate not available
Piggyback approach--bill never contained a tax
rate (Appendix K )
Identical bills (Appendices M and o )
Appendix N
Authorized conformity generally--no specific
approach. Cost represents range of impact
from increased rate to fully offset cost to
maximum piggyback revenue loss (Appendices J
and K ) .
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Constitutional Question
Aside from the previous issues raised on the merits of
conformity, there is a procedural question that has lingered
since 1959. The question is whether automatic conformity
must be achieved via constitutional amendment, or may be enacted
by statute alone.

The question is yet to be resolved.

On October 19, 1959, the Office of Legislative Counsel
issued an opinion to the effect that automatic conformity of the
California law to future federal law would be an unconstitutional
delegation of the state's legislative power to Congress.

And

this last September 30, an updated opinion was requested, and the
conclusion was the same--prospective conformity requires a
constitutional amendment.

(See Appendices F and G , respectively.)

A countervailing opinion is held by Prof. Gary T. Schwartz
of the UCLA Law School, who argues in a recent 70 page analysis
(Appendix H) that there is "very good reason to believe that an
open-ended conformity statute would be held constitutional by
the California Supreme Court", based on a review of case law, much
of it since the 1959 Counsel's opinion.

He states that whatever

doubt still exists, however, would be cured by an appropriate
amendment to the state constitution.

Schwartz and Counsel do

agree that conformity to federal law at a given point in time
can be enacted statutorily.
All of the measures considered by this Committee in the 1979-80
session were, or were linked to, constitutional amendments.

Federal Collection Option
A final issue of conformity to be examined is that of
37

TABLE 15

Federal-State Collection Act of 1972
(Internal Revenue Code Sections 6361-6365)
Required and Permitted Adjustments
State Tax Based on Percentage of Federal Tax
Required adjustment:
1.

Subtract tax due to interest on U.S. Government obligations.

Permitted adjustments:
1.

2.
3.

Add tax due to any interest on state or local obligations which
subject to the state inco~e tax.

~currently

Add tax due to state income tax deductions.
Add tax due to state or local sales tax deductions, if a credit
for such taxes (see below).

~a1lov1ed

4.

Subtract credits for taxes paid to other states.

5.

Subtract credits for state or local sales taxes.

State Tax Based on Federal Taxable Income
Required adjustments:
1.

Subtract interest on U.S. Government obligations.

2.

Add state income tax deductions.

3.

Add interest on state or local obligatio~s which currently
is subject to the state income tax.

4.

Add state or local sales tax deductions, if a credit is allowed
for such taxes (see below).

Permitted adjustments:
1.

Add an additional tax on federal tax preference items (items
subject to the "minimum tax").

2.

Subtract a credit for taxes paid to other states.

3.

Subtract a credit for state or local sales taxes.

38

federal collection of California's income tax.
Under Title II of Public Law 92-512, the Federal-State
Collection Act of 1972 (Internal Revenue Code Sections 6361-6365) ,*
the federal government will administer and collect a state 1 s income
tax at no charge, if the state tax laws meet certain requirements
and if the state so elects.

In general, to qualify for federal

collection a state's income tax must be either (1) based on a
flat percentage of the federal tax, or (2) based on federal taxable
income.

Under each of these options, there is a limited number

of required and permitted adjustments.

Tablel5 summarizes these

adjustments.
The Act can become operative only if at least two states
residents who in the aggregate filed 5 percent or more of
federal income tax returns filed during 1972 apply for
federal collection.

As yet,no state has applied for federal

collection under the Act.
Based on a 1980 survey by the Assembly Office of Research,
to which 36 of the 42 income tax states replied, only 6 commented
that they had "seriously" considered federal collection, and all
expressed various reservations, along the lines of the issues
previously discussed in this report.

The results of that survey

are summarized in Table 16 .

Conclusion
One cannot easily conclude that increased conformity is not
a worthy goal.

But one can conclude that there are major drawbacks,

of varying significance, to the three basic approaches to automatic

*

See Append1x P (tan pages)
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TABLE 16

State Survey Results
Federal Collection of State Income Taxes

Serious Con- Major Concerns With Federal Collection
sideration or
Loss
Constiof Tax
Tax
tutional
Discussion
of Federal
Revenue
Policy Burden Change
Disruptions Control Shifts Required
Collection

zona
ansas
California
aware
District of Columbia
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
llinois
iana

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
XI
X
X
X

b

X
X

X

X

ne
and
sachusetts
i nnesota
Mississippi
ana
Nebraska
Jersey
Mexico
York
h Carolina
Dakota

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

Vermont
Virginia
Virginia
sconsin
Total
(Percent of Total)
Respondents

X
X
X
X

6

(17%)

xa

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X
29
(81%)

X
X
33
(92%)

X

xa
xa
X

X
X

gon
Rhode Island
South Carolina

xa
xa
xa
xa
X
xa
X

X
X
X

X

xa

X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X
13
(36%)

xa
23
(64%)

robable constitutional change required.
nown.
Source: Assemb
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Office of Research

conformity.

Whether these drawbacks collectively outweigh the

advantages of simplicity must be judged by the Legislature.
Table 17summarizes the rankings of the four conformity
approaches on the five issues raised--simplicity, state
sovereignty, tax shifts, revenue instability, and revenue loss.
The Legislature has the option to adopt any one of the
automatic conformity approaches, with or without adjustments.
If adjustments

~made,

the Legislature must judge whether the

hybrid result is more or less complex then our present system.
If automatic conformity is to be tried, a constitutional
amendment appears desirable to reduce legal doubt.

It would

appropriate to defer action on federal collection until
some experience with full automatic conformity is gained.
The selective/piecemeal conformity system utilized at
present could be enhanced somewhat in three ways.

First, the

Conformity Task Force could be elevated to formal status by
Assembly Resolution, and permanent members designated.

Membership

could be expanded to include tax professionals, as well as
state and legislative staff, but the members should be technicians,
well versed in tax policy and administration.
Second, a statute could be enacted requiring introduction
all federal income tax changes for which there are comparable
state codes, immediately following their enactment by Congress.
Such "conformity bills" would be similar to the local government
claims bills under SB 90.

They could be introduced initially

by the Revenue and Taxation Committee chairmen of both houses.

They

could then be reviewed first by the task force, then the Rev. & Tax
Committees.

Subsequent enactment would be up to the Legislature.
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This procedure would help reduce "lag time", and in conjunction
with the Task Force would ensure a forum for each federal law
change.
Third, where both state and federal law are comparable,
regulations of the Franchise Tax Board could be required to be
comparable to IRS regulations.
case, it is not always so.

Although this is generally the

Appendix Q gives an example of

such regulatory non-conformity, involving employer reporting of
excess withholding exemptions claimed by employees
pages).

I
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(buff-colored

TABLE 17
COMPARISON OF FOUR CONFORMITY APPROACHES

e

SELECTIVE/PIECEMEAL

RANKING*
Low

Maximizes Taxpayer Simplicity
Maximizes State Tax Policy
Control
Minimizes Tax Shifts
Minimizes Budget/Revenue
Instability
tt

AGI CONFORMITY
Maximizes Taxpayer Simplicity
Maximizes State Tax Policy
control
Minimizes Tax Shifts
Minimizes Budget/Revenue
Instability

II

TI CONFORMITY
Maximizes Taxpayer Simplicity
Maximizes State Tax Policy
control
Minimizes Tax Shifts
Minimizes Budget/Revenue
Instability

11

PIGGYBACK CONFORMITY
Maximizes Taxpayer Simplicity
Maximizes State Tax Policy
control
Minimizes Tax Shifts
Minimizes Budget/Revenue
Instability

*As with preceding Tables 5,6,9 and 11, these rankings
are quite subjective, and are intended only to convey
an order of magnitude.
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APPENDIX A
Laws

Provision

I

State Law

Federal Law

1979 Returns Affected
Number
I % of Total

1981 Revenue
Effect of Conformity (in millions)

California
R&TC Sections

Federal IRC
Sections

Gross Income Exclu-~
sions and Ad'ustments
Dividends

Excludes up to$100 on single Has no comparable provisions; 1.5 million
treats such income as ordinary
return and $200 on joint
return allows certain mutual income.
fund d vidends to be treated
as cap tal gains.

Military Pay

No general exclusion, but
special exclusions.

Government Bond
Interest Income

som~Generally

Exempts interest on obligations of any state or local
government.

,.!:::>.
,.!:::>.

16%

120,000
excludes up to
$1,000 of al~. military compensation; for reservists and
retirees, exclusion is phased
out between $15,000 and
$17,000 AGI.

1%

I 10%
Allows deduction of 60 percen1Allows deduction of 50 percent 1 million
of excess net long-term gains of net long-term gains (5
(1 year or more) over net
years or more) and 35 percent
short-term gains;capital loss of net medium term gains
1
ideductions are limited to
(1-5 years) ;capital loss
j$3,000 in any one year.
deductions are limited to
$1,000 in any one year.
Gain on Sale of
-unkno;mProvides taxpayers 55 and
Provides all taxpayers a once
Personal Residence older a once-in-a-l~fet~me
in-a-lifetriiie $100,000 exclu1
sion of the gain on the sale
~000 exclusion of the
gain on the sale of a perof a personal residence (for
sonal residence.
taxpayers 65 and older,
this is in lieu of an exclusion of the first $35,000 of 1
such sale).

Capital Gains and
Losses

Mutual Fund
Dividends

Allows certain mutual fund
dividends to be treated as
capital gains.

Unemployment compensation

Includes as taxable income up ,Exempts all unemployment
to 100 percent of unemploycompensation from taxation.
ment compensation received
by taxpayers with AGI above
$20,000 ($25,000 on a joint
return).

'trreats such dividends as
ordinary income.

-unknown-

!
300,000

+3.6

17146-17146.8
112,113,122,
217,692,3401 (a)
(1)

-unknown-

Exempts interest on U.S.
Government and California
state and local obligations;
taxes interest on obligations
of other states and nonCalifornia local governments.

116

$-77

13%
I

i

Unknown loss

-204

-minor gain

103

17137

1202, 1211,
1223

18152,
18162.5

121

17155

Ii
I

II
I

... 20

+5

852

85

l

17071

-

AJnortization of
Alternative
Energy Equipment

Lann Clearing
Expense Associated
With Farming

comparable

of clearing land may be
sed in year cost is
incurred, rather than capitalizing cost.

Allows
amortization of cogeneration or
alternate en
and 36 month
solar or energy conservation
devices
No comparable provision

17:208,17208
11:226

unknown, probably
minor

-minor cash flow
loss-

182

'

•
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APPENDIX A (cont.)
1981 Revenue

Provision

1

Federal Law

·I

State Law

I

1979 Returns Affected

N\llllber

%

of Total

Deductions From
Adjusted Gross
Income
Personal and Depen-~Allows deduction of $1,000
dent Exemptions
per family member.

Allows personal exemption
I 9.5 million
credit of $27 ($54 on a joint
return) and dependent exemption ~of $9. Indexed.

Blind Exemption

Allows additional $1,000
exemption for blindness.

Allows additional $9 credit
for blindness. Index~

Old-Age Exemption

Allows additional $1,000
exemption for taxpayers 65
or older.

Allows no additional credit
or exemption for old age.

I

8,000
700,000

Standard Deduction !Incorporates "zero bracket"
'Provides a standard deduction I 5.7 million
in tax rate schedule: $2,300 of $1,100 for single and
for single1 $3,400 for joint. $2,200 for joint. Indexed.

100%

Effect of ConferFederal IRC
(in millions) ·I Sections

I mity

}

151-153

Under 1/10
of 1%
7%

-23

I

151

I 63

37%

-25

170

Political Contribu-,Permits no deduction for
Allows a deduction for politi-1 160,000
tions
politicar-contributions;
cal contributions of up to
allows a credit equal to 50
$100 ($200 on a joint return).
~
!percent or-such contributions
~
up to $50 ($100 on a joint
return).

2%

-12

41

State and Local
Gasoline Taxes

No such deduction.

39%

+30

Contributions to
Self-Employed Retir·
ment Plans ("H.R.
10" or "Keogh"
plan)

Allows self-employed person 'Allows self-employed person t 110,000
- to make deductible contri- make deductible contributions
butions to a qualified retire-to a qualified retirement plan
ment plan of at least $750
'of up to the lesser of 10
(if income exceeds $1,500) up percent of earned income or
to the lesser of 15 percent
$2,500.
of earned income or $7,500.

1%

-15

Allows a deduction for state
gasoline taxes.

3.5 million

3.7 million

17054

151

-no

I

Californi~

17171

17214 17216.2

I

17234

17204
401

1

_R~l'~-~e<;:j:~

,_.,

60%

Charitable Contri- !Limits most charitable contriiLimits charitable contribubutions
butions to 50 percent of AGI. tions to 20 percent of AGI.

!

17524

A
Provision
Adoption Expenses

Expense to Repair/
Remodel Premises
for Handicapped

•)

4

Federal Law
No such deduction.

State Law .
Tax payers adopting a child
may deduct expenses incurred
in process of adoption,
limited to 3% of AGI up to
$1000.

Allows $25,000 max. deduction
for repair/remodel costs to
buildings to permit easier
access to handicapped or
elderly. Limited to business
related expenses; does not
apply to residences.

State Income Taxes !Allows deduction for state
income taxes.

1979 Returns Affected
Number
\ of Tota+
4,200
I Under l/20
of 1%

-unknown-

Allows $25,000 max. deductio
for repair/remodel costs to
building or vehicle to permit
easier access to handicapped
or elderly. Applies both to
individuals and businesses.

Allows no deduction for
I 4 million
California state income taxes;
allows credit for other
states•-rncome taxes.

1981

+0. 25

17238

42%

-582

164

750,0001 million

8-10%

-180

43

730,000

8%

18001,18002

5~i~~l
Personal, Dependent
and Blind Exemption
Credits
Earned Income
Credit

.t::>
-1

Low-Income Credit

(See Deductions

fr~m

Adjusted Gross Income)

Allows a refundable credit
Has no provision allowing an
equal to 10 percent of earned earnea income credit.
(See
income. Credit may not exceed Low-Income Credit)
$500, is phased out between
$6,000 and $10,000 of AGI and
is available only to joint
taxpayers, heads-of-household
and surviving spouses claiming one or more dependent
exemptions.
Has no provision allowing a
credit to all low~income
taxpayers.----

Allows a nonrefundable credit
of $44 ($88 o~ joint returns)
which has the effect of eliminating the entire tax liability for taxpayers below
$5,000 AGI ($10,000 joint);
the credit is rapidly phased
out above $5,000 AGI
($10,000 joint).

.+0. 5

17069

.,
APPENDIX A (cont.)
Provision

Political Contributions Credit

L_

Feder11l Law

5.
State Law

1979 Returns Affected
Number
\ of Total

Allows credit equal to 20
percent of employment-related
child-care expenses. Maximum
credit is $800, with no AGI
limit.

Allows tax credit equal to 3
percent of employ~nt-related
child-care expenses; credit
may not exceed $120 and is
phased out between $15,000
and $20,000 AGI.

90,000

1%

Renter's Credit

Has no provisions allowing
a renters' credit.

Allows a refundable credit
for qualified renters of $60
($137 on joint returns).

3. 9 million

41%

Credit for Taxes
Paid Other States

Allows deduction for all
state and local taxes.

Allows credit for taxes paid
other states (see Deductions
From Adjusted Gross Income).

27,000

Under 1%

Employment Credits

Allows employers tax credits
of up to $3,000 per employee
for wages paid under the Work
Incentive (WIN) program and
to certain target groups
(e.g., handicapped, welfare
recipients, Vietnam veterans)

Allows employers a tax credit
of up to $300 per employee
for wages paid to welfare
recipients.

Allows credit of 15 percent
of a specified income base,
disregarding community
property rules.

Allows a 15 percent credit ofi 35,800
a specified income base.
Community property rules
observed.

(X)

Elderly Credit

California
R&TC Sections·

(See Deductions fromiAdjusted Gross Income)

Child Care Credit

·"""

1981 Revenue
Effect of ConferFederal IRC
mity (in millions) .1 Sections

-unknown, probably
minor-

Under 4/10
of 1%

$-75

44A

17052.6

17053.5

+420

-Unknown-

164

18001,18002

-tens of millions-

51-53

17(}53. 7

-loss of few
milli?n-

37

17052.9

APPENDIX A (cont.)

6.
1979 Returns Affected
Number
I \ of Total
State Law
Residential! CreolE of 55\,
25,000
3/10 of
not to exceed $3,000 for solai
1%
and wind systems. Swimming
pools phased down 10% per
year to 25% level. Noh-residential: 25% credit with no
upper limit. Federal credit
must be subtracted from state
claim.

Provision
Solar and Alternative Energy Credit

Federal Law
Residential:Credit of 40%,
not to exceed $4,000 for sola
geothermal and wind systems.
Business: 10-15% energy investment credit for solar,
geothermal,wind,ocean thermal
hydro-electric,and biomass,
not to exceed $25,000 plus
% of tax liability above.

Energy
Credit

Residential: Credit of 40%,
not to exceed $300 for energy not to exceed $1,500 for
conservation expenditures.
energy conservation expendiBusiness: No credit.
tures. Non-residential: 25%
credit with no upper limit.

240,000

Allows farmers to deduct as
current year operating
expenses certain expenditures
for water conservation equipment.

Allows a credit of up to $500
($1,000 on joint returns) for
cost of irrigation equipment
which conserves water.

300

Allows income averaging (and
reduced tax rates) if income
is at least $3,000 higher
than 120 percent of base
period income.

Allows income averaging (and
reduced tax rates) if income
is at least $3,000 higher
than 133-1/3 percent of baseperiod income.

290,000

Provides for a supplementary
tax of 10 percent to 25 percent of certain tax preferenc
items (accelerated depreciation, depletion, excluded
capital gains, excess itemize
deductions,etc.); tax applies
only to total amount of such
items exceeding higher of
$10,000 or other specified
amounts.

Provides for a graduated tax
70,000
of 1/2 percent to 5-1/2 percent on tax preference items
(some differences from
federal); tax applies only
to total amount of such item~
exceeding net business losses
plus deduction of $4,000
($8,000 joint).

t.ion Residential: Credit of 15%,

Irrigation
Equipment

[other

2.5%

1981 Revenue
Effect of Conformity (in millions)
-10

-25

.-minor loss-

Federal IRC
Sections
44C, 46

California
R&TC Sections·
17052.5
23601

44C

17052.8
23601.5

175

17052.7

1301-1305

18241-18246

56-58

1706217064.7

Pro~S]

Income Averaging
.!»
1.0

Minimum Tax on
Preference Income

3%

-26

1%

.-20 (offset only;
full conformity
impact is unknown)

7.

APPENDIX A (cont.)
Provision
I Federal Law
['!:'ax Rate Schedulesjl

·I State Law

1981 Revenue
jr:ffect of Ccmforof Total mity {in millions)

1979 Returns Affected

Nurnber

I

%

Zero Bracket

9. 5 million
Incorporates "zero bracket'' 1Provides no "zero bracket";
($2,300 single, $3,400 joint) standard aeduction ($1,100
in schedule; thus, zero brae- single, $2,200 joint), or
ket amount is included in tax full amount of itemized deducable income both for taxpayer tions, is subtracted from
claiming "standard" deduction taxable income before it is
and taxpayers itemizing
applied to schedule
116Xcess" deductions.

100%

Range of Marginal
Tax Rates

Imposes minimum marginal rate !Imposes minimum marginal rate
of 14 percent; maximum rate
of l percent; maximum of 11
of 70 percent. Tax tables
percent. Tax tables provided.
provided.

9. 5 million

I 100%

Maximum Tax on
Earned Income

Limits tax on "personal ser- Has no provision limiting tax
vice income" (primarily wages on earned income.
salaries and professional
fees) to 50 percent, rather
than maximum federal marginal
rate of 70 percent.

-unknown, probably
minot-

·Taxable Income
Brackets:
Single
lJl

0

Appli•• minimum r•t• b•low

1Appli•• minimum r•t• bolow

1 3.9

iJ
-UnknownComparison is
meaningless,
e.g. state tax
rates will not
be increased
to 70%.

Federal IRC
Sections

f

I

California
R&TC Sections·

63

-

1,3

17041,
17048

1348

million

I 41%

49%

1

17041

2%

1

17041

$3,400, maximum above $108,30 $2,240, maximum above
sixteen brackets vary in
$17,430; eleven brackets
width from $1,000 to $26,500. vary in width fcom $1,690 to
$2,240.

Joint

Applies minimum rate below
1Avoids federal "marriage
$5,500, maximum above $215,40 penalty" by allowing income
fifteen brackets vary in
splitting; i.e, provides
width from $2,100 to $53,000. brackets for joint which are
twice the size of those for
single.

4. 7 million

Separate

Prevents circumvention of
Allows separate filers to use
"marriage penalty" by requir- same rate schedule as single
ing separate filers to use
taxpayers.
brackets which are one-half
the size of those applicable
to joint returns.

150,000

I i

I 1

I

17041

I
l

APPENDIX A. (cont.)
Provision
Head-of-House
hOJ.u

Indexing

U1

I-'

Federal Law

State Law

Applies minimum rate below
$2,300 (same as single), maxi
mum above $161,3001 fifteen
brackets vary in width from
$2,100 to $53,0oo· (same as
joint).

Applies m1n1mum rate
$4,500 maximum above
!eleven brackets vary
~idth from $1,690 to

Provides no automatic inflationary adJustment of rate
schedules, exemptions,
deductions or credits.

Provides automatic annual
I 9. 5 million
inflationary adjustments. For
1978 and 1979, rate schedule
'brackets are increased by per,centage change in California
Consumer Price Index(CCPI)
above 3 percent. For 1980 and
1981 brackets are increased by
full change in CCPI. For 1982
and thereafter brackets index
ing goes back to CCPI in
excess of 3%. For 1978 and
thereafter, the standard deduction and personal dependen~,
blind, and low-income credits
are increased by full change
in CCPI each year-.---

below
$20,240;
in

790,000

8.

1981 Revenue

1979 Returns Affected
Number
% of Total

Effect of Confermity (in millions)

Federal IRC

California
R&TC Sections·

I Sections

8%

1,2

17041 17043

$4,500.

100%

I .$+2

*

I

900

I -

I

I

I

I

I

I

*See
Indexing
Discussion
pages 168175.

I

i
I

I

17041

II
I

I

APPENDIX B
ANALYSES OF INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS
WHERE CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL INCOME
TAX LAW DIFFER
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INTEREST AND DIVIDEND EXCLUSION

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Federal law allows a limited exclusion for interest and
dividends. California law contains no such
sions although some
interest is exempt from taxation.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY

•

Full conformity to the federal provisions would result in a
revenue loss of $77 million for 1981.
For tax effect by income class and type of return, see tablel8
on page 56.
FEDERAL LAW
The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-223)
provided that gross income of an individual does not include dividends from a domestic corporation or interest. The aggregate amount
which may be excluded for any taxable year may not exceed $200 ($400
in the case of a married couple filing a joint return~ Formerly
only $100 ($200 for married) of dividend income was exempt.
CALIFORNIA LAW
Existing California law taxes dividends and most interest in
full.
Interest on the following obligations is exempt from
California tax:
1. Bonds and other obligations of the United States, the
District of Columbia, territories of the United States, and Puerto Rico.
(Interest on Phillipine Islands' obligations issued on or after
March 24, 1934, is not exempt.)
2. Bonds (not including other obligations) of the State of
California or of political subdivisions thereof, issued after
November 4, 1902.
Interest on bonds issued by a territorial government
(e.g., Alaska or Hawaii) continues to be exempt after the territory
becomes a state.

53

POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1. Rationale for Federal Law - The dividend exclusion
provision was orig~nally enacted ~nto law to somewhat mitigate the
so-called double taxation of dividends, i.e., first at the corporate
level as earnings and again at the shareholder level when declared.
The committee reports on P.L. 96-223 do not reveal the reason for
addition of the interest exclusion to the law but the reason
usually given by writers on the subject is to encourage saving.
2.
Rationale for California Law - The smaller state tax
rate makes the exclusion of income from taxation a much less imperative matter than at the federal level.
In addition, as noted above,
conformity would be a costly matter.
3. Equity Considerations - An exclusion from gross income
provides the greatest benefit to taxpayers in the highest income
bracket. For example, a $400 exclusion saves a taxpayer in the
11 percent bracket $44, while the same exclusion only means $16 to
a taxpayer in the 4 percent bracket.
4.
"Small Saver'' Incentive - While this provision has
been billed as a tax incentive for "small savers," an analysis
of the impact of the federal provision in Tax Notes (1/7/80)
concluded just the contrary:
" ... Currently approximately 95% of interest and
dividends are earned by taxpayers whose interest
and dividend income exceed the exclusion's
dollar limit ... Moreover, because the measure
is structured as a deduction rather than a
credit, it provides more incentive for those in
the upper tax brackets--just those people who
are already likely to exceed the $200 limit-and virtually no incentive for the "small savers"
in the lower brackets."
5.
Other Savings Incentives - A recently enacted federal
law allows gradual phasing out over the next six years of the
ceilings on interest rates which banks and savings and loans
may pay on savings accounts.
This may be a more effective
savings incentive than the interest and dividend exclusion.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
1. AB 181 (Young), 1979 - Would permit, under specified
conditions, an individual to create a tax-exempt savings account.
Died in Senate Finance.
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2. AB 1124 (Bane), 1979 - Provides for a $100 state income
tax exclusion ($200, for married taxpayers filing jointly) from gross
income for interest from a savings account.
Failed passage in
Assembly Revenue and Taxation.
3.

AB 2039 (Bane), 1980 - Same as AB 1124.

4.
A.H 20..74 Cb.Bo;own.L, 1980 - Provides for the exclusion of
up to $201 received by a single taxpayer C$400 for :rn.a.rried persons
filing jointly, heads of households and surviving spouses} earned
as interest from savings accounts or time deposits. Failed passage
in Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee.
5.
AB 2542 (Robinson), 1980 - Same as AB 2074.
passage in Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee.
6.
SB 1399 (Keene), 1980 - Same as AB 2074.
Assembly Ways and Means Committee.
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Failed

Died in

TABLE 18

FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
Dividend and Interest Exclusion
AGI Class
But Less
At Least
Than

Tax Decrease
No. of Returns

Amount of Tax Decrease

Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

$6,377
1,526,439
5 '138,511
4,926,660
1,962,068
739,372
843,809
244,607
$15,387,843

4,488
349,435
601,405
341,438
105 '727
37,050
40,315
11,459
1,491,317

Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

$6,141
12,944
4,122,366
9,951,194
13,521,878
11,246,201
15,836,158
4,535,541
$59,232,423

2, 716

5,259
496,078
829,010
757,901
443,309
441,814
107,542
3,083,631

Unmarried Head of Household
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

$236
236
577,220
683,932
409,565
173,216
165,690
54,230
$2,064,325

236
236
106,200
64,504
25,557
8,927
8,238
2,522
216,421
All Taxpayers

$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

7,440
354,931
1,203,683
1,234,953
889,185
489,286
490,367
121,526
4,791,368
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FTB/R&S

7/18/80

$12,755
$1,539,619
9,838,097
15,561,786
15,893,511
12,158,789
16,845,657
4,834,378
$76,684,591

MILITARY PAY EXCLUSION
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
State law excludes from taxable income up to $1,000 of
military active duty pay and retirement compensation.
Federal law provides no comparable general exclusion,
but does allow various specific military income exclusions
(e.g., combat-related pay and mustering-out payments), to
which California substantially conforms.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY

•

Repeal of California's general military pay exclusion
would increase state revenues by an estimated $3.6 million for
the 1981 tax year.
For tax impact by income class and type of return, see
table on page60. As shown in this table, elimination of the
military pay exclusion would increase state income taxes for
about 100,000 recipients of military income. The average
increase for these taxpayers would be approximately $35 per
year.
FEDERAL LAW
Federal law exempts from taxation mustering out pay,
pay for duty in specified combat zones, pay received while
hospitalized as a result of combat duty, terminal leave pay
and specified G.I. educational benefits.
CALIFORNIA LAW
California substantially conforms to the specific
federal military income exclusions listed above. In addition,
the state provides a general military pay exclusion of up to
$1,000, as follows:
1) Military personnel on extended active duty (90 days
or more) may exclude a maximum of $1,000 in salary, wages,
bonuses, allowances and other compensation. This $1,000
maximum exclusion is available to all enlisted personnel,
regardless of the level of their total income.
2) Military retirees and reservists are also entitled
to exclude compensation of up to $1,000, but this maximum
exclusion is reduced by 50 cents for each dollar of total
adjusted gross income in excess of $15,000. The effect of
this phase-out formula is to eliminate the exclusion entirely
for retirees and reservists whose total incomes exceed
$17,000.
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POLICY
enacted in 1952, the maxiapplied only to personnel on
the exclusion was broadened to
ect to
income-related
it is assumed that active
, do not have sub~-r-e_s_o~u-r~c~es than Californians
tenets of tax
ity offer no obvious
exclusion of regular military
so is not clear that the
to further broad social or economic
state and federal exemptions allowed
of military income (e.g., for combatother hand, are assumed to reflect
ive concern for the unusual
military personnel.
Repeal of the military
in substantial tax
As indicated above, the
increase would be about $35. Based on the
inal tax rate of 11 percent, the largest
would
$ 0 per year. Because the $1,000
not been revised since the exclusion was
in 1952, its "real" value (in terms of the
prov
by the dollar tax savings to
fallen dramatically over the years. Based on
inflationary price changes over the past 28
years,
current $1,000 ceiling would have to be raised to
over $3,000 to restore its original value.
e

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
1.
exclus
compensation
reservists.

Replaced the flat $1,000
percent exclusion of all military
removed income restrictions for retirees and
in Assern. Rev. and Tax.

2. SB 1393 (Robbins), 1980.
Increased the exclusion
it to $5,000 for retirees only. Failed in Sen. Rev. and
Tax.
1

3.
SB 171 (Campbell), 1979.
Removed the $1,000
exclusion limit and all income restrictions for retirees and
reservists.
Failed in Sen. Rev. and Tax.
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4. AB 2852 (Kapiloff), 1978.
Increased the exclusion
limit to $5,000 for retirees and reservists only.
From
Assem. Ways and Means without further consideration.
5. AB 2937 (Lewis}, 1978. With respect to retirees
only:
increased the exclusion limit to $9,000, raised the AGI
phase-out limit to $25,000, restricted the exclusion to those
age 60 and over, and eliminated the AGI limit entirely for
those age 62 and over.
From Assern. Rev. and Tax. without
further consideration.
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TABLE 19

FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
Military Exclusion
AGI Class
But Less
At Least
Than

Tax Increase
No. of Returns

Amount of Tax Increase

Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate
$5,000
,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

835
22,144
11,451
3,281
29
29

$14,100
629,149
602,895
191,209
3,238
147

0
0

0
0

37,769

$1,440,738

Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse
$1,299
4,467
981,402
649,063
279,952
136,503
92,351
2,711
$2,147,750

236
565
37,126
18,503
5,612
1, 972
988
37
65,038

$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

Unmarried Head of Household
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

$0
8,188
25,349
3,503

0
417
775
59
0
0
0
0
1,251

0
0
0
0

$37,040
All Taxpayers

1,071
23,126
49,352
21,843
5,641
2,001
988
37
104,059

$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

FTB/R&S
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$15,399
641,804
1,609,646
843,775
283,190
136,650
92' 351
2,711
$3,625,528

GOVERNMENT BOND INTEREST INCOME
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Except for the exemption for interest on California
State and local government bonds, California law and federal
law are basically incompatible with respect to interest
income from government bonds. The major differences between
the two laws are as follows:

•

1. The federal government exempts .interest income
from bonds issued by all states and their political subdivisions.
In California~he income from bonds issued by other
states (other than California) and their political subdivisions
is taxable.
(Interest on bonds issued by District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico and U.S. territories is tax exempt at both state
and federal level.)

2.
Interest on "arbitrage bonds" issued after
October 9, 1969, is taxable by the federal government. Interest on any "arbitrage bonds" issued by California or any
political subdivision thereof would be exempt under California
law.
3.
Interest on U.S. government bonds is taxed by the
federal government.
Such interest is exempt from the
California income tax. The u.s. Constitution prevents states
from taxing federal debt.

FISCAL IMPACT OF PARTIAL* CONFORMITY
The Franchise Tax Board states that the revenue
effect is "unknown".
*See Policy Issues Comment #1

FEDERAL LAW
Interest on u.s. government bonds is taxable by the
federal government.
Interest on state and local government obligations is
exempt from federal taxation, except that "arbitrage bonds"
issued after October 9, 1969 are subject to tax and industrial revenue bonds over $10 million (and over $1 million
in certain situations) issued after April 30, 1968, are
subject to tax.
(An "arbitrage bond" is an obligation
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issued by a state or local government for the purpose of
investing the proceeds therefrom in high-yielding securities
or obligations generating taxable interest.)
CALIFORNIA LAW
California law exempts interest on:
a.

U.S. Government Bonds (Federal National
Mortgage Association obligations taxable).

b.

Bonds of U.S. territories, Puerto Rico and
District of Columbia.

c.

State of California state or local government
bonds.

Interest on other government bonds is taxable.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1. Full conformity is not possible, as states are
prohibited by the u.s. Constitut1on from taxing U.S. government obligations.
2. Out-of-State Benefit. With respect to state and
local obligat1ons, the question is whether California should
give a tax incentive for investing in bonds of other states
other than California.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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CAPITAL GAINS
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
"Capital gains" refers to the preferential income tax
treatment of net gains from the sale or exchange of most property. The preferential treatment is twofold:
(1) less than
100 percent of the gain is taxable as ordinary income, if
that asset was held one year or more, and (2} capital gains
are taxed only when realized, not as they accrue, as is the
case with ordinary income.
There are numerous major differences between California
and federal law relative to capital gains treatment, which are
highlighted in Table 20 below:

TABLE 20
Provision

California Law

Federal Law

(a) Categories
of Gains

Three: short-, mediumand long-term.

Two: short- and longterm.

Asset held less than
1 year: 100%.

Asset held less than
l year: 100%.

Asset held l-5 years:
65%.

Asset held l year or
more: 40%.

(t)

Percent of
Gain
Taxable
as Income

Asset held over
5 years: 50%.
(c) Loss
Offset
Procedures

Takes into income
initially only the
percentages of gain
or loss shown in
(b) above.

Takes into income the full
amount of all gains or
losses, and then allows a
deduction for 60% of the
excess of net long-term
gain over net short-term
loss.

Losses are deductible
only to extent of aggregate gains after applying above percentages
plus up to $1,000 of
ordinary income. Unused
net capital losses may
be carried forward
indefinitely.

All short- and long-term
gains and losses are grouped,
and losses are deductible
only to extent of aggregate gains pl~s up to
$3,000 of ord~na~J income.
Unused net capital losses
may be carried forward
indefinitely.

Any net capital loss
has already been reduced by above percentages, and can be used
to offset ordinary
income dollar for
dollar, up to the
$1,000 limit.

However, only 50% of longterm losses can be offset
against ordinary income.
Thus, to take advantage
of full deduction, taxpayer must have a longterm loss of twice that
amount.
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In addition, there are other differences, in greater
or lesser degree, in the areas of (a) sale or exchange of
patents, (b) sale of stock of foreign investment companies,
(c) recapture
excess depreciation, (d) coal and domestic
iron ore royalties, (e) redeemable ground rents, and (f) adjusted basis.

FISCAL EFFECTS OF FULL CONFORMITY
result

Full conformity to the federal provisions would
a revenue loss of $204 million for 1981.

For tax effect by income class and type of return,
see Table 22 on page 69.

FEDERAL LAW
The Revenue Act of 1978 increased the federal capital
gains exclusion from 50 percent to 60 percent, for long-term
gains, which were re-defined to be assets held one year or
more, rather than 6 months or more.
(The move to a one-year
cut-off was in conformity with California law.) A former
"alternative capital gains tax" was repealed in the same act,
and the loss offset limit against ordinary income was increased from $1,000 to $3,000. A special study was provided
for to determine the effectiveness of liberalizing the capital
gains law.
CALIFORNIA LAW
Up until 1971, California conformed to the federal
law in effect at that time relative to holding periods and
percent taxable as gain.
In that year, California was facing
a severe revenue shortage, and in special session the Legislature enacted Assemblyman Bill Bagley's so-called "mini-tax"
plan, which in fact made substantial changes in the state
tax structure. One of these was to create a medium term gain,
thus resulting in the present three-tier structure which
varies considerably from federal law.
The percentage of gain taxable as ordinary income has
varied over the years, as follows:
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POLICY ISSUES
conformity
simplified compliance
, as the current differences
deral law are significant.
tax systems would be far ~
1 capital gains were treated
if adminis
simplicity
concern.)

.,-.,,-......-~

b

c.

that
in
On
to

3.
favoring
economy.
state

income taxes on the
assets, there
the
potentially increased,
spur the California
pre rential capital
d on equity concerns,
realized gain was due
further reducing taxes, these
are thus more fully addressed
There is little doubt
income will be conveneliminate numerous disparities
of basis and exclusion.
Tax Board
11
to adjust
that any state administraconformity.
(About 1 million
, or 10.6
of total returns.)
The second argument
the California
ted below, the incentive effect
atment is very questionable.
6

a.

Present Incentives Substantial. Total federal
revenue effect of capital gains is estimated
to be $22.3 billion in 1980-81, and California's
present exclusion entails a $380 mi
loss.
Against this current magnitude of
tive,
how much additional investment would be encouraged
by the $204 million additional state cost of
conformity?

b.

Federal System Dominant. Since Cali
a's
tax 1s much lower than the federal tax,
practically all business decisions which might
be affected by capital gains treatment would
presumably be resolved with the federal provision in mind. Any additional impact of the
California provision, especially after interaction with the federal law, would only rarely
be a deciding issue.

c.

Windfall Effect. Conformity would reduce
California capital gains tax burdens, but it
is questionable whether this tax reduction provides only a windfall to taxpayers for doing
what they planned to do all along anyway, or
whether it will be the motivating force to
attract an investment that would not otherwise
have been made. Would the state be "getting"
anything for its money?

d.

Revenue Exported. Whether or not the state
cap1tal ga1ns treatment proves to be an incentive, 14-70 percent of the tax savings to
California residents are already taxed away in
higher federal income taxes--depending on the
taxpayer's marginal federal tax rate--due to a
reduction in the federal itemized deduction
for state income taxes paid. This will also
apply with the increased tax savings under
conformity.
This effect appears to work counter to the
idea of improving the California economy, for
by this "reverse revenue sharing", California
would be exporting dollars out of the state
and into the federal treasury.

e.

Out-of-State Benefits.
Some portion of any
increased capital formation may accrue to
business activity located outside California.
Current state capital gains treatment favors
California residents, whether or not the assets
in which they have invested are in California.
Reducing state taxes simply exacerbates this
effect.
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f.

Investment Influences Vary. Capital gains treatment is not the only motivating factor in a
person's investment decisions--it is but one
of many factors.
Of far greater import in
recent months have been interest rate levels
and availability of financing.
Countervailing market forces spurred by federal monetary
policy might completely offset the independent effect, if any, of the relatively modest
cut in effective state tax rate brought about
by conformity.
Further, not all investments are in equal need
of additional incentives. For example, investment in small, new high-technology firms is
generally riskier than sale of single-family
dwellings. And if the latter involves speculative activity, the former may also be more
"socially productive".

g.

Impact on Capital Mobility. One of the economic
arguments in favor of existing capital gains
is to encourage mobility of capital by reducing
the tax consequences upon realization (sale of
the asset). However, in inflationary times,
the longer an asset is held, the higher the
gain to the taxpayer. Thus, the incentive is
still to hold appreciated assets, not realize
them, even under conformity.

4. Equity Issues. The third argument for capital
gains--equity--applies both to current law and conformity.
The two most frequent concerns are that a large part of the
gain is due to inflation, and that the gain is taxed in a
single year although it may have accrued over several years.
a.

Inflation of course effects all taxpayers;
not just those with capital gains.
In response
to this concern, the Legislature enacted
indexing in 1978, the first state in the
nation to do so.
Indexing is not in conformity
with federal law.

b.

Gains taxed in a single year will be subject
to a higher effective rate than if taxed on
accrual (i.e., as gains are earned), but
with or without the capital gains exclusion,
the income averaging provisions are applicable,
and help spread the tax effect over several
years.

5.
Higher Income Taxpayers Benefit. Regardless of
the potential adrninistrative,investroBnt or equity advantages
of conformity, it is clear that capital gains conformity
yields the largest tax benefit to higher income individuals.
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As Table 22 shows, 75 percent of the net tax relief
accrues to persons with an AGI of $50,000 or over; this
group of 323,000 taxpayers will realize a net benefit of
$152.4 million. The 90,000 taxpayers with over $100,000 AGI
will realize an average savings of $1,000 apiece.
6. Alternatives to Conformity. There are a number of
possible alternatives to total federal conformity, which are
responsive to some of the above points.
a.

Conform, but limit provisions to California
investments only (to encourage in-State investments).

b.

Conform, but limit provisions to a specified
list of "priority" investment activity,
e.g., in designated "risk capital" ventures
(to encourage "socially productive" investments).

c.

Conform to loss limitation only (to encourage
risk-taking).

d.

Conform to loss offset procedures and limit
only (to address most complicated differences).

e.

Full or partial conformity, with concurrent
beefing up of preference tax on excess
capital gains (to give increased net benefit
to low and moderate income taxpayers, but
minimize increased benefit to taxpayers with
large gains, who generally are high-income
taxpayers) .

f.

Some combination of the above.

g.

Defer any action pending results of federal
study on the liberalized federal treatment,
which is due in September, 1981.

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
1. AB 1445 (Naylor), 1979.
Held in Assembly Rev & Tax.

Proposed full conformity.

2. AB 2371 (Naylor), 1980. Proposed conformity to
exclusion level only for residential real estate, new firms,
new stock issues .
Failed passage in Assembly Rev & Tax.
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TABLE 22
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
Capital Gains
AGI Class
At
But Less
Than

Tax Decrease
No. of
Amount of
Returns
Change

Tax Increase
No. of
Amount of
Returns
Change

Net Amount

Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate

•

$5,000
,000 - 10,000
10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 30,000
30,000 - 40,000
40,000 - 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

946
24,517
62,560
58,167
33,503
14,384
23,320
8,839
226,235

$4,491
492' 869
3,236,253
6,805,331
6,580,795
3,831,122
8,836,341
10,332,484
$40,119,686

634
2, 924
5,907
5,785
2,433
1,427
1,309
343
20,763

$351,931
21,040
659,250
246,204
151,061
355,691
530,173
100,547
$2,415,898

7,440
-4 71,829
-2,577 '003
-6,559,127
-6,429,733
-3,475,432
-8,306,168

Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse
$5,000
,000 - 10,000
10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 30,000
30,000 - 40,000
000 - 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

709
1,362
62,330
101,281
114,672
106,343
184,540
75,256
646,493

$2,834
10,967
1,645,967
5,297,008
10,086,168
15,386,560
55,262,857
79,866,334
$167,558,695

1,816
370
9,340
9,918
12,000
10,911
16,570
4,227
65,152

$940,201
55,941
87,825
1,198,428
719,758
490,635
2,816,979
2,037,268
$8,347,033

$937,366
44,97
-1,558,143
-4,098,580
-9,366,410
-14,895,
-52,445,87
-77
066

Unmarried Head of Household
$5,000
$5,000 - 10,000
10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 30,000
30,000 - 40,000
40,000 - 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

0
0

$0

1

0

0

$10,318
0

7,924
8,331
9,187
1,582
4,677
1,790
33 '491

310,222
860,740
2,017,714
318,992
1,527,781
2,382,283
$7,417,732

534
476
329
118
1,116
110
2,684

1,629
47,232
12,707
7,271
263,242
29,453
$371,852

All Taxpayers
$5,000
$5,000 - 10,000
10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 30,000
30,000 - 40,000
40,000 - 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

1,654
25,879
132,814
167,780
157,362
122,309
212,537
85,884
906,219

$7,325
503,837
5,192,442
12,963,079
18,684,676
19,536,675
65,626,978
92,581,101
$215,096,114
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7/18/80

2,451
3,294
15,782
16,179
14,761
12,456
18,995
4,680
88,599

$1,302,449
76,981
748,703
1,491,865
883,526
853,597
3,610,394
2,167,269
$11,134,784

$1,295,124
-426,856
-4,443,740
-11' 4 71 '214
-17,801,150
-18,683,078
-62,016,584
-90,413,832
-$203,961,330

SALE OF A RESIDENCE
CAPITAL GAINS
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Both state and federal law provide a once-in-a-lifetime
exclusion of capital gains on the sale of a principal residence.
The only difference is that federal law applies only to
taxpayers 55 years of age or older, while the California
exclusion has no age limitation.

FISCAL EFFECTS OF FULL CONFORMITY
The Franchise Tax Board estimates an unknown but
minor revenue gain under full conformity.

FEDERAL LAvl
In 1978, Congress enacted a one-in-a-lifetime elective
exclusion of $100,000 for taxpayers 55 years of age or older;
home must have been principal residence for 3 of past 5 years.
CALIFORNIA LAW
The only difference here is the age limitation. California first enacted a $100,000 exclusion in 1978 (AB 3802,
Kapiloff) with no age limit, while the feds followed suit
later in the year with the same level exclusion, but with a
55 year or older limitation and different eligibility criteria.
In 1979, California revised its exclusion to conform to the
federal eligibility criteria, but chose to keep its no-age
limit.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1.
Imposition of Age Limit. Conformity will mean
loss of this benefit to taxpayers under age 55 who may wish
to avail themselves of it. The state would save a minor
amount of revenue, which was the principal reason for the
feds adopting their 55 age limit in the first place.
If the use of this exclusion is one time only,
is it appropriate to impose an age limitation? Why age 55?
Most existing California senior relief programs start at age
62 or 65, in any event.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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TAXATION OF MUTUAL FUND DIVIDENDS

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS
The typical "regulated investment company" is the
mutual fund that makes diversified investments for its shareholders.
Federal law allows certain mutual fund dividends to be
treated as capital gains, while California does not offer such
treatment.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
The Franchise Tax Board estimates a revenue loss
of $20 million under full conformity.

FEDERAL LAW
If a regulated investment company distributes currently
at least 90% of its dividend and interest income (exclusive
of capital gain dividend distributions) and meets certain
other conditions {e.g. company must invest at least 50% of
its assets in cash and cash items and in issuers in which
it holds not more than 10% of the voting securities), it is
not taxed on amounts distributed to shareholders.
The company must notify its shareholders as to what
portion of the distributions made represents capital gain
dividends, what portion represents ordinary income dividends,
and what portion represents other income. The shareholder is
then taxable on the distribut1ons. Thus, the shareholder may
avail himself of (1) the long-term capital gain rate on his
portion of the distributions representing capital gains and
(2) the dividend exclusion.
CALIFORNIA LAW
State law recognizes all such mutual fund dividends
as ordinary income.
California has not conformed in the past both because
of revenue concerns and because in substance these proceeds
are dividends, and dividends are treated as ordinary income.
State law attributes the capital gains to the company, not
the individual.
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1. Rationale for Federal Law:
The rationale for
federal law was basically promotion of the mutual fund industry. Federal law treats the capital gains as being those
of the individual, rather than of the regulated investment
company.
This pass-through treatment is the same as SubchapterS (to which California also does not conform).
2.
Benefits Trade-off. Conformity would, on the
one hand, ease taxpayer compliance and provide tax savings.
On the other hand, it would appear that the bulk
of mutual fund investments are outside California. To what
purpose is a state subsidy to California residents who
invest out-of-state? Also, assuming levels of benefit
comparable to that of capital gains generally, the bulk
of relief would be granted to higher-income individuals.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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TAXATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Under federal law a portion of unemployment compensation
received is includible in gross income. California has no such
provision.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
The revenue gain associated with full conformity would
be in the range of $5 million.
FEDERAL LAW
In 1978 federal law was amended to provide for the inclusion in gross income of a certain portion of the unemployment compensation received by a taxpayer pursuant to federal
or state law.
Under this provision if the sum of the adjusted gross
income of the taxpayer and the unemployment compensation received exceeds the base amount (defined) , then gross income
for the taxable year includes the lesser of one-half of the
amount of the excess of such sum over the base amount, or the
amount of the unemployment compensation.
The "base amount" is defined as (1) $25,000 in the case
of a joint return, (2) zero in the case of a married taxpayer
who does not file a joint return for the year, and (3) $20,000
in all other cases.
Prior to 1978 unemployment compensation was considered
exempt from tax under a series of IRS rulings. The IRS took
the position that funds expended in the public welfare should
not be taxed.
CALIFORNIA LAW
There is no equivalent California law.
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1.
Rationale for Federal Law.
Congress took the position
that unemployment compensation represents substitute wages and
would be taxable if earned.
Theoretically, all income should
be taxed, to treat persons with equal resources, but from different sources, equally.
Further, such compensation from private
plans is taxable.
Congress apparently reasoned that total
exclusion also operated as a work disincentive.
2.
Inaccurate Rationale? At a time of high inflation
and unemployment, there appears to be little validity to a
theory that full exemption of unemployment compensation serve
as a "work disincentive".
3.
Equity.
For some, unemployment compensation is
not analogous to wages.
For them it is more like public
assistance.

4. Administration.
The federal law involves a complicated computation.
Conformity would tend to result in additional administrative burdens and costs and complicate return
preparation for taxpayers.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
AB 93 (W. Brown), 1979.
Orginally provided for the
inclusion of certaln unemployment compensation in gross income
as follows:
1. One-half of the amount of the excess of the sum of
the recipient's unemployment benefit payments and adjusted
gross income above $25,000 joint or $20,000 for all others,
or
2.

The amount of the unemployment benefits received.

However, this provision was amended out of the bill
before enactment.
AB 671 (Fazio), 1977.
Included UI and Social Security
benefits in income for computing gross income for persons with
$30,000 AGI or more. Interim study •
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CARRYOVER/CARRYBACK OF NET OPERATING LOSSES
DI

BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW

law
lows taxpayers a deduction for
incurred in the conduct of a business
deduction exceeds the taxpayer's tax
ility for the year in which the loss was incurred, it
may be carried back to the three preceeding tax years and
carried forward to the succeeding seven tax years in order
to offset taxable income.
net

C 1
does not allow net operating loss
carrybacks or carryovers under either the Personal Income
Tax law or
Bank and Corporation Tax law.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
If only individuals (proprietorships and partnerships) were allowed to carry back and/or carry forward business net operating losses for state income tax deduction
purposes, it is estimated the "accrued" revenue loss would
be approximately $50 million annually. Because it is
assumed that taxpayers would not be allowed to carry forward
any losses incurred prior to the effective date of the
change (i.e., conformity would be prospective only), the
full "cash" impact of conforming to federal net operating
loss provisions would not occur for several years.
For annual tax effect on individuals by income class,
see table on page 79.
FEDERAL LAW

I

Under current federal law, net operating losses may
be carried back three years and carried forward seven years
from the year in which the loss occurred. In effect, this
provides an eleven year income averaging period (3 prior
years + loss year + 7 succeeding years) for purposes of computing federal income taxes.
A net operating loss
is the excess of allowable deductions over gross income,
with certain adjustments. These adjustments limit some of
the types of deductions that may be included in determining
the net loss and require special treatment of capital gains
and losses.
A taxpayer's net operating loss deduction must first
be carried back to the third tax year preceeding the year in
which the loss was sustained. Any amount of the loss not
used to offset taxable income for the third preceeding year
is carried to the second preceeding year. Any amount of the
loss that still remains unused is then applied to the first
preceedi
year. If the loss is not entirely used to offset
7S

taxable income in the three preceeding years, the balance
may be carried forward to the seven succeeding tax years in
order of their occurrence.
It should be noted, however,
that federal
lows a taxpayer to elect to forego any
carryback
to carry the entire loss forward to offset
taxes
s
CALIFORNIA LAW
Losses incurred in the operation of a trade or business are deductible under California law only in the year in
which the losses are incurred. There are no provisions
allowing taxpayers to carryback or carryforward such losses
to other tax years.
POLICY ISSUES OF FULL CONFORMITY
1. Background. The federal operating loss carryback
and carryforward provisions, which were first enacted in
1918, initially permitted net business losses sustained in
one year to be claimed as a deduction against income of the
prior taxable year and then against the income of the succeeding year.
A 1918 report of the u.s. Senate Finance
Committee indicated that a system of taxation based upon the
annual accounting concept had as its chief merit simplicity
of administration, but " ••• it does not adequately recognize
the exigencies of business, and under our present high rates
of taxation, may often result in grave injustice." Since
that first effort at dealing with the question of the
appropriate way to handle operating losses, the Internal
Revenue Code sections relating to this subject have been
amended no less than 17 times.
2.
Rationale. One observer of this area of tax law
has listed four main Congressional objectives in enacting
loss carryback and carryover provisions:
a) To preclude the imposition of what is tantamount to an income tax on capital rather than
income.
(By taxing only in profitable years and
denying carryovers and carrybacks, the average effective rate of tax on the income of capital over a
large number years would clearly exceed the nominal
rate and would reduce the rate of return on capital
below what might be considered the fair market rate
of return. )
b) To reinforce tax neutrality by permitting
businesses with wide cyclical swings to level their
incomes, thereby facilitating competititon for
investment capital with others whose earning levels
are more stable.
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t by stimurecession or finanby carrybacks
ide a form of

e
d

ri

or venture

capi
3. Advanta~e~ and Disadvantages. The loss carryback
and carryover prov1s1ons have certain distinct advantages:
results in an immediate infuto a
iness with losses which
firm.
From a macroe
, it
also a valuable
way to
counter
economic aid to
indus
In times
recession, when business
losses are high, the refunds made possible by the
carryback provide useful economic stimulus to business.
a

b) From
point
view of business, the
carryback
the
ue of providing certain relief,
while the carryover
speculative to the extent its
value
profit projections. Past
tax payments are certain and the value of refunds can
be calcu
d
t
by the taxpayer.
c) The carryover
of particular value to new
businesses that have large start up losses, little or
no prev
tax liability,
the potential for
large future profits.
d) Another advantage of the carryover prov1s1ons
is that they provide an incentive for businesses to
operate in an efficient manner so as to generate
future profits and tax liabilities which may be
reduced by the loss carryover.
There are also significant disadvantages to the use
of carryback and carryover provisions:
a) The carryback can lead to very cumbersome
administrative problems, particular
as the length
of the carryback period
increased. The recordkeeping requirements and
need to be constantly
recalculating prior-year tax returns can lead to
administrative nightmares for both the taxpayer and
the administering agency.
b) A chief disadvantage of the carryover is the
potential that exists for a market which trades in
"tax loss" corporat
to develop. Corporations
with
tantial
carryovers can be attractive
acquisit
itable corporations because of

7

the
for lowering the taxes of the firm
that
tax loss.
Federal law and IRS regulations attempt to limit this trafficking in tax loss
but
effort in this area can be
t
Firms that otherwise might go out
inefficiency or changing
market conditions are acquired solely as a means to
reduce
taxes of a profitable business.
c) Fi
ly, a serious problem with both carrybacks and carryovers is the uncertainty that such
prov
add to the operation of fiscal policy by
the federal government. Particularly as the period
over wh
losses may be averaged is increased, the
ability to accurately predict tax revenues is greatly
reduced.
4.
Lower State Tax Rates. Given the lower
California marginal income tax rates, is there as great a
need for the "income averaging" aspect of carryback/
carryover provisions as there is in federal law?
5. Revenue Estimating Problems. Given the degree of
unpredictability that carryback/carryover provisions add to
the already uncertain world of revenue estimating, does the
state place itself in greater danger of violating the
constitutional requirement for a balanced budget as a result
of enacting such provisions?
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
1. AB 2012 (Naylor), 1980. Allowed
losses to be carried forward (but not back)
to specified dollar limits.
Effective only
levels of Bank and Corporation tax revenues
Vetoed by Governor.

net operating
and deducted up
if specified
realized.

2.
AB 2500 (Cline), 1980. Conformed to federal
carryforward provisions only. Held in Assembly Revenue and
Taxation Committee.

3. AB 3066 (Lehman), 1980. Same as AB 2500.
in Assembly Revenue and Taxat1on Committee.

Held

4. AB 1479 (Naylor), 1979. Conformed to federal
carry forward and carry back provisions. Died in committee.
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TABLE 23

FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
Allow Net Operating Loss Carryover

•

Adjusted Gross Income Class

Tax Decrease
(000,000)

Under $10,000
$10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 30,000
30,000 - 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 And Over

$4.5
3.5
4.0
8.5
13.5
16.0

Total

$50.0

This table was derived from data published in the U.S.
Statistics of Income - Individual Income Tax Returns.
The tax decrease shown is on an "accrual" concept. It
would take several years for the tax decrease shown to
be effective on a cash basis. This lag occurs because
conformity would be prospective as it is assumed that
losses in years prior to enactment of a conformity
provision would not be allowed carryover status.
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INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
ides
a tax credit equal to 10 percent of the cost of new equipment used for business purposes.
This credit is designed to stimulate business investment in
capital equipment by lowering the effective after-tax cost of
business equipment.
State law does not provide for any such credit.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
Conformity to the federal investment tax credit provisions could reduce annual state revenues by as much as $1.5
billion.
FEDERAL LAW
A credit against the federal income tax is allowed for
10 percent of the cost of qualified investments acquired and
placed in service or constructed during the tax year.
Qualified Investments. A qualified investment is
generally an expenditure for new machinery ~r equipment used
in a business enterprise. In most cases, land, buildings, and
components of buildings are not eligible for the credit.
Investment goods produced in-a-foreign country and up to
$100,000 per year of used equipment expenditures also are
generally eligible for the investment tax credit.
Useful Life. In order to qualify for the full 10 percent investment tax credit, the investment goods must have a
useful life of seven years or more. For equipment with a useful life of between five and seven years, a taxpayer may claim
only 2/3 of the full 10 percent credit. For equipment with a
useful life of between three and five years, the taxpayer may
claim only 1/3 of the full 10 percent credit. Equipment with
a useful life of less than three years is not eligible for the
investment tax credit.
--Limitations. The amount of the investment tax credit
may not exceed the lesser of (1) the taxpayer's tax liability
or (2) $25,000 plus a specified percentage of the tax liability above $25,000. This percentage is 70 percent in 1980 and
is scheduled to increase to 80 percent in 1981 and 90 percent
in 1982 and subsequent years. Any part of the investment credit which is not used may be carried back three years and
carried forward seven years.

80

CALIFORNIA LAW
Californ

law does not provide for an investment tax

credit.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
l. Objective of federal credit. The apparent objective of the federal investment tax credit is to increase business investment in capital equipment toward the end of
improving the overall productivity and international competit
position of the u.s. economy. Since its inception,
however, there has been continuous debate as to the effectiveness of the credit in accomplishing this goal. Proponents
argue that the credit has been responsible for increasing
investment in production equipment and facilities. Critics
argue that the credit may not be cost-effective when revenue
loss due to the credit is compared with the amount of extra
investment stimulated by the credit. It is also argued that
the credit distorts the market mechanism and that policymakers
should refrain from specific interventions (i.e., altering the
price of capital equipment relative to all other prices), and
should rely on the general stimulus provided by cuts in individual and corporate income tax rates. Proponents counter
this argument by pointing out that inflation may be partly due
to inadequate supply of goods and services in the economy and
that a tax cut focused on investment spending may do more to
increase industrial capacity and supply than would more
general forms of tax relief for business.
A 1978 study by the General Accounting Office (GAO)
concluded that the federal investment tax credit has succeeded
in shifting investment toward plant and equipment, but has not
increased the overall level of investment.
2. Appropriateness of State Credit. Is it appropriate
for the state to engage in macro-economic policymaking (i.e.,
stimulating growth and investment), an area traditionally left
to federal control?
3. Limited Effectiveness. Given the current fiscal
constraints on the state, would any feasible amount of state
investment tax incentives provide a significant economic stimulus for the California economy?
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
AB 1555 (Filante), 1979. Provided a five percent state
investment tax credit for both individual and corporate taxpayers. Died in Committee.
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Act of 1978,
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under the laws

member of an affiliated group of
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Have on

one class of stock.

4.

Have 5 or fewer shareholders, who must be either
or e tates
cannot include a nonresident alien.

income and net operating losses of a qualified
S
ion are passed on to the shareholders,
not the income is actually distributed.
A net coring loss is treated by the shareholders in the
arne manner as a loss from a trade or business under the
federal individual income tax law.
A shareholder may deduct
his or her pro rata share of the loss, but the amount deducted
shareholder's adjusted basis in the corExcess net operating losses may not be carried over
to other tax
Income from long-term capital gains of a tax option
tion retains its capital gains character when passed
onto the shareholder.
Generally, more favorable capital gains
rates are allowed under the individual income tax law than
corporation tax law.
To prevent
use of Subchapter S provisions as a
means of avoiding the higher corporate tax on capital gains,
long term corporate gains are subject to a special tax at the
c
level if the gain:
1) exceeds any short-term capital losses by more than $25,000; 2) exceeds 50 percent of the
total corporate taxable income; and 3) corporate income
exceeds $25,000.
Net capital gains passed through to
individual taxpayers are reduced by the amount of any special
taxes paid at the corporate level.
The excess of capital losses over capital gains is not
sed on to the shareholders, but may be carried over to
future years by the corporation.
CALIFORNIA LAW
California law contains no prov1s1ons similar to the
federal provisions relating to Subchapter S corporations in
either the Personal Income Tax law or in the Bank and
Co
ion Tax law.
Corporations electing federal
Subchapter s status are subject to the state Bank and
Co
ion Tax on net corporate income at the standard 9.6
percent rate of tax for corporations and the higher rate for
banks
financ 1
ions.
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POLICY ISSUES OF FULL CONFORMITY
Subchapter S provisions were first
Technical Amendments Act of 1958.
ional staff analyses prepared at the
sed
s
ion to:
Perm
businesses to select the form of organization
they desired, without taking into account major differences in tax consequence;
Aid small business by allowing shareholders to
report their proportionate share of corporate
income,
lieu of a corporate tax; and
Benefit small corporations by allowing them to
apportion any net losses to shareholders.
The chief advantage of the corporate form of doing
business is the limited liability of the managers and shareholders of the business. Limited liability encourages risktaking in economic ventures and makes it easier for small
businesses to attract investment dollars from potential
investors.
2. National Subchapter S Activity. The following
statistics drawn from publications of the Internal Revenue
Service provide a profile of the nature and extent of
Subchapter S activity in the u.s. in 1974, the last year for
which such data are available.
Economic Activity of Subchapter S Corporations
Number of Subchapter S Returns
Number of Shareholders
Business Receipts
Net Income {Less Losses)
Net Worth
Income Distributed to Shareholders
Firms With:

333,099
832,493
$120,960,889,000
$ 3,549,831,000
$ 14,986,003,000
$ 2,108,297,000

Percent of Total

1 Shareholder
2 Shareholders
3 Shareholders

31.2%
33.6
15.2
9.7
10.

4 Shareholders
5 or More Shareholders

Total

100.0%
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Percent of Total
Forestry, Fishing

5.1%
.7

tur
Transportation and Public Utility
and Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Services

11.3
10.3
4.4
35.5
11.5
21.2
100.0%

TO

way of comparison, there were 10,881,969 sole
torships and 1,073,147 partnerships involving 4,950,576
in the entire u.s. in 1975. As can readily be seen,
Subchapter S corporations are only a minor part of the small
business community in the United States.
3. Participation in California. California taxpayers
have not particiated in the use of the Subchapter S option in
p
ion to their share of the total population of the u.s.
In the 1976 tax year, 642,980 individual tax returns in the
entire u.s. reported net income or a loss from a small business corporation electing Subchapter S treatment. Only 4.1
percent of these individual returns were from California taxpayers, a total of 26,226. In comparison, a year earlier in
1975, there were 1,105,976 sole proprietorships and 156,817
partnerships involving 794,171 partners in California.
Whether the limited use of the tax options corporation by
California businesses was due to the lack of corresponding
provisions in state law is hard to determine without an indepth examination of the circumstances in individual cases.
Clearly, however, the rather substantial state corporation tax
rate (9.6 percent), has some deterrent effect upon California
businesses' choice of a legal form of doing business.
4. Exemption from minimum tax. If the state should
decide to enact provisions simliar to the Subchapter S provisions in federal law, is it appropriate to exempt Subchapter S
corporations from the minimum tax ($200) features of the
California Bank and Corporation Tax Law?
5. Appropriate Objective? Should it be state policy
to encourage the types of businesses that are most likely to
make use of Subchapter S (retailing, finance insurance, real
estate and services)?
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RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
1. AB 874 (McVittie), 1979. Conformed both Personal
Income Tax Law and Bank and Corporation Tax Law to federal
Subchapter S provisions (amended out of final version). Died
in committee.
2.
AB 874.

AB 1470 (Kelley), 1979.
Died in committee .

Same general provisions as

•
TABLE 24
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
Allow Sub-Chapter "S" Corporation Losses on
Individual Returns

Tax Decrease
(000,000)

Adjusted Gross Income Class
Under $10,000
$10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 30,000
30,000 - 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 And Over

$.3
1.1

2.0
3.3

5.4
7.9
$20.0

Total

This table was derived from data published in the U.S.
Statistics of Income - Individual Income Tax Returns.
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY

1.

Rationale for Federal Law - Over the years, depreciagenerated many d1sputes and litigation. The ADR prosions are the latest in a series of steps which have been taken
to alleviate the contention which has surrounded this deduction.
ADR essentially represents an agreement that if its provisions
are elected, the depreciation claimed need not be justified by
the taxpayer and cannot be changed by either the taxpayer or the
government.
2.
Rationale for California Law - At the time of the
federal adopt1on of the ADR rules, 1t was felt that the cash
flow problems the provisions would cause would be unacceptable
for the state. Later, after the federal law had been in place
for several years, it was determined that the ADR mid-range
depreciation would not cause any major disruption and would
conform to the method used by most taxpayers for federal purposes.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION

NONE.
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has
instances.
is allowed
i

percent
1, gas and geothermal
which is phased out depending on
aimed.

SCFili EFFECT
net e
full conformity will be a gain in revenue,
amount cannot be predicted since it depends upon utilization
of the deposits.

The
of

gas percentage depletion allowance has been a
ss
concern for many years. From 1926 until
allowable percentage depletion was 27 1/2 percent of
s income
property. Beginning after October 9, 1969,
allowab
percentage was reduced to 22 percent. In all cases
the depletion could not exceed 50 percent of taxable income comwithout
to depletion. In 1975 several changes were
A 22
le
rate is allowed for regulated
natural gas and
natural gas sold under contract, subject to
the 50 percent limitation noted above. Independent oil and gas
producers and royalty owners are also entitled to the 22 percent
rate for the period 1975 - 1980. The rate drops for these
producers each year until it reaches 15 percent by 1984 and
thereafter. The rate for geothermal wells varies in a similar
fashion to 15 percent in 1984. These rates apply to an average
daily production in 1979 of up to 1,200 barrels of oil per day
or 7.2 million cubic feet of gas per day. These daily maximums
drop to 1000 barrels and 6
llion cubic feet after 1979. For
se producers
is
to 65 percent of taxable
income computed without regard to the depletion allowance,or 50
of
property before the depletion
ce. For purposes of the 65 percent limit, taxable income
is reduced by
zero bracket amount
the case of an individual
is computed without regard to any net operating loss carryportion of the al
be carried over.
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, conformed to federal law.
gas depletion allowance from 27 1/2
rate applies to oil, gas and
law was extensively amended to end
for smaller producers, California
, but not in a similar fashion. Percentage
fully allowed as to amounts up to $1.5
$1. million the deduction is reduced by 125
excess depletion over $1.5 million. By this
deduction can be claimed if it exceeds $7.5

Rationale of Federal Law- The exploitation and availgas and oil have always been important in Congressional
The strategic and public welfare implications of
r with the more recent desire for American
in them has led Congress to provide many
encourage further exploration and development
geo
rmal sources, consis.tent with a desire that
s not
le to routinely evade paying a "reasonable"

Under
sent law this incentive is directed more to small
rs, apparently on the theory that small producers are more
in exploration within the United States.
2. Rationale for California Law - The California rationale
is much the same as the federal.
The 1975 California amendments
ch were analogous to the federal changes in that year also benesmal
producers rather than larger ones.
Relation to Actual Costs - The statutory percentage
allowances bear little or no relationship to the amount
of resources lost or to the taxpayer's original investment. The
current law as to large producers reflects the concern that percentage
can permit tax free recovery of several times the taxactual
stment.
4.
eas

r

Full conformity would make administration
in increased revenues.
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THAN

FEDERAL LAW
law minerals,other than oil, gas and geothermal
ject to percentage depletion according to
by statute. Generally, California follows the
federal law includes more minerals and
instances.
EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
1

result in some revenue gain, but the
since the degree of utilization cannot

FEDERAL LAW
Under

a taxpayer earning income from depletable
a percentage depletion allowance for
at a percentage rate specified by statute for
mineral. The amount of deduction is limited
computed without regard to the

Cali
generally follows federal law. The California
not provide for percentage depletion for as many minerals as
s the federal
, and the percentages differ in many instances.
The
depletion for sulfur is treated like that for
1, gas and geothermal deposits. The percentage rate is 22 percent
and the amount deductible is decreased by 125 percent of all
allowance
excess of $1.5 million.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
- Congress has, for many
concern for the development and exploitation
The strategic and economlc importance of
Congress to extend a number of incentives
exploitation of mineral reserves. The
allowance is one such tax benefit.
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2. Rationale for California Law - The California rationale
for this deduction is much the same as that for the federal law to encourage production of valuable minerals for industrial use.
The California approach has been slightly different from the
with California generally allowing lower depletion
percentages where state and federal differ.
3. Efficacy of Rationale - Percentage depletion bears no
relation to actual costs or capital investment, but is rather an
arbitrary amount which may be taken year after year even though
the taxpayer's original costs have long before been recovered.
This approach more closely resembles a subsidy than a recovery of
capital investment.
4. Administration - Although the federal approach is no
simpler than that of Cal~fornia, full conformity would simplify
administration somewhat.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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farming purposes or may charge
There is no comparable Calif-
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cash f

rather

•
a taxpayer engaged in the
expense and deduct, within certain
during the taxable year for
making it s table for farming.
ted to
lesser of $5,000 or
farming. The allowthe land, or amounts which
fue Internal Revenue Code.

no

ions.

ISSUES

Law - This measure was first
1. Rationale for Fede
in the Revenue Act of 1962 for taxable years beginning
December 31, 1962. The purpose of this election was to
add incentive to
land
to productive farm use.
of the relatively low
rare
afford a substantial
to those who would underwould appear that the high
California farmland would
stances
re
s tax
would be where marginal

land and marginal farming operations are involved. This
raises the question, however, of whether in such cases
the deduction may operate as a subsidy to inefficient
operations.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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AMORTIZATION OF FOREST LAND IMPROVEMENT

RAL LAW
California law permits taxpayers to elect to amortize
over 60 months or to depreciate, according to schedule, the cost
any forest land improvement.
There is no comparable federal law.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
1 con
ty (repeal) would not affect revenues
substantially but would result in some minor cash flow savings.

FEDERAL LAW
None.
CALIFORNIA LAW
Under California law taxpayers may elect to amortize
over 60 months the costs of forest land improvements or to
charge such costs to capital account and depreciate over a
regular depreciation schedule.
Forest land improvements are defined as all or a portion
of the costs of labor, materials and use of equipment required to
(1) re-establish commercial tree species pursuant to the requirements of Section 4561 of the Public Resources Code and/or (2)
accomplish forest resource improvement work as defined by subdivision (j) of Section 4793 of the Public Resources Code.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY

1. Rationale for California Law - This law was enacted
in 1978 with the intent of increas1ng forest renewal and productivity.
2.
Incentive Value - The incentive value of this law is
questionable.
Rapid amortization is valuable only if there is
income.
Income does not arise until the trees mature and are
cut. Further, the relatively low California tax rate is usually
not an important consideration to taxpayers making the decision
to undertake such improvements,
compared to availability of
financing and forest management objectives, for example.
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2. Propriety of Incentive - Reforestation is itself
a benefit to the taxpayer whose business is sale of timber.
Should the tax law be used to encourage undertakings which
themselves are direct benefits to the taxpayer? This is somewhat like offering a tax incentive to a grocer to continue
to stock his shelves.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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a taxpayer to elect to amortize
pollution control facilities over a short
charge such cost to capital account and
schedule.
similar to federal law except that
rapid amortization over 60 months
zation over
ther 12 months or 60
months

The
fiscal effect of full conformity would be
to change cash flow between years.
LAW
law taxpayers may elect to amortize the
the installation of certified pollution
over 60 months or to charge such costs to
account
depreciate in the usual manner. The rapid
amortization election is made
the months after the facilibeen
led and may be revoked at any time before
is
a provision for facilities having a life
greater than 15 years.
In such instances the taxpayer may
claim rapid amortization for only that portion of the cost
which represents the first 15 years' depreciation of the life
of facility. The remainder of the cost must be depreciated
in the regular manner.
In order to qualify for the election the equipment must
be certified by the appropriate state and federal authorities.
CALIFORNIA LAW
The
very similar to the federal law.
California had a somewhat more liberal pollution control
facilities amortization law between 1955 and 1971. After the
federal law was
69, California conformed its law
more close
to the federal provision.
The only substantial differences from federal law is that
California al
a 12-month rapid amortization as well as
60-month and
state election to amortize in 12 months is
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1. Rationale forFederal Law - The temporary repeal of the
investment tax cred~t by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 removed some
incentive to install pollution control equipment. This law was
aimed at restoring the incentive for equipment which would help
alleviate the growing pollution problem. The 15-year limitation was directed at encouraging use of shorter life equipment
rather than longer -- presumably to encourage taxpayers to
constantly adopt newer technology.
2.
Rationale for California Law - California has encouraged pollut~on control fac~l~t~es by rapid amortization
of costs since 1955. Conforming to the federal law reduced
administrative problems and potential taxpayer confusion.
3. Windfall - There is already much legislation mandating pollution control. To the extent the equipment must be
installed anyway, the tax break is a windfall and has no incentive value.
4.
Revenue Effect - Even without the rapid amortization
feature, there would be little direct tax impact upon
taxpayers. The regular depreciation rules would still apply
so that costs would be fully recovered in any event.
In
general, only cash flow would be affected.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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RAPID DEPRECIATION/AMORTIZATION OF ENERGY-SAVING EQUIPMENT
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Recent changes in California law provide fast writeoff
options for four kinds of equipment:

•

•

Co-generation equipment - rapid amortization over
12 or 60 months.

•

Alternative energy equipment - rapid amortization
over 12 or 60 months .

•

Solar energy systems - depreciation over 36 months.

•

Energy conservation devices - depreciation over
36 months.

All these fast writeoff options are in lieu of any
credit incentive for which they may qualify.
Federal law does not offer rapid depreciation or amortization for these items.

FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
Repeal of California's fast writeoff provisions would
result in cash flow gain for the state.

CALIFORNIA LAW
These four provisions were enacted by 1980 legislation,
as listed below. The co-generation and alternative energy
provisions were patterned after the existing pollution control
writeoff provision. The solar and energy conservation provisions were part of the respective bills establishing tax
credits in those two areas.
Co-generation - AB 1404 (Hayes), Chapter 1328
Alternative Energy - AB 2893 (Cline and Hayes),
Chapter 1327.
Solar Energy Systems - AB 2036 (Hart), Chapter 903.
Energy Conservation Devices - AB 2030 (Levine) ,
Chapter 90 4.

99

FEDERAL LAW
No similar provisions.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1. Incentive. The California fast writeoff options
are intended to ease the initial cash-flow burdens of installing these energy-saving types of equipment.
In the case of
items which qualify for the state solar or energy conservation
tax credits, fast writeoff was offered as alternatives to those
tax incentives.
2. Other Benefits. Even without rapid depreciation
options, normal depreciation is still available to installers
of this kind of equipment, so that costs can be fully recovered
over the life of the equipment.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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PERSONAL, DEPENDENT, AGE AND BLIND EXEMPTIONS

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE

AJ.~D

FEDERAL LAW

Under federal law taxpayers are allowed to deduct specified
amounts for exemptions from adjusted gross income to arrive at
taxable income. California law allows credits against the tax
for these exemptions and does not have a credit corresponding to
the federal exemption deduction for the aged.
The state credits
are indexed.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
Conformity to federal law would result in a loss of revenue
of $429 million in 1981. To conform to the added age<exemption
would add S2JJffiillion to this loss in 1981.
For tax effect by income class and type of return see
Table 25A on page 104and Table 25B on page 105.
FEDERAL LAW
Current federal law allows the following deductions for
exemptions in computing taxable income:
Single person
Married persons filing jointly
Dependent
65 years of age or older-additional
Blind - additional

$1,000
2,000
1,000
1,000
1,000

Under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code taxpayers were
allowed a $600 exemption for themselves, their spouses and their
dependents.
The amount of the deduction was gradually increased
over the years to its present level. The Revenue Act of 1943
added an additional $600 for blind persons in recognition of
the fact that such persons often incur extra expense which are
not incurred by sighted persons. In 1948 the law was amended
to allow an additional $600 exemption for persons 65 years of
age or older. These additional exemptions have been increased
at the same times and in the same amounts as the personal exemptions.
CALIFOR...'IIJIA LAW
Prior to 1967, deductions were allowed for personal exemptions as follows:
Single person
Head of household
Married couple
Blind Person - additional
Dependent
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$1,500
3,000
3,000
600
600

In 1967 the California law was amended to substitute tax
credits for exemptions.
The tax is now conputed on income without
reduction by exemptions and the credits are then deducted from the
tax. The
67
were:
Single person
Married couple
Head of household
Dependent
Blind person - additional

$25
50
50
8
8

The amount of the credits have varied over the years,
generally depending on the amount of the General Fund surplus.
~or example, due to a one-time major tax cut (AB 3802, Kapiloff,
1n 1978), and the advent of indexing, for the past three years
the credits have been:

Single person
Married person filing
separate return
Married couple filing
joint return
Head of household
Surviving spouse
Dependent
Blind person - additional

1977

1978

1979

$25

$100

$27

25

100

27

50
50
50
8
8

200
200
200
8
8

54
54
54
9
9

For years after 1978 the exemption credits are indexed
to reflect changes in the California Consumer Price Index,
from June of 1978 to June of the current year, rounded off to
the nearest $1.
(The reason for freezing the exemption credits
to a base year is so that this very low dependent exemption
credit, $8, eventually may be adjusted. Without such a provision, the Legislature feared that the credits would forever
keep rounding back to $8.)
Federal exemptions are not indexed.
The California rules with respect to the determination of
whether an individual is married, surviving spouse, head of
household, a dependent, or blind are generally the same as under
federal law. One significant difference between state and federal
law is that, for California purposes, no dependent credit is allowed
for the first dependent who qualifies the taxpayer as "head of
household." There is no comparable loss of a dependency deduction
under federal law.
California does not allow an additional credit
to taxpayers 65 years of age or older.
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POLICY ISSUES

CONFORMITY

The allowance for personal
economic and political
1 should be exempted from
is
of a more generic concept that income
taxation should
based upon the ability to pay. It was also
felt a married couple is entitled to an exemption recognizing there
are two persons involved rather than one taxable entity; likewise,
exemption from tax should be weighed in proportion to the number
children or
r dependents of the taxpayer. It was also dethat
consideration should be given to persons
over 65 years
and to the blind.
2.
California Law - The considerations set
forth above
to federal law generally apply for
California
s. The switch from deductions to credits,
however, represents one additional consideration. A credit
confers the same benefit to all taxpayers, regardless of income.
A deduction, on the other hand, becomes progressively more
valuable as one's income increases. It was felt that no public
policy was
rewarding the well-to-do by an item which
essentially was a
tion of a taxpayer's personal status.
As to the "aged"
, California has various programs
which are targeted to "needy" senior citizens instead of to
senior citizens
ly.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
1. AB 234 (McCarthy), 1979 - Increases the personal exemption credit from $25 to $135 and from $50 to $270 for taxable
year 1979. Died in Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee.
2. SB 20 (Smith}, 1979 -Would continue the increased
personal exemption credits of $100 and $200 for taxable year 1979
and succeeding taxable years. Died in Senate Revenue and Taxation
Committee.
3. SB 679 (Carpenter), 1979 - Provides for a nonrefundable
personal exemption credit of $8 for a taxpayer who is permanently
physically handicapped at the close of the taxable year. Died
in Senate Finance Committee.
4. AB 2478 (Brown), 1978 - Increases the dependent credit
from $8 to $25. Died in Assembly Ways and Means Committee.
5. AB 2895 (Mori), 1978 - Provides for an additional $8
tax credit for a taxpayer or taxpayer's spouse who is severely
impaired. Died in Assembly Ways and Means Committee.
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'!'ABLE 25A
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR

Personal and Dependent Exemptions

Tax Decrease
No. of
Amount of
Returns
Change

Tax Increase
No. of
Amount
Returns
Change

Net Amount
of Change

Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate
$5,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
- 100,000
And Over
Totals

0

82,112
1,231,707
482,884
122,690
38,331
42,617
12,033
2,012,374

$0
649,512
24,657,589
29,412,729
10,650,675
3,746,684
4,054,527
1,171,133
$74,342,849

58,062
1,086,253
67,300
5,202
206
29
65
12
1,217,130

$498,993
12,887,651
654,357
61,364
1,943
206
591
284
$14,105,389

$498,993
12,238,139
-24,003,232
-29,351,365
-10,648,732
-3,746,478
-4,053,935
-1,170,849
-$60,237,460

Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse
$5,000
10,000
- 20,000
- 30,000
- 40,000
50,000
- 100,000
And Over

,000 -

,000
000
,000
40

,000
000
Totals

236
118
284,696
1,171,525
954,932
503,333
469,167
109,926
3,493,934

$236
591
5,798,987
57,921,039
96,444,481
78,011,420
106,424,423
30,450,649
$375,051,825

23,384
33,409
824,554
123,661
18,144
3,905
2,192
13
1,029,262

$199,709
659,260
19,053,768
1,974,496
349,537
68,683
53,240
442
$22,359,136

$199,473
658,670
13,254,782
-55,946,544
-96,094,944
-77,942,737
-106,371,183
-30,450,207
-$352,692,690

Unmarried Head of Household
$5,000
000 - 10,000
,000 - 20,000
,000 - 30,000
30,000 - 40,000
40,000 - 50,000
,000 - 100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

0
0

$0

115,159
120,189
35,868
9,373
8,821
2,651
292,060

3,197,033
9,878,441
5,680,917
1,862,229
1,743,870
608,526
$22,971,015

0

0

0

271,923

$6,553,333

$25,746
80,072
3,092,486
-9,732,545
-5,679,886
-1,861,332
-1,733,698
-608,526
-$16,417,682

$724,447
13,626,983
25,997,645
2,181,755
352,511
69,787
64,003
726
$43,017,858

$724,211
12,976,881
-7,655,964
-95,030,454
-112,423,562
-83,550,547
-112,158,816
-32 '229 '582
-$429,347,832

3,189
3,071
257,928
7,049
88
299
299

$25,746
80,072
6,289,519
145,896
1,030
897
10,172

All Taxpayers
$5,000
000 - 10,000
,000 - 20,000
,000 - 30,000
30,000 - 40,000
40,000 - 50,000
50,000- 100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

236
82,230
1,631,562
1,774,598
1,113,490
551,037
520,605
124,610
5,798,368

$236
650,102
33,653,609
97,212,209
112,776,073
83,620,333
112,222,819
32,230,308
$472,365,690
104

84,635
1,122,732
1,149,782
135,912
18,438
4,234
2,556
25
2,518,314

TABLE 25B
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
AGE EXEMPTIONS ($1,000 per exemption)
AGI Class
At
But Less
Least
Than

Value
Number
of
of
Exemptions
Exemptions
( t h 0 u s a n d s )
Single Taxpayers

$5,000
$5,000 10,000
10,000 20,000
20,000 30,000
30,000 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 and Over
Totals

148
136
80
1

*
*
*
366

$0
5,440
5,600
152
51
23
7
$11,273

Joint Taxpayers
$5,000
$5,000 10,000
10,000 20,000
30,000
20,000 30,000 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 and Over
Totals

168
295
259
7

3
1
1
734

$0

0
10,352
430
278
140
55
$11,255

All Taxpayers
$5,000
$5,000 10,000
10,000 20,000
20,000 30,000
30,000 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 and Over
Totals

316
431
339
8
3
1
1

1,099

$0
5,440
15,952
582
329
163
62
$22,528

*Less than 500.
This table was derived from data published in the U.S. Statistics
of Income - Individual Income Tax Returns.
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STANDARD DEDUCTION

Both laws provide a standard deduction from adjusted gross
those taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions.
amounts allowed by each law differ however, and federal law
after 1976 contains a new concept for the standard deduction called
"zero bracket amount." The state indexes its standard
deduction.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
Full conformity to federal law would cause a revenue loss of
110 million for 1981.
For tax effect by income class and type of return, see table
on page 109.
FEDERAL LAW
The standard deduction was added to the law by the Individual
Income Tax Act of 1944. The stated purpose was to simplify both the
tax return and the computation of tax liability. The existence of a
standard amount, allowable to all taxpayers, makes possible the construction and use of tax tables. The initial tax table allowed a
deduction of 10 percent of adjusted gross income up to $5,000, for a
maximum deduction of $500. This deduction was in lieu of any
itemized deductions, such as contributions, interest and taxes, to
which the taxpayer may have been entitled.

•

In the case of married persons filing a joint return, there
is only one adjusted gross income and consequently, only one standard
deduction. The standard deduction was not allowed to either spouse
if the income of one spouse is determined without regard to the
standard deduction. This rule is necessary to prevent one spouse
from claiming all the itemized deductions while the other spouse
claimed the standard deduction.
The Revenue Act of 1964 changed the name of the standard
deduction to the "10% standard deduction" and raised the adjusted
gross income base to $10,000.
As the income level of the country rose over the years, and
as more persons purchased homes, it became increasingly advantageous
to itemize deductions. Therefore, the standard deduction was again
revised by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Under that Act, the standard
deduction is the larger of the "percentage standard deduction" or
the "low income allowance." The percentage standard deduction
increased the allowable amounts as follows:
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Taxable Years
Beginning In

Applicable
Percentage

Maximum
Amount

10
13
14
15

$1,000
1,500
2,000
2,000

70
1971
1972
1973 and thereafter

The low income allowance is set forth below:
Year

Amount

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

$1,050
1,300
1,300
1,300
1,900

The Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977 repealed
all provisions regarding the standard deduction and substituted the
"zero bracket amount" for taxable years beginning after 1976.
For individual taxpayers, the 1977 act redefined taxable
income in terms of the zero bracket amount. The zero bracket amount
is that part of a taxpayer's income which is not subject to tax.
However, in order to "simplify" the tax computation, the amount of
the zero bracket amount is built into the tax tables and tax rate
schedules. The net result of all this is that taxable income is
now defined as adjusted gross income--(1) either minus any excess
itemized deductions or plus any unused zero bracket amount, and (2)
minus exemptions.
The zero bracket amounts currently are:
Married persons filing jointly
Single persons and head of household
Married persons filing separately

$3,400
2,300
1,700

As earlier noted, these amounts are built into the tax
tables and tax rate schedules. Taxpayers, therefore, who itemize
their deductions can only deduct the excess of those deductions over
the zero bracket amount. Those persons required by law to itemize
deductions (e.g., unmarried person filing a separate return whose
spouse itemized) are required to increase income by the amount, if
any, by which their zero bracket amount exceeds their allowable
itemized deductions.
CALIFORNIA LAW
California law and federal law (prior to the federal adoption
of the zero bracket amount approach, which California has not adopted)
were essentially the same.
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the standard deduction was $500
person fi
a separate return
filing jointly,
houseamounts were increased to
, for the
1968-1978. Tax40,000 taxable income (or amounts as
prescribed by the Franchise Tax Board) are required to use a
tax table to determine their state income tax, and the FTB is
tted to redesign the form so that the standard deduction
no longer be
into the tax table; taxpayers would
claim
deduction or itemize and then go to
to
their tax liability.
For
1978, the standard deduction is indexed
to reflect the
the Consumer Price Index from June
the prior
, rounded off to the nearest $10. For this
reason
1979 standard deduction is $1,100 or $2,200, whichever is
cab
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1.

Rationale for Federal Law. The standard deduction is
recognition that all taxpayers incur some deductible
during the
ar and that some allowance should be made
zero
t amount approach was intended to
the preparation of the return.

2. Rationale for California Law. The same considerations
produced the standard deduction for federal purposes were
the formulation of the California law. The different
amounts
lowed generally reflect different fiscal situations in
state and
California has not conformed to
the federal zero bracket amount approach because it appeared to
add complexity to the law rather than simplification and, therefore, it was thought wise to wait and later review the federal
experience.
3. Equity v. Simplification. The entire concept of
deductions from income is a question which over the years has
received much consideration. There is no question but that
deductions complicate the law and contain a definite element of
the arbitrary. For example, a donation to a recognized charitable
organization is allowed as a deduction. The same donation to a
starving child
the street is not. The reason for this
difference in treatment, while perhaps not noble, is understandable; namely verification.
If there were no curbs and standards,
the tax system would likely collapse. A standard deduction
eliminates the need for verification, and as lt lS increased, it
displaces persons
currently itemize. A more radical departure
would be to eliminate all deductions and soften the tax burden
by adjusting the tax rates.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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TABLE 26
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
Standard Deductions
AGI
Least

But Less
Than

Returns With Tax Decrease
Amount of
No. of Returns
Tax Decrease
Single Taxrayers

$5,000
,000
10,000
,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30 000
40,000
,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
,000 And Over
Totals

37,830
1' 111' 112
1,065,716
248,606
40,792
11,526
9,111
1,476
2,526,167

&

Returns With Tax Increase
Amount of
No. of Returns
Tax Increase
Married Filing Serarate

$139,670
22,866,855
45,954,291
17,608,663
3,080,904
828,277
678,480
110,312
$91,267,452
Joint Taxrayers

$5,000
5,000
10,000
,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

9,330
18,487
765,899
474,354
182,666
63,757
47,675
7,557
1,569,725

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
&

$0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Surviving srouse
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

$0
0

1,063
1,063
267,266
50,898
7,520
1,099
954
248
330 '110

$1,181
8,621
5,915,265
2,409,499
430,753
74,478
63,048
17,007
$8,919,852

1,063
1,063
267,266
50,898
7,520
1,099
954
248
330,ll0

$1,181
8,621
5,915,265
2,409,499
430,753
74,478
63,048
17,007
$8,919,852

$10,629
54,988
9,122,674
9,526,672
5,036,818
2,173,036
1,926,320
314,283
$28,165,419

0

0
0
0

0
0

Unmarried Head of Household
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

$0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$0
All Taxpayers

$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

7/18/80

47,160
1,129,598
1,831,615
722,960
223,458
75,283
56,786
9,033
4,095,892

$150,299
22,921,843
55,076,965
27,135,334
8,117,722
3,001,313
2,604,800
424,595
$119,432,872
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CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Both California and federal law allow an itemized deduction
for charitable contributions. The differences between the two
laws are:

•

1. California limits the charitable contribution deduction
to 20% of AGI.
Under federal law, the limit for most contributions
is 50% of AGI (although contributions to some types of organizations
are limited to 20%).
There's also a difference in the calculation
of AGI to which the limit applies, due to other provisions of law.
2.
Federal law provides for a charitable contribution for
amounts spent to support non-dependent students (max:
$50 a month).
California does not permit this deduction butallows a separate
"dependent tax credit" which is indexed by CPI ($9 in 1979).
3.
California permits a charitable deduction as well as
a business expense deduction (a double deduction) for the cost
of agricultural products donated to a non-profit charitable
organization. Federal law does not allow such treatment.
4.
California law contains a special provision for artists,
not found in federal law.
The federal law allows a full deduction
for the value of art works created by the owner which have appreciated in value, if the value of the work is established by
independent appraisal and if 20% or more of the AGI of the taxpayer is derived from the sale of artistic property created by
such taxpayer.

ISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF FULL CONFORMITY
1.

Conform to federal 50% limit--State general fund
revenue loss of $25 million for 1981.

2.

Conform on other items--Unknown revenue implications, probably minor.

For tax effect by income class, see Table 27 on page 114.

CALIFORNIA LAW
The fair market value of property or money donated to
qualified charitable organizations may be deducted from AGI to a
maximum of 20% of AGI. Any excess may be carried forward up to
five years.
There are special rules for property which has
appreciated in value.
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If an individual (other than an artist) contributes
ated property, the allowable deduction is limited to the
's basis if the property, if sold would have resulted in
income or a
from the sale
a capital asset held
less than one year.
Current law also requires that the deduction of up to the
full fair market value of assets held more than one year must be
reduced by the amount of the reportable gain, if the property is
tangible personal property and the property will be used by the
donee organization in a manner unrelated to the exempt organization's purpose or function.
Also, if the tangible personal property
held more than one year is given to a private foundation, the
lowable deduction must be reduced by the reportable gain.
Charitable contributions of artistic property created by
the personal efforts of the income taxpayer (artist) are not
reduced because of the appreciated value of such artistic
property if:
(1)

20% or more the the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income is derived from the sale of artistic
property created by such taxpayer, and

(2)

the fair market value of the artistic property
is established by independent appraisal.

The value of a service donated to a charitable organization
is not deductible, but expenses incurred in connection with the
donation of the service are deductable.

FEDERAL LAW
Under federal law, contributions of money or property to
qualified charitable organizations may be deducted up to 50% of
the taxpayer's AGI (20% for certain organizations not regarded
as public charities such as war veterans' and fraternal organizations).
Amounts contributed in excess of the limit may be carried
over up to five years.
The value of a service donated to a charitable organization
is not deductible, but expenses incurred in connection with the
donation of the service are deductable.
There are special rules for properties which have
appreciated in value.
These are similar to California law,
except for the special provisions for artists.
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1.
Deductions for philanthropy are
justified as a way o
centralizing decisionmaking in wel
and cultural matters and to some extent as a
way of providing tax incentives for the private subsidization of
activities which might otherwise have to be carried out at public
expense.

•

Will an increase
the amount of allowable deductions
from state income tax, above 20% of AGI, increase the amount of
charitable giving? The major tax incentives will come from the
deductions allowed against federal law. There is no clear evidence
to help evaluate the impact of a state tax change on charitable
giving.
According to the U.S. Treasury Department, there are
many non-economic incentives for giving. These include:
" •.. responses to social awareness, generosity, social
pressure, pity, and habit. To the extent that the
noneconomic factors influence charitable giving
patterns, changes in the tax treatment of charitable
donations have little repercussion on the level of
contributions.
"Since these noneconomic motivations are largely
nonquantifiable, the importance of the economic
incentive is difficult to distinguish from that of
the noneconomic incentive. There is reason to
believe, however, that noneconomic motivations have
considerable influence on the level of giving. This
is substantiated by the fact that studies relating
variations in charitable contributions to changes
in both the tax treatment and the incomes of contributors have been successful in explaining scarcely
half of the observed variation in contributions."
2. Rationale for Federal Law. The present 50% federal limit
was enacted as part of the Federal Tax Reform Act of 1969. In
that measure, the then-30% cap was raisedto 50%, but the unlimited
deduction available to some taxpayers was also eliminated. Data
published in connection with the bill show an increase in federal
revenue from the interaction of the two provislon~.
According to the Senate Finance Committee:
"In order to strengthen the incentive effect of the
charitable contributions deduction for taxpayers,
the committee's bill generally increases the present
30-percent limitation to 50 percent. The committee
believes this change is particularly desirable in
view of the repeal of the unlimited charitable
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contributions deduction.
It is believed that the
increase in the limitation will benefit taxpayers who donate substantial portions of their
income to charity and for whom the incentive effect
of the deduction is strong--primarily taxpayers in
the middle and upper income ranges.
In addition,
the combination of the increase in the limitation
to 50 percent with the repeal of the unlimited
charitable deduction means, in effect, that charity
can remain an equal partner with respect to an
individual's income; however, charitable contributions no longer will be allowed to reduce an individual's tax base by more than one-half."
3. Simplification Argument. Conformity would help simplify
tax computations for those taxpayers who contribute more than 20%
of their income to charity. However, due to differences in
calculation of AGI, part of which may be due to u.s. Constitutional restriction, even if the state conforms to the federal
limit, the dollar amount which could be deducted may still be
different.
4. Beneficiaries. As noted in the U.S. Senate Finance
Committee report, conformity will generally benefit upper-middle
and upper income taxpayers who can afford to give away more than
20% of their income in a given year.
5. Revenue Exporting.
The Franchise Tax
40% to 50% of the benefits of conformity on this
lost to the federal government in higher federal
the reduction of California income tax deduction)

Board estimates
issue will be
taxes (due to
.

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
SB 94 (McBride) was introduced in 1961 to conform to
what was then the federal law in charitable contributions. The
bill was sent to interim.
Since that time federal law has changed
substantially.
AB 606 (Sieroty) was introduced in 1972 to conform to
federal law.
The measure died in Senate Finance.
AB 905 (Sieroty) was introduced in 1973 to increase the
20% limit to 30%. Thls provision was deleted in the Senate prior
to passage.
SB 1373 (Maddy) was introduced in 1980 to allow charitable
contributions to be aeducted from gross income, rather than from
adjusted gross income, provided such contributions did not exceed
20% of AGI computed without regard to AGI.
(This meant a taxpayer could take the standard deduction and still deduct charitable
contributions.)
This bill would have moved state law further out of
conformity with federal law.
It was vetoed by the Governor.
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TABLE 27
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
Contribution Limit Increase

At

AGI Class
But Less
Than

Tax Decrease
No. of Returns

Amount of Tax Decrease

Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate

•

$5,000
,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

118
956
4,734
1,570
623
505
1,008
606
10,120

$1,653
9,427
283,455
197,798
334,781
271,834
1,124,087
3,931~948

$6,154,983

Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

118
118
3,135
5,519
1,697
1,292
1,866
2,246
15,991

$827
2,126
74,104
334,565
114,599
443,204
1,197,716
16,669,604
$18,836,745

Unmarried Head of Household
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
100,000
50,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

$0

0
0
148
0
0
59

0

2,831
0
0

34,649
30,439
206,365
$274,284

77

16
299
All Taxpayers

$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

FTB/R&S

7/18/80

236
1,074
8,016
7,089
2,320
1,856
2,950
2,869
26,410
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$2,480
11,553
360,389
532,364
449,380
749,687
2,352,243
20,807,917
$25,266,013

POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TAX DEDUCTION

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
California allows a deduction from adjusted gross income,
not to exceed $100 annually ($200 joint return) •
Federal law uses the method of a tax credit against taxes
due, not to exceed $50 for an individual ($100 joint return).

FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
It is estimated that adopting the federal method and limits
would reduce state revenues by approximately $12 million annually.
For taxpayer impact by income class, see Table 28 on p.ll6.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONF0R}1ITY
l. Need. The purpose of both federal and state provisions
is to encourage financial participation in political affairs by
citizens of moderate means. Given the limits on the deduction (or
credit), the provisions have little financial impact on the wealthy.
2.
Incentive Value. The credit method is substantially
more enticing to taxpayers in lower marginal tax brackets, or to
taxpayers who do not itemize deductions. However, it is questionable whether a change from deduction to credit would actually induce substantially more taxpayers to participate, or simply give
current participants another tax break.
3. Federal Interaction. The Franchise Tax Board staff
estimates that the typ1cal participant is in an average marginal
federal tax bracket of 25%. Given a $12 million state revenue
loss, the federal gain under conformity would be approximately
$3 million annually from the increase in federal taxes of California itemizers.
HECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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TABLE 28
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
Political Contributions
AGI
Least

Tax Decrease
But Less
Than

No. of Returns

Amount of Tax Decrease

Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate
$5,000
,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40 000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

118
369,939
794,370
176,067
23,276
6,376
7,259
2,662
1,380,067

$118
417,200
1,031,590
470,950
204,297
83,544
135,669
80,383
$2,423,751

Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

$118

118
0

0

385,994
379,111
177,380
80,509
83,748
34,569
1,141,429

731,507
1,321,637
1,823,718
1,559,057
2,227,993
1,518,329
$9,182,358

Unmarried Head of Household
$5,000
,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

$0

0
0
87,730
40,301
5,788
1,516
1,144
686
137,164

0

225,939
124,850
52,783
28 ,424
19,459
18,851
$470,307
All Taxpayers

$5,000
$5,000
10,000
20,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

236
369,939
1,268,094
595,479
206,443
88,401
92,151
37,917
2,658,660
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$236
417,200
1,989,037
1,917,437
2,080,798
1,671,025
2,383,120
1,617,562
$12,076,416

GAS TAX DEDUCTION

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
California law allows for an itemized deduction for
the amount of state gasoline tax paid (7¢ times the number
of gallons purchased) .
Federal law does not provide for a gasoline tax deduction .

•

FISCAL EFFECTS OF FULL CONFORMITY
State General Fund revenue increase of $30 million for
1981.
For tax effect by income class and filing status,
see Table 29 on page 119 .

FEDERAL LAW
The former federal gas tax deduction was repealed as
part of the Federal Revenue Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-600).
CALIFORNIA LAW
See above.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1. Arguments in favor of conformity, and which were
used to justify the federal action of repealing the gas tax
deduction are as follows:
a.

The deduction of the gasoline tax has no more
justification than a deduction for bridge
tolls (which are not deductible).
This tax
is, by constitutional mandate, a user charge
designed to pay for the cost of a service.

b.

In a time when energy conservation is important, it is questionable tax policy to reward
large users of gasoline energy with larger
income tax write-offs.

c.

Since this is an item common to nearly all taxpayers who itemize, conformity will simplify
tax reporting.
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d.

The gas tax deduction is unenforceable
within rather broad limit$, as most taxpayers have no records to support the
number of miles driven in any given year.

2. Arguments which can be made in opposition to
conformity include:
a.

Many consider deductibility of excise and
other taxes from the income tax essential
to avoid "double taxation". These people
consider elimination of the gas tax deduction to be a step toward double taxation
of gasoline.

b.

Deductibility of sales tax, including
sales tax on gasoline, makes it difficult
to justify removing deductibility of the
gas tax.

c.

Conformity would cause a tax increase of
approximately $8 for each of 3 million
itemizing taxpayers.

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
1. AB 93 (W. Brown), 1978-Comprehensive Committee
bill on conformity with the Federal Revenue Act of 1978.
The provision repealing the gasoline tax deduction was
deleted by Senate Revenue and Taxation Committee.
2. AB 2030 (Levine), 1979.Energy Conservation Credit.
This bill was amended by Assembly Rev & Tax to repeal the
gasoline tax as a cost offset to new credits in the bill.
The provision repealing the gasoline tax deduction was
deleted by Assembly Ways and Means.
3.
SB 1911 (Petris), 1979. Credit for transit passes
and vanpools. Proposed to repeal the gasoline tas deduction
to offset cost of proposed new tax credits.
Failed passage
on Assembly floor.
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TABLE 29
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR

Gas Tax Deduction Elimination
AGI Class
But Less
At Least
Than

Tax Increase
No. of Returns

Amount of Tax Increase

Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

354
37' 722
256,063
258,244
87,119
28,067
31,054
8,600
707,223

$354
76,128
1,152,561
1,982,829
844,054
225,353
246,355
68,373
$4,596,007

Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

$0
2,244
732,342
4,571,543
6,568,880
4,860,803
5,227,431
1,115,593
$23,078,836

0

2,126
244,265
834,070
803,982
445,312
416,805
96,289
2,842,848

Unmarried Head of Household
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

0
0

$0

78,868
73,564
27,425
7,916
7,247
2,135
197,155

287,405
566,524
296,389
91,558
62,064
20,111
$1,324,052

0

All Taxpayers
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

FTB/R&S

7/18/80

354
39,848
579,195
1,165,878
918,526
481,296
455,106
107,024
3,747,226
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$354
78,372
2,172,308
7,120,897
7,709,323
5,177' 714
5,535,850
1,204,076
$28,998,895

PLANS

individuals are permitted
retirement account which
ect to tax when
very similar with the
amounts permitted to

FEDERAL LAW
under the sponsorship
taxable years
this provision a selffied pension plan,
This contribution
• There are
taxes and penalties for early
and other distributions
d
ibution.
92)

are
The contribution
of $750 (even
tion) or 100% of

of contribution to such plans.
must be at least the lesser
of earned income limita-

CALIFORNIA LAW
most
no

parallels the federal in
of deductibility, howThere are

POLICY ISSUES
was
corporate
plans in
has

federal enactment
individuals who
provisions available to
and the inclusion of such
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
this area.

2.

Rationale for California Law - California has followed
law very closely, inclUdinq the ERISA provisions, on
•
may be argued that the lower contribution
fornia's lower tax rates.

3.
Budget Impact - In a period of projected budget
deficits conformity would result in substantial revenue losses.
4.
Administration - Since California is in substantial
conformity with most of the technical and procedural features of
federal pension and stock option provisions there is no particular
administrative benefit to be gained by conformity with the federal
contribution limits.
5.
Taxtayer Com~liance - Conformity to federal limits
would avoid con usion an uncertainty among participating taxpayers, e.g., some taxpayers still claim the federal deduction for
California purposes1 this can be burdensome because there are
penalties for excess contributions.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
1.
SB 822 (Nielson), 1980. Conforms state law to federal
law with regard to maximum contribution limits for self-employed
pension plans. Vetoed.
2.
AB 766 (Filante), 1979. Amends state law to conform
to various changes in federal law relating to retirement plans.
Died in Assembly Revenue & Taxation Committee.
3.
AB 1131 (Nestande), 1977. Increases the amount of
deductible contribution by a self-employed individual to a qualified
pension plan to conform to the current federal limitations. Died
in Assembly Revenue & Taxation Committee.
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ADOPTION
LAW
costs
tax purposes.

, 0

1

to

ncome tax law contains no comparable provi-

s
EFFECT

FULL CONFORMITY
nse
imately

state revenues

increase

FEDERAL LAW
law
expenses, but
s
adopted chi
to

no income tax deduction for adoption
certain medical expenses of an
by the adopti
parents.

CALIFORNIA LAW
ion
nses deductible under
ated medical expenses of the
r
plus welfare agency, legal and
other costs relating
adoption. Generally, only those
qualified adoption expenses which exceed three percent of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income may be deducted for state
income tax purposes. The maximum deduction allowed is $1,000.
state

Hard-to-Place Children. Otherwise qualified taxpayers
who adopt "hard-to-place" chlldren may deduct the maximum
$1,000 of adoption expenses regardless of the level of their
income.
That is, they are not subject to the three percent
AGI test. A "hard" child is defined as "a child who
is disadvantaged because of adverse parental background, or a
handicapped chi , or a
ild of three years or more."
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1. Tax Policy or Social Program? From a tax policy
standpoint, allowing an income tax deduction for major medical
expenses is most often justified on the grounds that extraordinary, nonelective expenses can severely restrict a
taxpayer's "ability to pay" his or her income tax liability.

2

Adoption expenses do not clearly fall within this category to
the extent they are incurred largely at the option of the
taxpayer. Deductions such as those for medical expenses and
casualty losses also have been justified as a form of
"coinsurance" through which the state shares in the taxpayer's
risk of incurring large, unanticipated costs. Again, because
they are discretionary, there is no comparable rationale for
the deduction of adoption expenses.
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis. To the extent California's
adoption expense deduction is intended to encourage and/or
subsidize adoption, rather than to further tax equity goals,
the key conformity issues would seem to be:
a) Is an income tax deduction the most effective
and efficient mechanism for accomplishing this goal?
(One of the more serious limitations of using an income
tax deduction as a social policy tool is that it provides no benefits to taxpayers claiming the standard
deduction or to individuals with a zero tax liability.)
b) To what extent does the use of a "tax expenditure," rather than a direct Budget Act appropriation,
limit the Legislature's opportunities to review and
evaluate the costs and benefits of the adoption expense
deduction?
c) Can the costs of nonconformity (in terms of
foregone revenues and increased tax return complexity)
be justified by the measurable benefits of the
deduction?
RECENT LEGISLATION
None.
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DEDUCTION FOR REPAIR/REMODELLING OF BUILDINGS
OR TRANSPORTATION FOR THE HANDICAPPED OR ELDERLY

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
State law provides a deduction (alternatively
lization and depreciation) for both businessrelated and
sonal expenditures. This includes
personal res
s and transportation.
law is limited to business-related expenditures, the benefit of which is for the general
handicapped (or elderly) public.
State law sunsets as of 1985; federal law is
repealed as of 1983.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
Full conformity would produce minor savings for
the state. (The Franchise Tax Board est1mates that the
more inclusive
sions of Section 17238 (R&TC) currently
reduce state revenues by approximately $250,000 annually.)
CALIFORNIA LAW
Section 17238 (under a different number) was added
to the R&T Code in 1977. This followed enactment of
federal law in 1976. The state law is particularly
beneficial to individually handicapped (or elderly)
people who have funds to remodel or alter their personal
residential or transportation property for their personal
benefit. The maximum allowable deduction in one year
is $25,000.
FEDERAL LAW
The 1976 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code
provided for the equivalent $25,000 deduction, but is
limited to trades or businesses which deal with the
handicapped/elderly public.
The federal law is scheduled
to expire (after further amendments) in 1983.
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1. Need. The need for the differential between
the personal aspects of state law, and the more limited
aspects of federal law would appear to depend on individual legislative philosophy. The amount of money is not
great.
2.
Incentive Value. Since the benefit of the
California differentlal lS strictly personal, the public
interest of the state provisions may rest in concepts
such as:
a.

The ability of a handicapped person to equip
a vehicle to provide himself with a practical
means of gainful employment.

b.

The potential that elderly people may avoid
accidents which might lead to higher public
health costs.

In view of the maximum 11% marginal state tax rate
for individual returns, the incentive for non-personal
use of the combined federal/state provision would appear
small. The FTB estimates that users of the state provision
(from a personal standpoint) are probably at about the
35% marginal rate onfue federal tax. The net incentive
value is therefore about 8% of whatever personal expenditure is made in a year.
3. Time Limits. The available time limit for both
state and federal law have been extended since their
original adoptions. As an alternative to conforming the
1985 state expiration date to the 1983 federal date, the
committee may wish to eliminate any state date after
1985, and let the state law ride on whatever extensions
are granted federally.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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STATE INCOME TAX DEDUCTIBILITY
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
its state income taxes to be deducted
tax
, but does not allow a deducincome tax.
In other words, the federal
against itself.
Cali
income taxe

•

tax law allows neither state nor federal
ucted for state income tax purposes.

FISCAL EFFECT OF
state income tax as a deduction against
adopting federal taxable income as the
reduce state revenues by approximately
ax year.
For tax ef
table on
9.

by income class and type of return, see

FEDERAL LAW
law
lows state income taxes to be deducted for
income tax
Administratively, the federal
state income taxes is computed in two steps.
withholding tax payments made in the current
1 s
(as
form W-2) are included in the
's item
uctions.
Second, any refund of prioryear state income taxes received in the current year is added
to taxable income
e combined effect of these two computa1 taxable income by the net amount of
tions is to
uce
cash state income tax payments actually paid during the tax
f

CALIFORNIA LAW
to be

not permit the state income tax itself
for sta
ncome tax purposes. Most other
taxes (e.g., sales, property and gasoline
uctible and a credit is available for income
states.
Based on a strict comparison of
, federal and California tax laws are not
t to the deductibility of the state
, California does clearly conform to
the sense that neither the state nor the
its its respective income tax to be
itself.
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
Reduction in Progressivity. Apart from the
1 revenue loss, the most significant effect of state
uctibility
a
uct
in the "progresof the state income tax.
Due to a steeply graduated
tax rate s
ule, taxpayers at higher levels of income
current
a much greater proportionate share of their
income in state income taxes than do lower income taxpayers.
Because f this
because many low-income taxpayers do not
deductions, allowing the state income tax to be
from itself would result in much greater dollar and
uctions in state income taxes for higher income
for those at lower income levels. As a result,
some reduction in the progressivity of the
ncome tax, i.e., the rate at which the tax, as a percent of
income, rises with income.
The following table illustrates the average impact of
state income tax deductibility on married taxpayers at dift income levels. As shown in this table, both the dollar
tax decrease due to state income tax deducili
rise rapidly with income.
For example, taxpayers
with $20,000 to $30,000 of income would realize an average
nnual tax
uction of about $15, or 2.7 percent of current
tax.
For taxpayers with incomes above $100,000, the dollar
uct
average $1,773, representing nearly 11 percent
of current tax.
Impact on Married Taxpayers of
State Income Tax Deductibility
1981 Income Year
AGI Class

Amount

$10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
00,000

$

- 20,000
- 30,000
- 40,000
- 50,000
-100,000
and over

3

15
44
103
305
1,773

Average Tax Decrease
Percent of Current Tax
0.7%
2.7
5.1
7.4
9.9
10.8

It s important to note that this reduced progressivity
along wi
the revenue losses associated with state income
tax deductibility) could be minimized with offsetting tax rate
c
s.
2.
most f
taxes

Rationale for federal deduction. The arguments
tly offered for the deduction of state income
federal tax purposes are that the deduction:
a)

Encourages state use of the income tax;
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b)
Narrows interstate net tax differences and,
,
ts
impact of state tax policy on
population shifts; and
c)

Prevents excess ve, or even confiscatory, tax
ich
othe
result from the combined
of the state and
income taxes.

On more
state or local tax
tion or
s, but
is an
ate deduct

I

grounds, it is also argued that any
income available for consumpdirect benefits to the taxpayer,
the federal income tax base.

3. Federal Rationale Not Applicable to State. The
arguments listed above for allowing a state income tax deduction against
income taxes generally cannot be applied
at the state level. Much of the rationale for the federal
deductibility of state income taxes relates to interstate
fiscal coordination, an area in which the state has no
substant 1 responsibility. Although there may be some support
the deduct ility of state income taxes on purely
theoreti
grounds (ref
ting the fact that such taxes
reduce income avai
for consumption or savings), it is
equally logical to assume that the existing state income tax
rate schedule was designed based on the assumption that the
income tax itself would not be deductible.
4. Tax Return Preparation Considerations.
If the
state were to conform completely and automatically to federal
law (e.g., by adopting a percentage of the federal income tax
or the
t
e income base), one benefit to taxpayers
of allowing state income tax deductibility would be to
eliminate
relatively complex adjustments needed to net out
the effect of the federal deduction currently allowed for
state income taxes.
5. Administrative Versus Policy Conformity. The
deductibility of the state income tax may not even be a significant conformity issue, to the extent the Legislature's primary concern is with federal/state tax policy differences,
rather than with strict administrative conformity of the tax
bases. As indicated above, the state already conforms to the
federal policy of not allowing the income tax to be deducted
against itself.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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TABLE 30

FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
Deductibility of State Income Tax

Least

AGI Class
But Less Than

No. of Returns

Tax Decrease
Amount of Tax Decrease

Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate
000
10,000
20 000

000
40,000
50,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

$5,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
100,000

118
36,946
418,626
486,621
122' 778
38,360
42,641
12,033
1,158,124

$118
78,334
5,848,141
30,857,087
21,988,095
11,019,917
22,993,614
26,674,086
$119,459,392

Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse
$5,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
100,000

,000
10,000
20,000
,000
000
And Over

118
1,181
232,601
870,836
900,425
505,477
470,889
109,939
3,091,466

$118
1,299
806,462
13,489,246
39,614,716
52,076,548
143,412,088
194,927,027
$444,327,504

Unmarried Head of Household
$5,000
10,000
,000
,000
20,000
,000
30,000
,000
.40,000
,000
50,000
000
100,000
,000 And Over
Totals

$0
118
378,565
2,557,308
3,560,296
1,833,449
3,791,054
5,601,140
$17,721,931

0
118
77' 691
79,563
35,539
9,373
9,132
2,651
214,067
All Taxpayers

$5,000
000
10,000
000
20,000
,000
30,000
,000
40,000
000
50,000
50 000
100,000
000 And Over
Totals

236
38,245
728' 918
1,437,020
1,058,742
553,211
522,662
124,623
4,463,657

129
7/18/80

$236
79,751
7,033,169
46,903,641
65,163,107
64,929,914
170,196,756
227,202,253
$581,508,827

EARNED INCOME CREDIT

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Under this federal provision a refundable tax credit is
allowed on the "earned income" of lower income individuals.
California has no similar law.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY

I

Full conformity would result in tax refunds of about
$180 million for the 1981 taxable year.
FEDERAL LAW
The federal law allows a refundable tax credit of 10%
of earned income for the taxable year applied to earned income
not exceeding $5,000. The amount of the credit may not exceed
the excess of $500 over 12.5% of so much of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income (or, if greater, earned income) which
exceeds $6,000.
Earned income is defined as wages, salaries, tips and
other employee compensation, plus net earnings from selfemployment for the taxable year. Eligible individuals are
married persons entitled to a dependency exemption for a
child, a surviving spouse, or a person who qualifies as a head
of household. Persons entitled to a foreign source income
exclusion are not eligible for this credit.
CALIFORNIA LAW
California has no similar provision but does have a
special nonrefundable low income tax credit which relieves
low income persons of state tax liability.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1. Rationale for Federal Law - This credit first appeared
in the Revenue Act of 1924. In certain periods it was repealed
only to reappear in subsequent legislation. The purpose of this
provision is to provide cash assistance to low-income workers.
2.
Rationale for California Law The federal provision
is a form of negat1ve 1ncome tax. Cal1fornia has met the problem
of assistance to low-income persons both with direct assistance
programs and with its low income credit (see pagesl32-134).
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l
Administration - The federal law requires that
claimants of the cred1t provide certificates of eligibility
and must show that they have not made similar claims through
other employers. This could add considerably to administrative
burdens depending on how much of the federal system is adopted
by California. The federal law also contains provisions to
permit an eligible employee to claim a portion of the credit
during each pay period which places added burdens upon the
employer.

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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LOW INCOME CREDIT

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Federal law does not contain provisions for the allowance
of a low income credit as does California law.
The credit is
also indexed.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
The state revenue gain from full federal conformity (repeal of the low income credit) would be $500,000 for 1981.
For tax effect by income class and type of return, see
table on page 134 .
CALIFORNIA LAW
Since 1973 California law has provided a credit for persons
receiving less than a specified amount of income.
In the case of a single person or a married person filing
a separate return, the credit is $40 if the adjusted gross income
(plus any Keogh or IRA deductions made) of the taxpayer is
$5,000 or less and the total income is $10,000 or less. The
credit is reduced by fifty cents for each one dollar of adjusted
gross income in excess of $5,000.
In the case of a head of household, a surviving spouse, or
a married couple filing a joint return, the credit is $80 if the
adjusted gross income is $10,000 or less and the total income is
$20,000 or less. Again, the credit is reduced by fifty cents for
each one dollar such adjusted gross income is in excess of $10,000.
The credit is not allowed to any taxpayer required to pay
a preference tax.
For taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1979,
the credit is indexed to reflect the changes in the Consumer
Price Index from June of the prior year, rounded off to the
nearest $1.
For this reason, for 1979 the credit is a maximum
of $44 for single taxpayers and married taxpayers filing
separately and $88 for all other taxpayers.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY

1. Rationale for California Law - The rationale for the
low income cred1t evolved out of a bas1c policy decision that
low income persons should not have to bear a part of the income
tax burden because they do not have the "ability to pay."
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2. Equity Considerations - The foundation of a progressive income tax system is that each should pay according
to his ability.
Is it, therefore, equitable to excuse anyone
from making at least some contribution toward the support and
maintenance of the society in which he lives? While this program is modes, its beneficiaries nonetheless enjoy the advantages
of numerous public services.
Is it fair that they should contribute nothing and thereby raise the contribution of others?

3. Disappearing Credit. Although the credit was
indexed, the $5,000/$10,000 ceiling was not adjusted. Therefore, for certain taxpayers, there is a disappearing credit
because of the interaction with indexed brackets, the standard
deduction, personal credits, and the rate of the phase-out for
income over the ceiling.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
AB 234 (McCarthy), 1979. Raises the adjusted gross
income (AGI) limits for the special low-income credit from
$5,000 to $7,000 and from $10,000 to $14,000 for the 1979
and 1980 taxable years. The AGI limits for 1981 and subsequent years would be these limits indexed for inflation.
The amount of the low-income credit would be the amount of
the tax liability for a taxpayer with AGI equal to or less
than the limit. This amount would be reduced by 50 cents
for each one dollar of AGI in excess of the AGI limits.
Taxpayers require to pay tax on preference income would not
be eligible to claim the special low-income tax credit.
Died in the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee.
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TABLE 31
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
Special Low Income Credit Eliminated

At

AGI Class
But Less
Than

Tax Increase
No. of Returns
Single

$5,000
,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

Amount of Tax Increase

TaxEa~ers &

34,800
30,050
118
0
0
0
0
0
64,968

$69,903
171,976
4, 724
0
0
0
0
0
$246,604

Joint TaxEayers
$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

Married Filing SeEarate

&

Surviving SEouse

118
8,308
10,039
118
0
0
0
0
18,583

$118
$26,824
148,819
9,448
0
0
0
0
$185,209

Unmarried Head of Household

•

$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

0
5,414
5,074
0
0
0
0
0
10,488

$0
$17,381
53,985
0
0
0
0
0
$71,366
All

$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

34,918
43,772
15,231
118
0
0
0
0
94,040
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TaxEa~ers

$70,022
216,181
207,528
9,448
0
0
0
0
$503,179

EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CHILD-CARE EXPENSES
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Both federal and state law permit a tax credit for
certain "employment-related" expenses of caring for children
and other dependents.
The major differences are:
1.
Size of credit: Federal law allows a credit of
20% of qual1fy1ng expenses, while state law allows a credit
of 3% of qualifying expenses.
2.
Phase-out of credit: Federal law does not phase
out the credit as income rises.
The California credit is
reduced by 2% of the amount of the credit for each $100 of
AGI over $15,000. Thus, no credit is allowed if AGI is
$20,000 or more.

FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
Full conformity to the federal provisions would result
in a revenue loss of $75 million in 1981. This is compared
to the $2 mill1on revenue loss of California's current childcare credit.

FEDERAL LAW
The Federal Tax Reform Act of 1976 changed the federal
treatment of child-care costs from a deduction to the current
credit. The basic provisions of federal law are as follows:
Size of credit:
20% of qualifying expenses.
Expenses not to exceed:
$2,000 for one dependent,
$4,000 for two or more dependents.
Qualifying expenses: Employment-related household
services and direct care.
Eligibility of dependents: Child under age 15 or
dependent or spouse of taxpayer who is physically
or mentally incapable of caring for himself.
Limits on income: Earned income only, not to exceed
income of spouse with lesser earnings.
Generally,
if one spouse is not working, no credit is allowed.
No upper limit on eligibility based on income.
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CALIFORNIA LAW
In 1977, California law was changed to conform in all
respects to the new federal child-care credit, except the
two areas of divergence listed above. Prior to 1977,
California also allowed a deduction for certain child care
expenses.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY

1. Rationale for Federal Law. The reason for setting
the size of the federal cred1t at 20% is not known. The purpose of imposing no income ceiling on eligibility--a departure
from the prior federal law--was to allow more families to use
the provision.
Further, a fundamental of tax theory is that
all expenses of earning income should be deducted, regardless
of cost.
2.
Rationale for State Departures from Federal Law.
The apparent purposes for California's deliberate divergence
from federal law in 1977 were:
a.

Tax Relief.
Tax relief of another 20% of
child care costs on top of federal credit
not justified or needed; additional tax relief
of 3% was considered sufficient, as the state
tax burden is proportionately smaller than
the federal.

b.

Concentration of Benefits. The phase-out
feature concentrates benefits among lowerincome taxpayers, who presumably are less
able to afford child-care costs than higherincome taxpayers.

c.

Revenue Effect. These two features limit the
amount of state revenue loss.

3.
Cumulative Tax Relief.
If California were to
conform fully to federal law, the effective total credit
enjoyed by taxpayers would be 40% of qualifying expenses.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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RENTERS CREDIT

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
California law allows a refundable income tax credit
for qualified renters. There is no comparable federal
provision.

•

FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
State General Fund savings of $420 million for 1981.
For tax effect by income class and filing status,
see Table 32 on page 139 .

FEDERAL LAW
Federal law does not provide for a renters credit.
CALIFORNIA LAW
California law allows a refundable income tax credit
for qualified renters. Married renters, heads of households
surviving spouses are entitled to a $137 credit and single
renters are entitled to a $60 credit.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1.
History of the Renters credit. The renters credit
California originally was enacted to offset the impact of
a sales tax increase which funded tax relief for homeowners
(SB 90 of 1972).

Subsequently, the State Constitution was amended to
require renters relief comparable to homeowner relief (but
not vice versa).
In 1976, the original variable credit of $25-$45
(based on income) was changed to a flat $37 credit.
In 1979, the Legislature increased the amount of the
renters tax credit to present levels.
The rationale for
the higher level for married renters is that in many cases
single renters share domiciles.
The comparable tax benefits received by homeowners from
the homeowners' exemption is approximately $84.
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2. Viewed as a State Issue. The federal government
provides for no renters tax cred~t, since the federal government has not attempted to fund a separate homeowners' relief
program, preferring to leave such matters to the individual
states.
3. Constitutional Constraint. Full conformity with
federal law--that is, repealing the renters tax credit--would
probably require a change in the California Constitution,
even though the credit was originally enacted statutorily
(see Comment #1) .
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
SB 1604 (Wilson), 1980. Proposed giving the $137 renters'
credit to surviving spouses permanently (until remarriage), rather
than the current 2 year period. Died in Ways and Means.
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TABLE 32
Elimination of the Renters' credit
Existing Levels of Benefit {1977 tax year) *

I
I

REKTER'S CREDIT

ADJUSTED GROSS
INCOME CLASS
NOKTJI.XJ\BLE RETURNS
NO ADJ. GROSS INCOME
$1 UNDER
$1,000
2. 0 0 0
1' 0 0 0 UNDER
UNDER
3.000
2 '0 0 0
4.000
3' 0 0 0 UNDER
4,000 UNDER
5,000

•

5,000 UNDER

6,000 UKDER
7. 0 0 0 UNDER
8,000 UNDER

9,000 UNDER
1 0 '0 0 0 J\ND OVER
~OTAL

6.000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10,000

NONTAXABLE RETURNS

HUMBER

AMOUKT

153. 116
103.404
145,273
18 6. 18 0
218,746
206.098

$5,272.001
3,750,080
5,265,066
6,811,626
8,013,795
7,563,434

96,367
98. 16 5
97,940
91,474
89.224
6' 6 18

3,552,406
3.617,889
3.599,134
3,376,788
3,291.135
243,116

1. 492.605

$54,356,470

. TAXABLE RETURNS
LESS THfdi
3' 0 0 0 UNvEF.
4,000 UNDER
I

,000
,000
,000

2,765
2' 553

$63,907
6 4' 86 1

5,000
6' 0 0 0
7' 0 0 0
8.000
9' 0 0 0

UNDER
UNDER
UNDER
UNDER
UNDER

6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10' 000

133,603

4,902,432

118' 39 1
128,867
120,468
112.809

4,320,664
4,726,823
4,412.796
4,140,669

10' 000
11,000
1 z' 0 0 0
1 3' 0 0 0
14.000

UNDER
UHDER
UNDER
UNDER
UNDER

11.000
1 2. 0 0 ~I
1 3' 0 0 0
1 4' 0 0 0
1 5' 0 0 0

168' 0 18
169,375
157,1l75
133.036
11 3. 4 8 1

6,184,428
6,252.219
5,821,175
4,908,086
4,185,545

15'
1 6.
17'
18'
1 9'

000
000
000
000
000

UHDER
UHD R
UND R
R
UHDER

16, 0 00 I
17. 00 0
18' 0 0 0
19,000
20,000

103.402
90,673
82. 136
72.784
58' 147

3,811.897
3,347,625
3,033.364
2,676,883
2.146,419

20,000
21.000
22' 000
23,000
24,000

UNDER
UNDER
UNDER
UHDER
UNDER

21.000
22,000
23,000

51.750
45,320
40' 390
31.260
28,708

1. 908.990
1,675,990

ll
R
!<

2G,OOO

18' 47 3
17' 56 0
17,788
13,318
9,560

683,401
648,550
657.706
481,225
353,520

34,873
16.368
1 3' 18 1
4,750
2,850

1.283,543
604,818
487,047
174,570
104,780

I

I

25,000

26.000 u

i'
'

UH'J

24,000

25.000

n. occ

ZB, OOU
29,000

27' 000
! ~; (j 0 0
L ':J, 0 0 0

Ln{

VHD!:R

30~tJOO

30,000
35' 000
40' 000
50' 000
60' 000

UHDER
UHDER
UNDER
UNDER
UHDER

35,000
,, 0. 00 0

n

50,000

80.000

UllDER

100,000
200,000
500,000

90,000
100,000
200' 000

500,000
1. 000' 000

UllDER
U~{DER

I

60,000
70,01]0

UHDER
80.000 UHDER

70,000

2,800

90,000

1 '48 0
810
480
1,740
310

I

UHDER 1,000,000
AND OVER

78' 300

1, 489' 576

1.153,750
1,059,586

II

I

54. 180
29,750
17,480
6 4' 150
11. 36 1

47
14

1 '721
518

TOTAL TAXABLE RETURNS

2,122.263

$78,024,305

GRAND TOTAL

3.614,868

$132,380,775

I
I

*From Franchise Tax Board's 1978
Annual Report -- reflects $37
credit for all renters.
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TARGETED JOBS TAX CREDIT & WORK INCENTIVE PROGRAM CREDIT

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW

•

Both federal and state law allow employers to claim
a credit against tax owed equal to a portion of wages paid
to employees from targeted hard-core unemployed groups.
There are two nearly identical federal laws--a Targeted Jobs
Tax Credit (TJTC) for several categories of disadvantaged
unemployed, and a WIN (Work Incentive) credit for WIN program
recipients. These two federal credits are discussed below
as one provision.
The differences between state and federal law are as
follows:
1. Size of Credit: Federal law limits the credit per
employee to 50% of wages paid in the first year and 25% of
wages paid in the second year. The credit applies to wages
up to $6,000 per year. California law allows credit of 10%
per year of wages paid for each of the first two years of
employment, and applies to $3,000 per year in wages.
2.
Qualified Employees: Federal law covers a variety
of targeted groups, including economically disadvantaged
youth, veterans, and ex-convictsi certain handicapped persons;
and certain public assistance recipients.
The state credit
is available to a sub-set of this federally-eligible group,
comprising persons who receive state or local public assistance or are WIN registrants.
3.
Cap on Amount of Credit: Federal law requires
that an employer's credit for first-year wages may not exceed
30% of the aggregate unemployment insurance wages paid that
year*. California law has no such cap on the total amount
of wages for which the jobs tax credit may be claimed.
4.
Double Benefit Prohibition: Federal law requires
that the amount of the credit be subtracted from the amount
of wages the employer deducts for business expenses. California law contains no such provision.
5. Sunset date.
The Federal Credit (TJTC only) is
authorized through December 31, 1981. The state credit has
a sunset date of December 31, 1984.

*

Thls llmlt applicable to the TJTC only.
the federal WIN credit.
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No such cap for

FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
Full conformity to the federal provisions would result
in an estimated revenue loss in the tens of millions .
This would be in addition to the $10 million to $15 million
annual cost of the current state jobs tax credit.

FEDERAL LAW
Prior to 1979, federal law provided for an untargeted
"new jobs tax credit". The program was altered by the Tax
Reform Act of 1978 to its present form as a Targeted Jobs
Tax Credit, which will be effect through the 1981 year.
The credit is "targeted" in order to encourage jobs
for "hard-core unemployed" in the following groups:
•

Handicapped vocational rehabilitation referrals

•

"Economically disadvanted" youth, 18-24 years old

•

SSI recipients

•

General assistance recipients

•

Youth participating in cooperative education
programs

•

"Economically disadvantaged" ex-convicts

•

"Economically disadvantaged" Vietnam-era veterans

In addition, there is a separate federal credit for
employing AFDC recipients who are registered in the WIN
program, which is nearly identical in most respects to the
TJTC. The size of the credit and restrictions on its use
are as described above in "Differences".
CALIFORNIA LAW
California's jobs tax credit was enacted in 1979 after
the federal TJTC and WIN credits were put into place. Presumably, each of California's departures from the federal
framework were deliberate.
The state credit allows employers a credit for employing
persons in the following groups:
•

WIN program registrants

•

AFDC recipients not in WIN
141

•

SSI recipients

Size of the credit and restrictions on its use are as
in "Differences".
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY

•

1.
Size of Credit.
The federal credit amounts prewere 1ntended to provide an economic incentive suffito encourage employers to create new jobs and fill them
th un- or under-employed persons. The smaller size of the
fornia credit apparently was chosen on the belief that
behavior is more greatly influenced by tax incentives
the federal tax than by the lower state tax, and that a
state credit added to the federal one may have diminishing returns
terms of jobs created.
Revenue loss consideramay also have entered into the choice of the lower state
credit.
Conformity to the federal credit size would give
loyers a total credit of 100% of wages of up to $12,000 per
loyee for the first year and a 50% credit the second year.
Is an incentive of this magnitude needed? Would any additional
j
be created over those created with the existing credit
s
, or would this be merely a tax windfall?
2.
Cap on Amount of Credit.
The federal requirement
ting the credit to 30% of all wages paid by the employer
is intended to prevent wholesale substitution of existing
for subsidized workers.
The reason for California's
from this provision is not known.
The effectiveness of the federal cap in preventing
lacement is questionable, however.
From a recent mail
survey of 1,000 firms, the General Accounting Office concluded that only 13%-25% of jobs taken by subsidized workers
were new jobs created by the federal credit. What this percentage would be without the cap is not known.
3. Qualifying Employees.
The purpose of targeting the
deral jobs credit at the specific groups listed above was to
encourage creation of jobs for the hard-core unemployed.
California's apparent purpose in limiting the state credit to
a subset of these was to provide further encouragement to
employers to hire persons on state and local public assistance.
The rationale was that the state cost of the credit would be
at least partially offset by reduced state aid payments to
who became employed.
State conformity to the broader federal list of
lifying employees would increase the state cost of the
rogram without increasing the potential for off-setting
assistance reductions.
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POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1.

Rationale for Federal Law - The basic idea of the
income credit/credit for the elderly is to place
receiving retirement income on the same basis as persons
s
security payments, payments under the Railroad
Act or other tax-free retirement income.
It was felt
pre-1954 system discrminated against persons receiving
under other publicly administered programs, such as
servants, as well as persons receiving industrial pensions
independently for their old age.
The amendments made by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 were to
s
lify
computations and to recognize the increased and
liberalized benefits which had occurred within the social security
system over the years.

2.

Rationale for California Law - The California law

was straight conformity legislation, prompted by the same considerations which influenced the Congress.
The nonrefundable
credit is 15% of retirement income with theoretical maximum of
$375 (single), $562.50 (married-joint returns), and $281.25
(married-separate returns).
The community property provisions
were retained
the California provisions because of the statets
storic commitment to the concept of community property.
The
ssion of an earned income definition was an oversight which
can be remedied by legislation.
LEGISLATION
None.

146

SOLAR AND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY TAX INCENTIVES
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

LAW

ral law provides tax incentives for installation
of solar and other alternative energy source devices under
both the Residential Energy Conservation Credit and the
Bus
s Energy Investment Credit. California's Solar Tax
Credit was recently extended to be effective through 1983.

•

A comparison of the two laws is made in Table 33 .
The major differences are:
1. Size of the Credit. For residences, the federal
credit is 40%, not to exceed $4,000, while the state credit
is 55%, not to exceed $3,000.
In the non-residential sector,
the federal credit is 10% to 15% (depending on the device),
while the state credit is a flat 25%.
2. Qualifying Expenditures--Residential. Both federal
and state law cover solar, wind and geothermal. In addition,
the state covers photovoltaic, and may be claimed for swimming
pool improvements (federal law does not cover pools).
3. Qualifying Expenditures--Business. Federal coverage
is broader than the state.
In addition to solar, geothermal
and wind (covered under both laws), federal credits are
available for ocean thermal, hydroelectric, intercity bus, and
biomass investments.
4. Excess Credits. Federal law allows carryover of
credits in excess of tax liability and carryback for businesses).
California law allows carryover, and in addition, for individual taxpayers within certain income limits, permits refunds
for credit amounts in excess of tax liability.
5. Limitations. The federal credit is generally more
restrictive regarding who may claim and how much may be
claimed, particularly for residential property. See Table 33 .
6. Sunset Dates. The federal credit is effective
through 1985, while the state credit sunsets at the end of
1983.
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FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
would result
a 1981 revenue loss
impact results as follows:

of

1981 Income Year
(in millions)
Revenue gain from repealing
s
credit

+ $ 15

Revenue loss from federal
conformity*
•

Residential Solar

•

Business Energy Investment Credit

5

NET EFFECT

20
- $ 10

*Based on 5% of federal revenue loss.

FEDERAL LAW
federal benefits were recently raised to their
current
1 as part of the Windfall Oil Profits Tax bill.
See Table 33
summary of provisions.
CALIFORNIA LAW
California has had a solar tax credit since 1976.
It's 1980 sunset date was extended to 1983 by AB 2036 (Hart),
Chapter 903 of 1980. Refer to Table 33 for provisions.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1. Simplicity. Full conformity would reduce
complexi
and confusion for taxpayers, since the present
laws are quite different in terms of eligible expenditures,
limitations, and other provisions.
2. Changed Benefit Levels. Total taxpayer benefits
under conformity compared to benefits under current state
and federal credits could both be claimed (i.e., are additive),
or whether the federal credit must be subtracted from the
state ere t, similar to current law. This is shown below:
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If State & Federal
)"

Additive
Res1dent1al

Business

varies.
Generally
greater,
except
where costs
exceed
$200,000.

Mutually Exclusive
Residential Business

Generally
Less.
less,except
where costs
exceed $7, 500

3.
Incentive.
The optimum size of a credit to encourage
additional installation of solar devices is unknown. With
prices of conventional energy sources continually increasing,
and with
stence of the federal credit for solar devices,
it
questionable how much additional investment is encouraged
by a state ere t.
4. Benefits for Businesses. Conformity with federal
law would reduce the dollar amount of credit available to
businesses, since California law currently provides a flat
25% ere t with no upper limit and allows state and federal
credits to be additive.
It should be noted that both state
and federal law already offer other tax benefits in addition
to the solar credits. Businesses may take deductions either for
depre
of such property or for a business expense for
items not depreciated on top of the credits.
However, conformity would broaden the list of eligible expenditures for
the business solar credit.
5.
Benefits for Low Income Taxpayers. One of the
objections to tax credits in the past has been that they provide scant incentive to low income people with little or no
tax liability. Even with provisions for carryover of unused
credits, the benefit is so delayed (and perhaps diminished
by inflation) that it is an ineffective incentive and makes
the credit discriminating. California's credit attempts to
respond to this concern by providing that any portion of the
credit which exceeds current-year tax liability may be
refunded to individual taxpayers with incomes under a specified
level.
Conformity to federal law would remove this refundability
ion.
6.
Swi~ning Pools.
One of the major criticisms of
ifornia's credit recently has been that over two-thirds
credits were claimed for swimming pool systems.
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In response, recent legislative changes phases the pool credit
down to 25% by 1983. Federal conformity would eliminate
pool solar equipment from eligibility entirely.

TABLE

33

COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
SOLAR AND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY TAX INCENTIVES
Federal

State
Residentia-l----Non-residential

Residential

Non-residantial

Size of Credit

40%

10%-15%,depending on category
below.

Not to Exceed

$4,000

$25,000 plus % of $3,000
tax liability above
$25,000.

Qualifying
expenditures

Solar, Geothermal or
Wind. Swimming
pools excluded.

(l)Solar, Geothermal or Wind (2)
Ocean thermal
(3)Hydroelectric
generators (4)
Intercity busses
(5) Biomass

Passive, semi-passive and active
solar, photovoltaic and winddriven systems. Swimming pools
included. Energy conservation
measures applied in conjunction
with solar energy system.

Excess Credit

Carryover

Carryover,
carryback.

Carryover. For individual taxpayers under certain income limits,
may be refunded.

Limitations

eDwelling unit
must be taxpayer's principal
residence, completed before
4/22/77.

eProperty must be
depreciable and
have a useful
life of 3 or
more years.

•Applies to any eState credit may
dwelling owned be claimed in addi(not necesstion to any federal
arily occupied) credit.
by taxpayer

25%

55%**

No upper limit

eState plus
federal credit
may not exceed
55%.

eCredit must
be reduced by
prior year's
claim.

eMay be claimed
in future
years for
other systems.
Sunset

*

Dec. 31, 1985

Dec. 31, 1985

Dec. 31, 1983

Appl1es 1n cases where costs exceed $2,000. Where
costs are less than $12,000, non-residential buildings
treated as residential.

** For swimming pools, credit phased down 10% per year 1981
through 1983.

150

Dec. 31, 1983

ENERGY CONSERVATION TAX INCENTIVES
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE & FEDERAL LAW
Federal law contains a recently-expanded Residential
Energy Conservation Credit. Legislation enacted in California
in 1980 establishes a state Energy Conservation Tax Credit,
effective beginning the 1981 tax year.
The differences are illustrated on Table 34 .
major departures are as follows:

•

The

1. Sectors Covered. The federal credit applies to
owner-occupied residences only. The state credit applies
to the residential sector (including non-owner-occupied)
and the non-residential sector.
2.
Size of the Credit. The federal residential credit
is 15%, not to exceed $300. The California credit is 40%,
not to exceed $1,500.
3.
Excess Credits. Federal law allows carryover of
credits in excess of tax liability. California law also
allows carryover, and in addition, for individual taxpayers
under certain income limits, permits refunds for credit
amounts in excess of tax liability.
4. Qualifying Expenditures. Federal law covers insulation and a variety of other components, such as storm
windows, weatherstripping, set-back thermostats, energy use
meters and others. The state credit covers all items on the
federal list, plus numerous others. Some of the additional
state items are water-conservation devices, load management
devices, heat pumps, window coverings, swimming pool and hot
tub covers, and others.
5.
Limitations. The federal credit is generally
more restrictive regarding who may claim and now much may
be claimed. See Table 34 .
6.
Sunset Dates. The federal credit is effective
through 1985 wh11e the state credit sunsets at the end of
1986.
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TABLE 34
COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
ENERGY CONSERVATION TAX INCENTIVES

r-'

Ul
IV

Residential

Non-residential

State
Residential
--Non"""res1dential **

Size of Credit

15%

*

40%

25%

Not to Exceed

$300

*

$1,500

No upper limit

Excess Credit

Carryover

*

Carryover. For individual taxpayers under certain income limits
may be refunded.

Qualifying
Expenditures

Energy conservation expenditures, as defined

*

Energy-conservation expenditures,
as defined. More inclusive than
federal law.

Limitations

eDwelling unit
must be taxpayer's principle residence,
completed before
4/22/77.

*

•Applies to
any dwelling
owned (not
necessarily
occupied) by
taxpayer.

eCredit must be
reduced by prior
year's claim.

eState plus
federal credit
may not exceed
40%.

eApplies to any premises owned by taxpayer.
eState credit must
be subtracted from
federal credit (if
enacted) .

eMay be claimed
in future
years for
other measures.
Sunset

December 31, 1985 *

December 31,1986 December 31, 1986

* No federal credit for energy conservation expenditures.
**Applies in cases where costs exceed $6,000. Where costs
are less than $6,000, non-residential buildings treated
as residential

FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
Full conformity would result in a 1981 revenue gain
of $20-25 million. This impact results as follows:

1981 income year
(in millions)
Revenue gain from repeal
of state credit:

I

+ $ 50

Revenue loss from federal
conform1ty:

25-30

+ $ 20-25

NET EFFECT

FEDERAL LAW
See Table 34 .
CALIFORNIA LAW
California's Energy Conservation Tax Credit was newly
added by AB 2030 (Levine), Chapter 904 of 1980.
It is considerably broader than the federal credit.
Refer to Table 34.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1. Simplici!Z. Full conformity would reduce complexity
and confusion for taxpayers, since the present laws are quite
different in terms of eligible expenditures, sectors covered,
and other provisions.
2.
Incentive. Full conformity would reduce the size
of the tax incentive substantially.
If addit1ve, total
benefit from both credits would be 30%, not to exceed $600.
If mutually exclusive--as under current law--benefits would
be half that.
This would reverse the action taken by the
California Legislature this past August to enact a -40%,
$1500 maximum credit.
The need for and effectiveness of a credit of 40% can
be questioned, however:
In light of large price increases
expected for conventional energy sources, how much impact
will an additional incentive for conservation (in the form of
a state tax credit) will have on consumers' decisions? The
state tax credit may primarily be a windfall for those who
would have made such expenditures anyway.
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3. Benefits for Low Income Taxpayers. One of the
objections to tax credits 1n the past has been that they pro-ide
de scant incentive to low-income people with little or no
tax li
lity. Even with provisions for carryover of unused
credits, the benefit is so delayed (and perhaps diminished
inflation) that it is an ineffective incentive and makes
the credit discriminating.
California's credit attempts to
respond to this concern by providing that any portion of the
credit which exceeds current-year tax liability may be
refunded to individual taxpayers with incomes under a specified
level. Conformity to federal law would remove this refundlity provision.
4.
Benefits for Businesses.
Conformity with federal
law would eliminate the credit available to businesses for
energy conservat1on expenditures.
It should be noted that
both state and federal law already offer other tax benefits
to businesses. Businesses may take deductions either for
depreciation of such property or for a business expense for
items not depreciated.
Under the newly-enacted California
law, these deductions are available in addition to the tax
credit

154

AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION TAX CREDIT

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
California allows a credit to certain farmers for 10%
of the cost of installing water-conserving irrigation equipment, not to exceed $500.

I

Federal law provides no such special credit, although
general-purpose 10% investment tax credit does cover agriirrigation equipment. All equipment, regardless of
water conservation potential, is eligible for the investment
tax credit.
(Refer to Investment Tax Credit section of
this briefing book.)
Federal law contains no specific credit for waterconserving equipment similar to California's credit, so full
conformity would mean repealing the existing state credit.

FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY
Repealing California's special 10% state tax credit
for water-conserving irrigation equipment would produce an
annual revenue gain in the $100,000 range.
(Re r to the Investment Tax Credit section of this
book for fiscal effect of conforming to that federal
provision for all equipment, pages 80-81.)

FEDERAL LAW
Federal law has no special tax incentive for installing
water-conserving irrigation equipment.
The federal 10% investment tax credit may be claimed for irrigation equipment,
regardless of water-conserving potential, along with a variety
of other types of machines, equipment and property.
Congressman Norm Shumway (Stockton) introduced
H.R. 5965 last year, which would have established a new
federal 10% credit for equipment which conserves irrigation
water, claimable on top of the current 10% investment tax
credit. The bill also would have allowed rapid 3-year depreation of such equipment.
The bill is being held in the
House Ways and Means Committee and, according to the author,
will not move further this year.
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CALIFORNIA LAW
Current state law allows a credit against net taxes of
(not to exceed $500) of acquisition and installation costs
(excluding interest charges) for irrigation systems used on
cultivated agricultural land which result in reduced water
usage.
The credit is limited to taxpayers who receive at least
75% of their income from farming and whose adjusted gross
come does not exceed $500,000. The credit is allowed in
addition to any other deduction which the taxpayer is entitled
to claim. The credit is in effect for the tax years 1977
through 1980.
SB 1367 (Vuich), Chapter 900 of 1980 extends the
sunset date for this credit until December 31, 1985.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1. Need. The original state credit was enacted in
1977 during the California drought. The Legislature, in
recently extending the credit through 1985, apparently concluded that a tax incentive is still needed to encourage
farmers to purchase water-conserving equipment.
2.
Incentive Value. With the cost of drip irrigation
systems at approximately $1,000 per acre, is a credit of 10%
not to exceed $500 per year a sufficient incentive to change
behavior?
3.
Declining Use of Credit.
Claims for this credit
in 1978 were only half what they were in 1977, suggesting
declining interest in the program.
In 1978 (the latest year
for which figures are available), there were 339 claims.
4.
Other Tax Benefits. Conformity to federal law-that is, by repeal of this credit--would still allow farmers
annual deductions for depreciation of such equipment.

156

INCOME AVERAGING

DIFFERErJCES BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Both laws provide for income averaging. There are
differences in the amounts used to compute the averaged income.
FISCAL EFFECT OF FULL CONFORMITY

•

Full federal conformity would result in a revenue
of approximately $26 million in 1981 .

~

For tax effect by income class and type of return, see
table on page 159.
FEDERAL LAW
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1964, federal law provided
a special computation to soften the impact of income earned over
a period of years but which was received in one year. These
provisions were repealed by the 1964 Act and were replaced by
a new general method of averaging income. These new provisions
are based upon a comparison of income received in a taxable year
with the taxpayer's income during the prior four-year base period.
The 1964 provisions were liberalized by the Tax Reform Act of
1969. The current provisions may be outlined as follows:
The 1'averageable income 1' is determined. This is the
excess of the current (or computation) year's taxable income
over a base amount.
The base is 120% of the average taxable
income for the preceding four years (the base period years) .
In order to qualify for income averaging, averageable income
must exceed $3,000.
1.

2.

A tax is computed upon the base amount.

3. A tax is computed on the sum of the base amount and
one-fifth of the averageable income.
4.
The difference between the taxes computed under 2. and 3.,
above, are multiplied by 5 to get the tax on the averageable income.
5. The total tax is the sum of the tax on the base amount 2.
and the tax in 4. on the averageable income.
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CALIFO&"\JIA LAW
a law is much like the federal law as
Reform Act of 1969. The existing differtwo laws are:
l. Under California law, tax relief is based on the
excess of the current year's income over 133 l/3 percent of
period income. The federal percentage is 120 percent.
2. In computing average income for the base period,
income which was excluded because it was from sources
United States must be added back. There is no
fornia adjustment because such excluded income
have been received by a nonresident who is not
for income averaging in the first place.
3. The federal computation requires that each pre-1977
base period year be increased by the zero bracket amount in order
to make the pre-1977 taxable incomes comparable to post-1976
taxable incomes which are determined with the zero bracket
amounts taken into account.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORMITY
1.

Rationale for Federal Law - Since 1939 the federal
to spread back to prior years
types of income which were received in a taxable year
but were attributable to services rendered over a period of
ars. The intent of these rules was to mitigate the effect of
the progressive tax rates on the "bunched" income.
law has

conta~ned prov~sions

The prior provisions were considered to be too narrow and
the computation too complicated and, therefore, were replaced
the income averaging concept in 1964. As earlier indicated,
the 1964 provisions were liberalized and expanded in 1969. The
intent of all this legislation, however, remains the same - to
alleviate the impact of the progressive tax rate structure.
2.
Rationale for California Law- California's reason
the adoption of income averaging was based upon the same
considerations underlying the federal law. With the much lower
state rates,
need is perhaps not so imperative. The state
has not conformed to the 1969 federal amendments because of the
revenue loss involved.

RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
None.
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TABLE 35
FEDERAL CONFORMITY ISSUES
1981 INCOME YEAR
Income Averaging - Federal Basis
AGI Class
But Less
Least
Than

Tax Decrease
No. of Returns

Amount of Tax Decrease

Single Taxpayers & Married Filing Separate
$5,000
,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

$0
2,094
273,798
1,205,330
722,136
435,387
761,202
240,107
$3,640,056

0

299
13,670
31,506
10,591
4,337
4,689
1,073
66,164

Joint Taxpayers & Surviving Spouse
,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

$5,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
100,000

0
0

$0

2,629
34,045
60,672
63,246
84,172
12,297
257,061

71,679
992,155
2,097,375
3,373,283
10,118,151
4,253,907
$20,906,550

0

Unmarried Head of Household

•

$5,000
$5,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

0
0
2,751
5,552
4,567
893
1,987
380
16,131

$0
0

52,462
197,234
298,750
80,319
360,595
113,152
$1,102,511
All Taxpayers

$5,000
,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
100,000
50,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

7/16/80

0

299
19,050
71,104
75,830
68,476
90,848
13,749
339,356
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$0
2,094
397,939
2,394,720
3,118,261
3,888,989
11,239,948
4,607,166
$25,649,117

AND FEDERAL

income"
, off-

assume not only a change in state
but also changes
the
would also assume changes in
capital gains, percentage depletion
The fiscal effect of such full
this time,but the impact of the offa revenue loss in 1981 of 20 million.

federal law provides for an "add-on minimum tax"
and an "alternative minimum tax."
The "add-on" is computed separately from and is in addi"
"
The items of tax preference include:
on real property
personal
(2) excess amortization
certified
railroad
s
(3) excess
institutions, (4) excess
, (5) excess amortization of on-the-job training and childcare facilities, (6) the "bargain element"in qualified stock options
and (7) excess
drilling costs. The sum of
tax
preference items in
of $10,000 is subject to a 15 percent
rate.
there are net operating losses,
married persons
returns, estates and
, etc.
The "alternative minimum tax" applies to individuals,
estates and trusts. The tax is imposed only to the extent it
exceeds the "
tax" plus the "add on" minimum tax. Generally,
the tax base
allowable deductions tlls
adjusted
deductions and the deduction for capi a gains.
The rates are: 10
minimum taxable income over $20,000
and less than $60
minimum taxable income over
$60,000
to
such income over $100,000.

o

law somewhat parallels the "add-on m1n1mum
an "aluernative minimum tax." The
include excess amortization items but
capital gains and excess farm
tax
to
sum
0

return)

aws

federal ~add-on"
response to the complaint
or no income
to
items of income.
was provided in 1978 to insure that
itemized deductions or capital gains
2. Rationale for California Law - The rationale for
fornia law regaraing tax preference items is the same as
the differences in the tax
items of
preference
of certified pollution control
ference" items, (2) the belief that
a
"tax
" which constitutes
(3) the belief that the rates should be
proportional (flat), and (4) the belief
taxes" is unnecessarily complicated and
fication - The tax preference
grounds (everyone
") even though they tend to greatly
In effect, the provisions "penalize"
"preferences" which are expressly authorized

~~~~~~~e~~e~n~e~-o~n~e~quity

4. Partial Conformity - Changing state law to the
law as to the items of tax preference would not result
unless additional state provisions are also
, the amount of capital gains which would be
be
fferent because of the basic
in how capital gains are computed.
of 15 percent would also not represent
state "normal" tax rate is 11
70 percent.

change the method

which
le drillwells by
Assembly

TABLE 36

FEDERAL CONFORMITY
1981 INCOME YEAR

AGI
Less
Than

I

of Tax Decrease

No

,000
10,000
,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

1,

,289
17.013
,196
1,223,942
1,557,397
1,535,399
3,577,234

923
7,641
12,928
11,887
7,928
15,114
6,889
64,363
Joint

,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
,000 And Over
Totals

,082
4 894
41 925
165 04
438 456
681,922
488
486

1,187
71

1,962
7,002
15,186
21,375
65,550
48

Head of Household
,000
,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
20,000
30,000
30,000
40,000
40,000
50,000
50,000
100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

1

0
7,180
8,065
,776
,138

0
897
716
1,757
476
3,129
1,398
8,374

961

All Taxpayers
2,241
994
10,500
20,646
28,830
29,779
83,792
56,817
233,600

$5,000
10,000
,000
20,000
10,000
30,000
000
40,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
100,000
50,000
100,000 And Over
Totals
162
~

..

~~~

,499
21,
327,301
1,397,053

TAX RATE STRUCTURE

Both

s
rate schedule. Federal
Special schedules are provided in
households. Federal law provides a special
singles. State provides for automatic indexing of
brackets, which federal law does not.

EFFECT OF
State adoption of
federal rate schedule (14 percent to
not realistic. Partial conformity to grant equiva
f to singles, head of households or to make the state
tax
steeply progressive, will have varying revenue impacts
depending on the draft language and interaction implications.
However, if the state were to drop indexing to conform
to federal practice, the state would save a staggering $2.9 billiT
in 1981-82.

FEDERAL LAW
Provides
separate progressive tax rate schedules which
on fi
status [single, unmarried head of household,
married
ling separate
and married
ling jointly]. The rates
for singles ranging from 14 percent for income over $2,300 to 70
percent for income over $108,300; for head of households the rates
range from 14 percent for income over $2,300 to 70 percent for
income over $161,300; for marrieds filing separately the rates
range from 14 percent for income over $1,700 to 70 percent for
income over $107,700; and for marrieds filing jointly the rates
range from 14 percent for income over $3,400 to 70 percent for
income over $215,400.
Generally the federal tax law treats a married couple as
one tax unit and filing separate returns generally leads to a
tax
compared to filing a joint return.
The federal head of household schedule imposes a tax which
is about halfway between the tax for a single return and a joint
return on the same amount of income. The federal single schedule
gives about half the benefit of "income splitting." Thus, for
come levels between $10,000 and $100,000, the single schedule
provides a tax which is 10 to 20 percent more than the tax
imposed on married persons filing a joint return with the same
amount of aggregate income. This means that if two wage earners
marry and one earns 20% or more of their total income, they
will
more tax. This
the so-called !'marriage tax" or
"diverse bonus".
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1 law also provides for a tax rate limit of 50 percent
income (earned income and pension or annuity
employer-employee relationship or from tax
to a retirement plan) .
FORNIA LAW
California law provides for two tax rate schedules. The rate
for all taxpayers except head of households ranges from one
for income of less than $2,000 to 11 percent for income over
500. For head of households the schedule ranges from one percent
less than $4,000 to 11 percent for income over $18,000.
persons fil
jointly are allowed to "income split" so that
rate schedules reflects a tax ranging from one percent
less than $4,000 to 11 percent for income over $31,000.
The preceding figures do not take into account the impact of
the brackets which began in 1978. The current rates are
unchanged, but the income tax brackets have been changed:S:l<fnificantly.
See discussion about indexing.)
The schedule for heads of household gives modified income
, but unlike the federal schedule it is designed to give
relief to lower income persons. California does not have
schedules for singles so the so-called "marriage tax"
(However, the"marriage tax" could apply in some cases
heads of households with equivalent incomes marry
Beginning in 1978, the California income tax brackets have
usted to reflect an inflation factor.
For 1978 and 1979
factor was the Consumer Price Index percentage change from
June to June to the extent it exceeded three percent. For 1978, this
was 5.222 percent. For 1979 the factor was 6.8822. For 1980
1981 t~e factor is the full Consumer Price Index percentage
For 1980 the Consumer Price Index change will be 17.3346%.
For 1982 and thereafter, the three percent threshold will again be
us
to determine the factor.
California does not have a counterpart to the federal maximum
rate of 50 percent for personal service income.
POLICY ISSUES OF CONFORJHTY

1. Rationale for federal law - The federal provision allowing
income splitting" by married persons was enacted in response to a
court decision that persons living in community property states could
ly divide income and thus reduce their taxes in a progressive
Those persons living in noncommunity property states could
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taxes
and

The

As a re
, many
to s
this
1948 enacted

the treatment
heads
was
single persons with dependents in their
living expenses and thus are entitled to some
greater expenses. The head of household
present s
1951.

for s
les was enacted in 1969.
le some difference was justified as to
single persons or marrieds, because of
,
amount of "extra" taxes paid by singles
Accordingly, Congress provided a new schedule for
imposed a tax which was no more than 20
percent above the tax for married couples. This new schedule,
however, resulted in the "marriage tax" discussed above. One
"marriage tax" is that a married couple's
"
s are
to be less than those of two single
tax should be higher.
This "marriage
is
subject to criticsm, and Congress is
ways
alleviating it. An artie
outlows--see page .l6 7.

all income.
schedule for heads of households generally
for
federal special schedule,
that
directed that the schedule be designed to confer
to lower income taxpayers.
Californ
has not followed the federal approach
of revenue loss cons
tax" and the
argument
tend to
income splitting
state.

s

schedules
a community

zed that
lation does
taxes as taxpayers
le the
"buying power" they are subject to
rates.
A more detailed analysis of indexing
--see pages 168-175
3.

neutra

Some
which

should be the same as two single persons with the same amount
of income. Others argue that married persons are an economic
unit with pooled income so that equity requires that married
couples taxes not depend on how thier combined income is disd between them.
Still others contend that the tax system
should be progressive.
These three propositions are logically
inconsistent--you can't have all three at the same time. The
present federal system (and the state's to some extent) relies
on equal taxation of couples and progressivity and ignores
marriage neutrality.
4. Simplicity. Joint returns are defended because they
are simpler than separate returns. Also, if separate returns
were encouraged, there could be manipulation of unearned
come deductions to reduce taxes.
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION
1. AB 2669 (Deddeh) 1980. Would have conferred tax
relief to heads of households who maintain a home for a dependent child under a joint custody decree for less than a full
taxable year. Died in Senate.
2. AB 2001 (Bergeson) 1980. Would have removed the
three percent threshold for indexing tax brackets for 1982
and thereafter. Vetoed.
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INCOME TAX INDEXING

the cost of 1
adjustprogressive individual income
automatic tax increase that ~TOuld
inflation. The procedure is to
rsonal exemptions, deductions,
general price level. The
income tax brackets is
page.
Trend?
can be advanced for and against indexation.
the merits of the arguments, or lack thereof,
indexing is gaining increasing popularity
Perhaps the time for indexing
s
have concluded that there
s no reali
of reducing inflation significantly.
For
reason,
, to a verv limited extent, shifts
some of the
ary pressure off individuals and
sibly
ates the
caused by continuing inflationary
pressures, at
have
zona, Cali

for
, Iowa,

on Income Taxes
tax, California's income tax is progressive;
that is,
tax rates increase as income goes up.
flationary
s, an un-indexed tax system cannot
between nominal
increases -- i.e.
below or above
-- that is,
ion which actually
tax
of whether
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TABLE A

TAX RATES BY TAXABLE INCOME CLASS
EFFECT OF INDEXING FOR TAXPAYERS FILING JOINT RETURNS
1977
Before Index.

1979
1980
1978
. CPI!+Ii. 33%
CPI ::t9.""8 8 %
CPI:+8.22 %
Index:+6.88
%
Index:+l7.
33%
Index:+5.22 %

11%

,000
,000
,000
38,000
37 000
36,000

,000
,000
,000

32,000
31,000
30,000
29,000
28,000

EXAMPLES

2 '000

l.

A family on a fixed income (for
example, a taxable lncome of
just over $13,000) loses buying
power over the years as lntlation occurs. Reading across the
chart shows that indexing lowers
the family's tax liability-rn--recognition of the loss in buying power, from the 5% tax
bracket in 1977 to the 3% tax
bracket in 1980.

2.

A family with a $16,000 taxable
income in 1977, whose income
goes up at the exact rate of
inflation, would have a
$22,300 income in 1980. Looking at the 1977 column shows
that, without indexing, that
family would have been pushed
from the 6% to the 8% tax
bracket, with no increase
in buying powe~ Reading
across the chart shows that
indexing keeps that family
in the 6% tax bracket.

26,000
25,000
24,000
2 '000
,000
1,000
0,000

19,000
18,000
17,000
16,000
15,000

14,000
3,000
12,000
ll' 000

10,000
9,000
8,000

7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000

1%

1%

1%

2,000

* Taxable income is all household income minus exempt
l~come (i.~., social security), minus adJUstments
(l.e., bus2ness expenses, alimony), minus standard
deduction or itemized deductions.
-----

1t;C)

lation continues to push taxpayers into
brackets, there would come a time when most
the 11 percent bracket. This would
sivity of the tax and a loss of
revenues relative to growth in the
In short, inflation causes individual income tax burdens
automatically, without public debate or legislated tax

Present State Law
Indexing was first introduced in thel978 tax year by
AB 3802 (Kapiloff), Chapter 569, Statutes of 1978.
Elements of the tax system that are subject to indexing
are (a) the tax brackets, (b) credits for personal,
dependent, and blind exemptions, (c) the special low-income
tax credit, and (d) the standard deduction. Each item is
indexed somewhat differently, as indicated in the following
discussion (and summarized in Table B below) .
It is important to note, however, that this basic system of indexing
enacted in 1978 is permanent, and does not sunset in any
future year.
a. The income tax brackets are indexed by the annual
change in Cal1forn1a Consumer Price Index (CCPI) from June
prior year less 3 percent. For example, if the CCPI
is 11 percenr;-the inflation adjustment factor applied
brackets would be 8 percent. The brackets are rounded
to the nearest $10.
However, legislation in 1979, AB 276 (Bergesen),
Chapter 1198, eliminates this 3 percent threshhold for the
1980 and 1981
years only; thus in these two years, the
InCOme tax will be fully indexed to the rate of inflation.
The indexing above the 3 percent threshhold is scheduled to
resume in 1982 and thereafter.
The rationale for the 3 percent threshhold is that (1)
this amount is thought to be "structural" inflation representing productivity, rather than inflation, and (2) the threshhold mi
s state revenue losses until experience
indicates whether or not the state can afford full indexing.
Legislation in 1980, AB 2001 (Bergesen), proposed to
extend full indexing of the brackets beyond 1981 indefinitely.
That bill was vetoed by the Governor on the grounds of
future fiscal uncertainty and the substantial income tax
relief already provided by indexing and other measures enacted
since 1978. An attempt to override that veto failed.
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The personal exemption and dependent credits are
the CCPI change from June of 1978 to June of the
to be indexed was 1979.
f to the nearest $1.
z
the exemption credits to a base
that this very low dependent exemption
ly may be adjusted upward. Without such
, the Legislature feared that the credits would
back to $8.
tax credit for low-income
in subsequent years by
June of the prior year rounded
The credit cancels all tax liability
adjusted gross incomes of $5,000
for
couples filing joint returns with
gross income of $10,000 or less.
d
$1,000/$2,000 standard deduction will be indexed
79 and for the following years by the change in the
from June of the
or year, rounded off to the nearest

TABLE B
TAX INDEXING COMPARISON CHART
Credits
rst
Base Year
Year upon
va
based
Index Factor*
off to the
nearest

Standard Low Income
Deduction Credit

1978

1979

1979

1979

1977

1977

1978

1978

Prior Year

1978

**
CCPI minus 3% CCPI
$10

$1

Prior Year

Prior Year

CCPI

CCPI

$10

$1

* CCPI = California Consumer Price Index, "All Urban
Consumers"

s.

** In the 1980 and 1981

years the 3% threshhold
for
is removed.
In 1982 and thereafter, the
3% threshhold for indexing is again applied.

credit is reduced by 50% for each dollar of income in
LOWexcess of $5,000/$10,000. The credit is indexed, but these
therefore,for some taxpayers there is a disl
ause of the intera
indexed brackets,
l
t, and the rate of the phase-out
1 1

TABLE C
REVENUE EFFECT OF INDEXING OVER TIME
rsonal Income
Tax Receipts
(
billions)
$12

12.0
,#

current Law,
WITH Indexing

11

-----

10

/

10.3

,;

WITHOUT Indexing

/

/

"'

"'

/

.,.

8. 7

9

;

,/

____
/

8

7. 2

7

/;

5.1 ; /

r

,

;/

6. 5

6.7

78-79

79-80

80-81

81-82

82-83

Annual Revenue Reduction Due To
Indexing (in billions)

$0.3

$0.7

$2.0

$2.9

$3.6

cumulative Revenue Reduction
(in billions)

$0.3

$1.0

$3.0

$5.9

$9.5

6

--

5
4

/

.,...¥

3
2

1

1.8

0
1973-74

74-75

75-76

76-77

77-78

NOTE: Effect of indexing shown above reflects 3% threshold for 1978
and 1979 tax years, full indexing for 1980 and 1981, and a
return to the 3% threshold in 1982 and thereafter.
Source of data: Department of Finance
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results in a substantial state
compounds over time -- tax savings for
lation rises.
shows that the estimated cumulative effect of indexthe 1978-79 through 1982-83 fiscal years will be
tax reduction of $9.5 billion below income tax
which would have been realized without
The Franchise Tax Board estimates that, in
each one percent increase in the CCPI, after
the 3 percent threshhold, results in a
tax reduction, which is currently in
million range.
Since the CCPI increase is not estimated and
in the withholding tables, overwithholding
occurs. California has not yet dealt with withholding
ons.
It is anticipated that this problem can be
omewhat alleviated by indexing, in advance, the withholding
tab s and rates on some conservative basis. AB 2539
(
) proposed using 50 percent of the prior year's CCPI
current year withholding. That measure was
, however, due to a substantial cash flow loss that
is necessarily involved.

. *
Benef1t
shows the tax benefit of indexing for a married
th two children and a constant income of $25,000
from 1977 through 1980.
Tax
Savings % Reduc.
Personal
From
From
Tax Before & Dep.
1977
Credit
Credits Net Tax Index.
TABLE D

Income
Standard
Year Income Deduction
1977 $25,000
978 25,000
1979 25,000
8
25,000

$2,000
2,000
2,200
2,580

$930
884
820b
686-

$66

216~

72
84

$864

668~

748b
602-

$46
116
262

5.3~

13.4
30.3

a One year $150 increase in personal credit.
If $150 excluded,
then net tax would have been $818. Percent change based on $818.
b

s amount reflects the full value of the 3 percent wider tax
rate brackets.
If the 3 percent had not been taken into effect,
these amounts would have been $17 more, $703 and $619,
1y.

Data and text of
Law",
Sta

s section from ''Indexing Under the Persona 1
Allan N. Desin, Director, Franchise Tax Board
s Bureau (September 26, 1980)
1 7 ')

40

19 8 and the
1978
1980,
about 3 percent
indexing the

tax
nearly 20 percent
CCPI change made

for high
indexing
a constant income

•
TABLE E
Personal
Year

Tax
Credit

ncome
$1
1 0
100,000
0 000

2,000
,000
2,200
580

&

Credits

$9,030
8,939
8,790
8 407

$66

216
72
84

Tax
Savings % Reduc
From
From
1977
Net Tax Index.
$8,964
8,723
8,718
8,323

$91
246
641

cates that
bene
than the higher income taxtaxpayer's tax was reduced by
to 1979
the
1
S tax was reduced by 20 percent,
was indexed by 17 percent for both
no tax liabi

is
The
the

ty

the annual
brackets
Taxat
Code.
se
effect in 1977,
is to these brackets that
tments
been made.
4

1.0
2.7
7.2

TABLE F
State of California
Cumulative Tax Benefit From Indexing
1980 Income Year
(Data in Millions)

1977 Law Tax
% Of
Tax
Total

Under $5,000
Under 10,000
Under 20,000
Under 30,000
Under 40,000
Under 50,000
Under 100,000
And Over

$2
147
650
516
196
83
163
153
$1,910

.1
7.7
34.0
27.0
10.3
4.4
8.5
8.0
100.0

Under $5,000
Under 10,000
Under 20,000
Under 30,000
Under 40,000
Under 50,000
,000 Under 100,000
,000 And Over
Totals

$1
2
267
863
1,120
826
1,380
1!224
$5,683

*
*
4.7
15.2
19.7
14.5
24.3
21.5
100.0

$3
149
1,014
1,480
1,356
924
1,573
1,410
$7,910

1.9
12.8
18.7
17.1
11.7
19.9
17.8
100.0

Benefit Of
Indexing
Tax
% Of
Reduc.
Total

1980 Indexed Tax
% Of
Tax
Total

$1
60
194
117
28
9
11
3
$423

.2
14.2
45.9
27.7
6.6
2.1
2.6
.7
100.0

$1
87
456
399
168
74
152
150
$1,487

.1
5.9
30.7
26.8
11.3
5.0
10.2
10.1
100.0

$1
113
265
311
208
224
52
$1,174

.1
9.6
22.6
26.5
17.7
19.1
4.4
100.0

*

$1
1
154
598
809
618
1,156
1,172
$4,509

*
*
3.4
13.3
17.9
13.7
25.6
26.0
100.0

$1
61
354
417
349
219
238
56
$1,695

.1
3.6
20.9
24.6
20.6
12.9
14.0
3.3
100.0

$2
88
660
1,063
1,007
705
1,335
1,354
$6,215

1.4
10.6
17.1
16.2
11.3
21.5
21.8
100.0

Returns
Under $5,000
,000 Under 10,000
,000 Under 20,000
,000 Under 30,000
,000 Under 40,000
40 000 Under 50,000
,000 Under 100,000
000 And Over
Totals

*

than .05%
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State of California
Personal Income Tax Statistics
Summary of Data
1978 Income Year
Returns
Nontaxable

Taxable

All

Total Returns
Adjusted Gross Income
Total Deductions
Taxable Income
Tax Assessed

4,098,438

5,350,272

9,448, 710

Salaries and Wages
Dividends
Interest
Annuities and Pensions
Alimony
Business and Professional
Gains
Losses
Farms
Gains
Losses
Partnerships
Gains

3,351,608
322,059
1,427,596
331,372
26,760

4,877,175
1,121,965
3,449,496
407,026
21,753

263,040
125,378

Nontaxable
Returns
(

•

h

0

All
Returns
d

s

$23,287,166
8,753,751
15,617,590

$125,816,480
21,833,113
104,041,143
4,174,011

$149,103,646
30,586,864
119,658,733
4,174,011

8,228,783
1,444,024
4,877,092
738,398
48,513

19,718,139
347,584
1,656,656
1,409,603
76,930

101,836,261
3,167,818
5,810,340
2,683,661
119,167

121,554,400
3,515,403
7,466,997
4,093,264
196,097

441,557
202,371

704,597
.327,749

1,344,714
567,403

7,217,465
743,565

8,562,179
1,310,968

10,083
19,171

31,834
49,236

41,917
68,407

28,138
205,544

422,215
327,951

450,353
533,495

44,107
45,953

206,195
161,301

250,302
207,254

194,031
332,923

3,180,790
1,066,988

3,374,821
1,399,911

23,373
1,422

69,712
5,581

93,085
7,003

69,086
6,259

693,439
21,787

765,525
28,047

123,378
117,199

:n2,0l9
408,251

4 35.397
525,450

224,334
480,876

1,523,378
1,411,839

1,767,712
1,892,

76,053
6, 799

236,042
16,185

312.095
22,984

132,543
28,276

575,667
46,480

708,210
74,757

23,542
20,611
50,125
17,297
91,287
18,769
28,611

126,445
116,489
298,863
68,901
347,000
'. 85,830
121,433

149,987
137,100
348,988
86,198
438,287
104,599
150,044

$67,282
100,569
247,810
42,997
358,068
60,710
295,678

$467,517
424,912
2,920,459
193,897
4,756,966
254,563
1,165,250

$534,798
525,481
3,168,270
236,894
5,115,034
315,273
1,460,928

139,130
61,391

568,648
.246,645

707' 778
308,036

361,078
46,204

4,338,057
185,698

4,699,136
231,902

15,987
12,837

49,536
18,608

65,523
31,445

32,994
84,812

191,678
88,268

224,672
173,080

25,949
32,890
149,093
64,480
9,125
25,030
584
22,237
9,528

7,451
83,840
640,939
43,125
80,009
210,635
1,228
55,099
63,483

33,400
116,730
790,032
107,605
89,134
235,665
1,812
77,336
73,011

103,446
52,020
291,643
61,917
8,484
23,993
692
7,625
26,578

12,652
157,363
1,151,094
39,045
149,621
261,361
1,752
15,335
262,822

116,098
209,383
1,442,738
100,962
158,105
285,354
2,443
22,960
289,400

and Trusts

Assets
Short-Term Gains
Short-Term Losses
r·!edium-Term Gains
Medium-Term Losses
Long-Term Gains
Long-Term Losses
Loss Carryover*
Sales

t

Amounts on
Taxable
Returns
u s a n

Other Than Capital Assets
Losses

Sick Pay
Ex:>ense
Employee Business Expense
Military Exclusion
f-Emp1oyed Pension Plan
Defined Benefit Plan
ted Interest
Alimony

*Reportable on future returns.

- 3/10/80
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State of California
Personal Income Tax Statistics
Sununary of Data
1978 Income Year

Page 2
Continued

Returns
Nontaxable

Taxable

Nontaxable
Returns
(
t h

All

0

Amounts on
Taxable
Returns
u s a n

All
Returns
d

s

)

Itemized Deductions
547,650
815

2,140,047
3,384

2,687,697
4,199

$695,177
449

$1,260,058
1,424

$1,955,235
1,874

589,477
618,433
655,809
553,029
47,872

2,770,803
2,986,525
3,065,348
2,786,919
256,242

3,360,280
3,604,958
3, 721,157
3,339,948
304,ll4

398,497
63,606
224,562
43,557
13,437

2,158,821
370,008
1,561,897
261,273
56,067

2,557,318
433,614
1,786,459
304,830
69,504

587,935
200,984
24,603
26,260

2,871,369
1,192,878
18,637
219,876

3,459,304
1,393,862
43,240
246,136

229,891
37,569
42,689
1,61:<.

1,350,124
448,938
414.395
18,141

1,580,015
486,507
457,084
19,754

507,353
538,351
74,479
541,241

2,410,649
2,655,846
339,252
2,730,981

2,918,002
3,194,197
413,731
3,272,222

1,278,654
556,611
153,076
228,762

6,091,148
3,053,330
285,928
1,590,885

7,369,803
3,609,942
439,004
1,819,647

Standard Deductions

3,420,968

2,251,306

5,672,274

4,813,369

3,048,462

7,861,831

Personal
Dependent
Blind

4,098,438
2,563,918
2,255
2,195
12,772

5,350,272
4,680,205
5, 724
17,236
62,183

9,448, 710
7,244,123
7,979
19,431
74,955

602,265
20,103
18
$394
322

857,919
·n. 085
45,992
9,630
1,292

1,460,184
57,188
64,232
$ $10,024
1,614

13,734
5,670
20,798

309
346;537
16,409
15,009

309
360,271
22,079
35,807

1,398
2,209
2,400

98
68,203
7,140
3,107

98
69,601
9, 349
5,507

1,839,869
40,048
2,900,705
90,523

1,939,649
335,300
4,760,966
677,870

3,779,518
375,348
7,661,671
768,393

67,194
1,164
310,596
24,432

71,255
15,222
3,824,614
1,086,032

138,449
16,386
4,135,210
1,110,464

1,073,887

1,073,887

559,860

559,860

1,894

1,894

147

147

105,753

105,753

72,138

72,138

80

80

254

254

4,087,964
236,047

7,616,529
267,812

1,281,873
101,290

1,678,603
108,585

Medical
Child Adoption
Taxes
Real Estate
Gas
Sales
In Lieu License
Other
Contributions
Cash
Other
Excess*
Political
Interest
Home Mortgage
Other
Casualty Loss
Miscellaneous

Other States
Child Care
Low Income
Agricultural Water
Income Averaging
Solar Energy
Retirement

$

Refundable Credits
Renters
SDI
Withholding
Declaration
Balance Due with Return
IRA Premature Distribution
Preference Tax
Throwback Tax
Oveqlayrnents
Refundable
Credite'J

3,528,565
31,765

177
!'Tll/R&S
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396,730
7,295
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State of California
Personal TncomP Tax Statistics
Summary of .Data
1978 Income Year

Returns
Nontaxable

..

Taxable

All

Nontaxable
Returns
(
t h

0

Amounts on
Taxable
Returns
u s a n

Net Tax Liabilit:t
(thousands)
Other Distributtons
Single Returns
Joint Returns
Separate Returns
Head of Household Returns
Surviving Spouse Returns
Renters' Returns
Nonresident Returns
Fiduciary Returns

1,993,544
1,458, 728
62,642
572,516
ll,008
1,839,869
201,385
160,606

1,975,555
3,065,239
60,576
244,662
4, 240
1,939,649
136,492
44,033

3,969,099
4,523,967
123,218
817,178
15,248
3,779,518
337,877
204,639

Tax Forms Next Year
Yes
No

3, 754,858
343,580

4,655,413
694,859

8,410,271
1,038,439

Type of Return
Single Page
Multi page

2,010,811
2,087,627

1,074,695
4,275,577

3,085,506
6,363,204

2,038,949
1,473, 796
555,332
30,361

2' 135.064
1,735,276
1,472,388
7,544

4,174,013
3,209,072
2,027,720
37,90'1

16,}')9
96
6,10 l

22,850
:160
12,1 l6

Administrative Information

Tax Return Prepared by
Taxpayer
Practitioner - :-iot Computer
Practitioner - Computer
VTAP
Solar Credit
Single Family Dwelling
Other Premises
Personal Residence Exclusion Returns
FTB/R&S
3/10/80

6,491
264
6,033

178

$975,672
3,033,826
31,399
128,875
4,238
875,281
52,331
33,519

All
Returns
d

s

)

APPENDIX D
CALIFORNIA'S
IDENTIFIABLE TAX EXPENDITURES
11110-11

(In biUions)

Personal income taxes ......................... ,............................
Retail sales and use taxes .... .. .. ..... .. ..... .. ..... .. .. .. ... .. ... ... .. ..
Inheritance Tax..................................................................
Bank and corporation tax ................................................
Motor vehicle fuel taxes....................................................
Insurance tax......................................................................
Horse 111Cinc ......................•......•.........•..............................

$3.8

Total State tax expenditUI'ell ........................................

$6.8

2.1
0.6

0.2
0.1
a

a

• Less than SSO million.
Personal Income Tax
(In millions)
Interest expense ..................................................................... .
Personal and dependent credit ........................................... .
Property, sales, and vehicle taxes ....................................... .
Capital ga!ns exclusion ......................................................... .
Charitable contributions ....................................................... .
Trade & business expense, union dues and miscellaneous
Employer contributions to pension plans........................... .
Medical expenses................................................................... .
Head of household status ..................................................... .
Employer contributions to health plans ............................. .
Employee business expense ................................................. .
Standard deduction ............................................................... .
Income averaging ................................................................. .
Social Security Income ......................................................... .
Capital gains on death ......................................................... .
Interest on government bonds ............................................. .
&"IJC'''""lS of certain agricultural costs ............................. .
Comrlen:satlon for injuries or sickness ............................... .
Low
credit ............................................................... .
Exclusion of $100,000 of gain from sale of home ........... .
Individual retirement accounts & self employed retirement
accounts ......................................................................... .
Casualty losses ..................................................................... .
Accelerated depreciation ..................................................... .
Taxes paid to another state ................................................. .
Solar energy device/credits ................................................. .
Professional corporations ...•..................................................
Meals & lodging furnished by employer ........................... .
Moving expense ..................................................................... .
Scholarships & fellowships ................................................. .
Exploration & development costs ....................................... .
Pe1centage depletion ............................................................. .
Timber valuation for capital gains ..................................... .
Military pay exclusion ......................................................... .

Bank and Corporation Tax
(In millions)
$880

520
250

380
230

210
140
140

120
125
100
100
85
60

Exploration and development expenses ................................... .
Accelerated depreciation ........................................................... .
Research and experimental expenses ....................................... .
Exempt corporations (from minimum tax only) ................... .
Charitable contributions ........................................................... .
Solar energy devices ................................................................. .
Depreciation of low-income rental housing ........................... .
Exemption from preference tax ............................................... .
Percentage depletion ................................................................. .
Bad debt reserves ....................................................................... .
Certain agriculture costs ........................................................... .
Pollution equipment ................................................................. .

ss

21
14
II
II
6
6

5
4
2

I

Other Taxes
(In millions)

so
40
32
32
27
30

20
17

IS

20
13
lO

9

s

4•
3
3
3

Horst:racing tax
Preferential rates ................................................................. .
Preferential breakage treatment ......................................... .

$3

lnhetit.ence Tax
Pret:!rential rates: Class A and B beneficiaries ............... .
Speci!ic exemptions ............................................................. .
Chari:cable contributions ..................................................... .
Life insu1ance exclusion ..................................................... .

$493
30
97

Insurance tax
Non;Jrofit hospital service plans ....................................... .
Pensions and profit-sharing ............................................... .
Fratt:rn~l benefit societies ................................................... .
Motor V einide fuel taxes
Aircraft nses, primarily commercial ................................. .
Sales w military ................................................................... .

Sales end Un Tax
(In millions)

179

$43
38

Sales tax expenditures:
To be consumed at home ............................. .
Candy ............................................................. .
Vending machines-33% provision ............. .
Gas, electricity, and water .............................. ..
Vessels and aircraft ........................................... .
Cargo and returnable containers ..................... .
Prescription medicines ....................................... .
Newspapers and periodicals ............................. .
Leases of motion pictures ................................. .
Option to pay on cost rather than rental receipts····························································
Sales by charitable organizations ..................... .
Master tapes ....................................................... .
Vending machine operators ............................. .
Optometrists and podiatrists............................. .
Hot food sold to airlines ................................... .

$950
50

13
605

215
115

69
28
23
15
3
2
2
2

I

2

8
$29
13
I

$45

35

APPENDIX E
FEDERAL INCOME TAX
'MIDDLE CLASS' ITEMS DOMINATE TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET
The tax expenditure figures in the President's 1981
are dominated by items with a solidly "middle
class" tone, such as the mortgage interest and property
tax deduction for owner-occupied homes, which is
estimated to cost $22.3 billion in fiscal 1981; the
exclusion of social security from income which (together
with other tax benefits for the elderly) is estimated to
$12.4 billion in 1981; and the exclusion from income
plan contributions and earnings, estimated to
$14.7 billion.

•

the 1981 tax expenditure budget does not
r:ontain a distribution of tax expenditures by
income class. The Administration has decided to make
such distributions only on special request, since it
appears inconsistent to allocate tax expenditures by
class in the budget documents, when similar
are not made in the case of other government
most

recent available allocations of tax
by income class are set forth in the
1978 publication by the Senate Budget
entitled Tax Expenditures: Relationships to
Programs and Background Material on

Individual Provisions. That study is available as Doc 787873 in the Tax Notes Microfiche Edition.
Some Expenditures Are Aggregated
For the first time, a few tax expenditure budget figt:~res
have been aggregated in the budget documents. In the
past, the Treasury officials who are responsible for
compiling tax expenditure figures have been content to
warn about the dangers of adding tax expenditures
together to get a grand total, since changes in one tax
expenditure figure are likely to cause changes in other
figures too.
This year. all of the previous caveats about
aggregation have been repeated in the budget
documents. In addition. however, a special "memorandum" aggregates a limited number of major tax
expenditures, including the special treatment for capital
gains, which is estimated to cost $22.3 billion; tax exempt
interest. estimated at $3.9 billion; the deduction for state
and local taxes. which is pegged at $24.8 billion; and the
charitable contributions deduction, estimated at $8.9
billion. The
figures also indicate that
itemized deductions, taken as a whole, will cost $44.6
billion in fiscal 1981.

Fu-
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1!79

of
!0

1979

1911

1919

!9B!

'"'

bef.el1ls and
Armed fO!ctS

1.360

1.470

1.585

115

115

135

Res.denlial energy cred1!s
Alternalivt, coostrvat100 and """
technology Cled!IS
Natural resources and envtron~

645

460

460

1l5

140

165

220

390

495

200

120

245

10

60

110

-15

10

15

10

20

10

15

385

410

470

110
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10

10

10

10

10

75
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80

445

430

15

10

20

365

SO\

540

590
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ment:

530
1.210
530

1,400
445

555

600

1.470
480

15

lxdus100 ol mterest on slate and
loc.al government pollutoo COO·
lrol bonds
U:cluSIOO of payments 1n aid of
coostroctoo of water, sewage.
gas and ele<:tnc utilitieS
fiVe-year amort1Zal100 on pollutiOfl
control fat1htlfS ...
Tax Jncent~m for preservat100 of
lustO!~ structures.
Caprtal gams treatment of certam
!Imber 1ncorne
Capital gams treatment of ~ron
ore ....
ArricuHutt:

1.490

1.160

1,930

35

35

40

1,275

1.580

1.815

470

610

750

1.010

1.160

1.350

820

1.150

1,670

10

10

10

65

75

90
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1910

!919

Commerce and

hou~ne:

-

1919

1911

1910

1910

1911

credit:

OJV!dend exch.JSiOO

ExclusiOn of mterest 011 Stale and
local tndustnal developmtnt
bonds
b:emot100 of cred1t umon mcome
Excess ba<l debt reserves of It·
nanoal mshtuhons
Deductibility of mortgage mterest
on owner .occupied ho<nes
Dedutliblhty of property lax on
owner «CillJied ho<nes
Deducttblilty of mterest on CtJn·
sumer credtt
Exoensmg of construct1011 penod
m:erest and taxes
hcess hrst,year deprec1abon
llepreetaiiOO on rental l!ousmg m
stratghlli~

on ilwldmgs (other
rental l!ousmg l m excess
of stratgh! lme
Asset depreCI>IIOO range
CaPital gams (other tnan agrrcul·
ture_ t1mbef. 1ron ore and
coal)
Deferral ol cap;tal gams on hOll\e
sales
CaPital g31ns at death
Surtax
exemptiOn
(through

1978)

460

490

515

255

305

360

180
100

335
115

780

855

965
10,745

11.505

14.760

6.760

7.740

8.975

3.085

3.595

4,240

525
50

555
50

585
50

90
135

140
135

160
145

70

65

65

190

285

190

I35
2.460

135
2.880

140
3.400

I20
I30

110
!50

I25
ISO

655

715

810

10.190

13,855

14.885

l.l15
4,440

1.010
4.750

l.lll
5.085

115

$100.000 of Ctlfpora!e 1nrome

3.185

7,555

7.510

Investment credlt, ather than
[SOP's and rehabllrta!ton of
structures
Investment cre<hf lOf rehablhta1100 of structures

13,910

15,705

16.860

2.590

2.910

3.115

55

I20

140

IO

60

65

rates

on

the

Transportation:
Deducttb<htl ot nonbusmess State

gasolme taxes
amortllatron on railroad

350
-40
75

pames

-40
70

-40
70

E.lcluSion of capdal gams on
home sales lor pe<SOI1s age 65
and O'ler
Exclus1011 of caprtal gams on
hOll\e S<les for per1011s age 55
and over
AdditiOllal exemptron lor the blrnd
Addrtronal exemption lor elderly
lax credit for the elderly
Deductrbllity of caSIJ.'llly losses
Earned mcome credit 1
ExcluSIOn of mterest on State and
local l!ousmg bonds

10

rehJblhtalion

10

IO

15

410

630

1.010

3IO

375

400

935

1.030

1.045

5,465

6.880

8.695

845

99()

1.205

285

330

380

980

l.l65

1.385

50

50

50

1.885

2.495

ll!O

345
185

395
185

450
190

ll.l35

11.925

I4.140

1}65

1.125

2.510

1.350

!.485

I,635

85

90

100

lO

!0

1.910

3,365

3.895

125
35
1.745
I45
530
300

535
40
!.970
135
590

590

m

2.070
135
665
360

80

I80

615

915
45
190

1.050
50
160

!.liS
55
130

80

100

80

1.110

1.365

2.615

12.595

I4.665

17J2L

500

190

250

I6.605

20.740

12.310

40

315
10

350
30

380
35

15

10

35

General purpose fiscal assistance:

650

700

740

315

345

360

680

765

885

405

430

450

5.110

5,725

6,645

ExcluSIOn of interest on general
purpose state and lor.al debt
Deductibilrty of norrbu~ness state
and local taxes (other than 011
owner.occupred homes and
gaSillrne) ..
Tax credit for Ctlfporations recerving income lrOll\ domg buS!·
ness m United States posses.
SIOIIS
Interest:
Deferral ol 1nterest on savmgs
bonds ..

1.215

1.265

!.580

Memoundum

715

810

900

Max1mum !ax on personal servtce
mrome

Cr€-(N tor .ctH!d and dependent
care expenses
Cred1t tor
of AfOC
rec!Cients
pubhc ass1st.
ance rec1p!ents under work m-

45
1.!10
IS

45
190
115

so

85
175

Health:
f.xclu:aon of
co-nlrlbu
t1ons for
msurance
pn:!m1ums and medJCal care
Oeducntnhty of medica! expenses
Expensmg of removal of arch!!ec.

ol chan!aO!e contn-

Exclusron of veterans pens10ns
Exclusion of Gl bill benefits
Credfts and deduct100s for polifr.
cal contnbulions

and social services:

tura! and transPQftatlon Darners to the handicapped

8ZO

General government:

Education, training, employment,

crotrve programs

685

75

compensation

Gene<al jOIJs credit
Targeted ,oils credr!

590

Exclusion of veterans disability

ment:

fiVe-year amorluat1oo fOf housmg

Exclus100 of scholarship and tel·
!owslup mcome
Parental personal exemptron lor
students age 19 v. over
Exciusron of employee meals and
todgmg (olher than mrhtary)
Employer educat100al ass1stance
Exclus100 of contnbut1011s. to prepaid
serv1ces pians
credit tor ESOP' s
Deducliblirly ol chantable contn·
ool!ons ( educat!Oil)
Oeduc!rllilrty of cha11!able con!n·
butrons. oth€r than educatron
and health

1911

Veterans benefits and services:

Commuruty and regional develop..

IO

5
685
!0

40

11.080
3.115

11.965
3.585

I5,2!5
4,050

1.020

l.l45

1.330

10

zoo

2!0

220

Income secunty:
b:c!u~mn

<

Premrums on IICCldent and diS·
ab!ltty insurance
Income of trusts to finance
suppleme!ltary
unemploy.
ment benefits ..
ExcluSIOO of rnterest on life rnStJr·

ance savmgs ..

first

stock
ot Ia< 011 shiPPing CtJm·

Benefits for dependents and
SUM'IorL
E.<ctusion of railroad retirement
system benefits ..
ExcluSIOO of workmen's compen·
sationllenefits ..
ExcluS!OO of specii! benefits for
disabled coal miners ...
ExcluS!OO of untaxed unempioy·
men! msurance llenefrts .
Exclusion of public assiStance
benefrts
UOUSIOO Of disability pay
Net exclUSlOfl of pensron COfllnlltl·
hoos and eammgs
Employer plans
P:ans lor self.employed and
ot1lers
Exclusron of other employee beneIris·
PremiUms orr grOUjl term life

msurance

3.IIO

Reduced

Disability insurance benefit'S ..
OASl benefits lor retired work·

en.
140
90

1910

1579

1911

740

3.5!5

780

3.900

860

effect of provisions

diuggregated above:
Caprtal garns
ExcluSion ot rnterest 011 state and
local debt
Deduclibility of state and local
noobusmess taxes
Deductrbilrty of chantable cootn·
butrons
ltemued deductions
Deduct.blh~l ot mortgage <nterest
and property tax on owner ·OC.
cuplf!d homes
Benefits lor the elderly
[xcluSIOII of soc<al secunty and
railroad retltemenf plus the
add1ftonal exemption and
tax credrt lor the elderly

!075

l.l/5

1.310

4,095

4.645

5,500

930

985

1.030

•tzSI!Iilll('f!orlts\ AAtastxl)f'Nltlurt!\!•'Tia!ts>tlvtlll!'e1liOO/lOOl!oH~eiiUif!t! SSm!l!lOfl
'fht hfiVt1 m tilt t~ ll'ldlult ~tiled M 'lit >'?ifltd •OCOI'l'lt !l.i cr€'111! Ofllftt!j)!~ T~ tti@C!
/l'liiboll 19Bl SJVOm.lllot!

of sooa! secunty bene

fits

TAX NOTES, February 4, 1980

Combined

3.145

181

(Ill

1.610

3,090

3.865

18.895

1l.l90

24.795

6.810
31.960

7.635

38.040

8.860
44.505

I6.545

19.095

22.340

8.405

10.145

11.4IO

Wil~~ ~~

i9H Sf!l

F'1!1l!Of'

1980 il6'Jt

LAWR€.1>4Clf G. ALLYN
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California
October 19, 1Y59

~acrar.1ento,

Constitutional Problema Involved in
Conforming California's Personal
Incor;le and Bank and Corporation 'l'ax
La~·:s t·Jith Federal Income '.i'ax Lat1

The question has been as
.hat constitutional
problems, if any, would confront the Le slature in reing California's ~ersonal Income Tax La~ (n. & T.C.
c. 17001 and fcl
·1ng) and .Bank and Corporation Tax Lm1
(F.. 1:: T .. c Sec. 23 1 and
11m: ing) to ra~(e these latts
co
with the Federal inco~e tax la~; (Internal Revenue
Code of 1S54, Subtitle ,'\, cor.Jnencing at Sec. 1)?
1.

Delegation of Legislative

Po~·~

A revision of the California la~s as indicated
wou
present the 9roblem of an unconstitutional del~3a
tion of the State•s legislative power to the Congress of
the United States should it provide for the automatic inclusion of pros~ective congressional legislation.
The State Legislature is vested uith a generally

nondelegable pm:er to r!:ake lattJS for the State of Califo~nia
(see 11 Cal. Jur. 2d 481; and Calif. Canst.~ Art. III).
California courts have _ooked upon this as ~rohibitinG
the Legislature fro1:1 providing for the autowat ic incor:;>orat
by re terence of the future ar.oendt;:ents of the la'!.·:s of
a
other jurisdiction. As the court stated in Erock v.
Superior Court (1937), 9 Cal. 2d 291, 297:
" ••• It is, of course, perfectly valid to
adopt existing statutes, rules or regulations
of Conzress or another state, by reference;
but the atte~,pt to rdake future regulations of
another Jurisdiction part of t)Je state la·.! is
generally held to be an unconstitutional delet
of legis lat
pm·1er. 11
1
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To the same effect, see In re
Cal. 326, 328; and 11 Cal. Jur. 2d-sl97

(1923), 190

In Fa lerrno v. Stockton Theaters,
• {1948),
Supre~e Court ci£ea the Brock And
Burt~e cases to the point that uher<? a statute adopts Ey
specJ.fic reference the lau o~ another juri
t
- Federal
as uell as State - the adopted lau is incorpora
in the
.foro in uhich it exists at the tirr.e of reference and not as
later modified. This \'las in regard to langua
the Alien
Land Lau giving aliens the right to acquire
"in the
~anner and to the extent, and for the purposes
scribed by
any treaty nou existing betueen the goverru:;e
the United
States and the nation or country of which s
1s a
citizen or subJect'' (p. 58). The court s
):

32 Cal. 2d 53:-Gur State

" ••• there is Erave doubt whether
Legislature could constitutionally
to the treaty-na~ing authority of the
States the right and po:jer thus direct
control our local leaislation uith res
future acta ••• "
None of the California cases Btie 1
lved
tax legislation. In the Brock case, houever,
court
cited in support of its sEate~ent as to the inval ity of
incorporating the future le~islation of a
jurisd tion
by reference, the South Carolina case of Santee r1ills, et al
v. Query (1922), 115 S.E. 202, 206. The
nere-ITas--concel'ned \'Jith the validity of a 1922 South
1
incon~e
tax lmJ \'Jhich imposed on individuals and orga
tior.:: liable
for payL1ent of the Federal incone tax, a tax on inco:!le equal
to 1/3 of the amount of the Federal tax. The provision~of
the Federal income tax law relating to the
assessment
and collection of such tax, "passed and
prior to the
t ir.1e of the approval" of the state lat;, a
in conflict
uith the latter, together '.!ith the rules and regulations
issued thereunder, t·Iere adopted and incorporated by reference
aD if set forth in full. It naa contended that this incorporation had the effect of ado;>ting, or atter.:pting to adept,
future Federal income tax la~s, ru:es and regulations, ae
uell as those in existence on the date of the approval of
the state lav, and thus delegated, or attempt
to delegate,
to Congress a nondelegable le~islative povJer
the South
Carolina Legislature. The court held agai
is c
enti~n
on the ground that the language of the la~1
support
it, and construed the la~ as incorporating
provisions of the Federal lat-I, rules and regul
ef'f:e
at
183

Constitutional Problems - p. 3 - #504

the time of the approval of the state law, stating that
such incorporation is valid. HovH~ver, it recognized the
existence of a prohibition against the adoption of prospective Federal legislation, and indicated that if such had
been the nature of the state law, it would have held it
invalid ..

•

Consistent with Santee fUlls, et al v. Query
is the Georgia case of Featherstone v. Norman-(1930),··
153 S.E. 58. There the court was conce~ned with a 1929
Georgia law which imposed a tax on the net income of
individuals and organizations equal to 1/3 of the tax
on the same net taxable income payable by them to the
United States under the Federal income tax law, provision
being made for excluding from the tax base any income
which was taxable only by the Federal Government and for
including therein certain income which only the state
could tax. The court held in part that the law did not
unlawfully delegate legislative power by making future
Federal legislation a part of the state law, since it
merely adopted an existing Federal method for determining
the state tax (at p. 70).
It is stated in an annotation in 133 A.L.R.
11
Adoption by or under authority of state
statute without specific enactment or re-enactment of
prospective Federal legislation or Federal administrative
rules as unconstitutional delegation of legislative power":

401, entitled

"Plthough there is some conflict, it is
generally held that the adoption by or under
authority of a state stat~te of prospective
Federal legislation,or Federal administrative
rules thereafter to be passed, constitutes an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power."
Cases cited in the annotation in support ·of thie
proposition include the Brock and Santee Mills cases (133
A.L.R., at p. 403).
.
Also in support of the proposition are the annotations in 166 A.L.R. 516, 518 (citing the Featherstone case),
and 42 A.L.R. 2d 191, 798, entitled Cons~itutionalifJ,
c
ruction,and application of provisions of state tax law
for conformity uith federal income tax law or administrative
and judicial interpretation."
11

184
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In the light of the foregoing, we consider it
extrerJely doubtful that the California c
s
sustain
a revision of our Personal Income Tax and Bank and Corporation Tax Laws to make them conform to the Federal income
tax law by the autcmatic incorporation by reference of
future provisions of the Federal law.

In reaching this conclusion we have considered
also·the case of Alaskg Steamship Co. v. Mullaney (19509th C.C.A.), 180 Fed. 2d 805, wfiicflSupports a contrax·y
view. That case involved a 1949 act of the
orial
legislature of Alaska which imposed an income tax on individuals and corporations at a rate of 10%
the total
Federal income tax payable for the same t
year to
the United States pursuant to the Internal
venue Code
"as now in effect or hereafter amended"
regulations promulgated thereunder. The court stat
that the
incorporation by reference of the provisions of
Federal law "now in effect" could not be que 1
, citing
the Santee Mills, Featherstone end Burke cases
p 815).
Hm·1ever, even though there Has no issue "before
on the
matter since the Federal law had not been arne
, the
court added that there was no unlawful de
legislative power by the incorporation by reference
future
ngea in the Federal law. It gave as
a reason for
this that a major objective of the legialatt're
making
a law conform to future changes in the
ral lawW3s
the attaining of uniformity.
Although the decision in the IVIullaney case was
later in time than any of the decisions ~hat we have noted
in support of the opposing view, we are unmvare of anything
in any California case decided since Mullaney indicating
that should the question now be presented to-the California
courts, they will go off in the same direction as Mullaney.
2.

Intergovernmental

Immunity

A revision of the California Personal Income Tax
Law to base the tax imposed by it upon the
orne subject
to tax under the Federal income tcx law would ~~pinge upon
the general immunity from state taxation accorded the
Federal Government and its instrumentalities (see i'•::Culloch
v. The State of Maryland (1819), 4 L. Ed. 579t in the
absence of a provision-lor the exclusion from the State's
tax of interest paid on Federal bonds (see Pollock v. The
Farmers' Loan & Trust Company {1895), ~9 L.~9, 82U=
E21;-and ~m~ Jur. 3~3-~ Such inserest is now exempt
from California person3! income taxation (see
18 Cal.
Adm. Code, Sec. 17130 lb)).
185
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•

For similar reasons, an exclusion or exemption
of the same kind should be incorporated in any revision
of the corporation income tax imposed
t
Bank and
Corporation Tax La\'r (R. & T.C. Sec.
and following).
Such an exclusion or exemption is unnecessary, however,
as to the franchise tax which that law imposes (R. & T.C.
Sec. 23151 and following) in view of a distinction between
a tax on income, which is the nature of
corporation
income tax, and a tax measured by income, 1r1hich describes
the franchise tax (see Pacific Compan~ v Johnson (1931),
76 L. Ed. 893). The Bank and Corporation Tax Law presently
provides for the inclusion of interest paid on Federal
bonds in the measure of the franchise
and for the exclusion of such interest from the c
tion inco~~ tax
(R. & T.C. Sec. 24272).

3.

Income of Nonresident I!idividuals

The California Personal
Tax Law presently
imposes a tax on the ta:-7able income
nonresident individuals which is derived from sources within this State
(R. & T.C. Sec. 17041). This is in accordance with a
general rule which prohibits a state from taxing the income
of a nonresident individual derived from sources outside
ita jurisdiction (see 27 Am. Jur. 416).
Any revision of the Personal Income Tax Law to
base the ta.1: imposed by 1 t upon the net income subject to
Federal income taxation should like
be consistent with
this rule.
There is no constitutional bar to the taxation
of the net income of resident individuals of this State
derived from sources outside Califor~
(see Lawr~~ce v.
State Tax Commission (1931), 76 L.
• 1102; Gu~r2~ty
Trust C0;"7'oany of New York v. Virginia ( 1938 L 23 L. Ed.
16; andlll30 A.L:R:-11~1186), and California taxes all
such income accordingly {R. & T.C. Sec. 17041). To the
extent, howe•ter, that taxable income derived from sources
in another state is taxed by that stlte without the allowance of a credit for taxes paid to Cal ornia, a credit
may presently t: taken against the latter taYes for the
taxes paid the other state (R. & T.C.
c. 18001).
4.

Income of Foreign Corporations

A revision of the Bank and Corporation Tax La\·1
to base ti1e ta~es imp0~ed ·by it upon
net income of
foreign corporations subject to Federal
orne taxation 186
could present some constitutional
ms
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In its impact on a roreign corporation which
engages in both interstate and intrastate commerce, the
rranchise tax imposed by the law (R. & T.C. Sec. 23151)
can be measured only by a fair proportion of the corporation's income at~ributable to business done within
California (Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone (1948),
93 L. Ed. 1613). The 1aw-as presently-drafted is consistent
with this principle {R. & T.C. Sees. 23040, 23151 and 25101).
A franchise tax cannot be imposed on a fcreign
corporation engaged e~clusively in interstate cOtllffierce,
e\en though measured only.by its net income from sources
within the state, since such a tax represents an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce {Soeccor Motor
Service, !!!.£. v. O'Connor (1951), 95 L. Ed. 571).
In its application to a foreign corporation
engaged exclusively in intersta~e commerce, the corporation
income tax imposed by the law (R. & T.C. Sec. 2~501) must
be nondiscriminatory and may relate only to pra;er!y
apportioned net income from activities within California
(West Publishin~ Company v. McC~lqan (1946), 27 Cal. 2d
705, affd. 90 L. Ed. 1603; N"O"rt:~-.:2'3tern States Portland
Cement Compan:v v. Minnesota, ar.c J. _lltams\i-:-"Stockh:lr.--:-Valves2,!!d F1ttings, J:nc. (1959Y:-3-L. Ed. 2d Adv., -421).
Since the decision in the two cases last cited,
Congress has enacted legislation limiting a state's right
to tax the income of a foreign corporation arising from
interstate commerce. Tl:is is P J.blic Law 86-272 (Senate
2524, signed by the President on September 14, 1959).
Generally speaking, it prohibits a state from imposing a
net income tax on income derived from activities within
the state by a foreign corporation engaged in interstate
commerce if such activities consist only of the solicitation
by salesmen of orders for sales of tangible personal
property, and the "orders are sent outs ide the State for
approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by
shiprr:ent or delivery from a point outside the State ••• "
This limitation must be borne in mind in the drafting of
any revision of the California Dank and Corporation Tax
Law to establish conformity with the Federal income tax
law through the use of the Federal tax base.
1

187
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5.

Income of Domestic Corporations

As in the case of resident
uals, there is
no constitutional bar to the taxation or
net incorne of
a domestic corporation derived· from sources outside
California other than in interstate comrr~rce (see Lawr~~
v. State Tax Commission (1931), 76 L. Ed. 1102; Guar..: :.!I_
Trust Compan* of New York v. ~Vir~inia (1938), 83 L. Ed. 16;
27 Am. Jur. 12; and 130 A.L.R. 11~3, 1186 • Neverthaless,
the corporation income tax imposed by
and Corporation
Tax Law is currently levied only on net
ome derived from
sources within this Scate (R. & T.C.
c. 23501).
The courts have not, to our
dge, been
squarely presented with the issue or
ther a state may
tax the net income of a domes tic corpora t
rived in
interstate commerce from sources outside
state. The
Uni d States District Court in Piedmont
Co. v.
_guery (1932), 56 Fed 2d 172, 176, by way
um-;-expressed
doubt that such a tax would be constitut
1
valid, on
the ground that it would, in effect,
operty beyond
the state's jurisdiction, and thus v
te ~ue process.
There is, on the other hand, substant 1 basis for a
position to the contrary (see Matson Navi~~tion Companl
v. State Board of Equalizat!2U (1935), Eo L. Ed. 791,
rehearing cien. CO L. Ed. lOll; United Sta ~es Glue Cor..:.~anv
v. Town of Cak Creek (1918), 247 L. Ed. 1135 and 27 Am.
Jur-:-.32'2-=3"2'3'}.

It appears that, as in the case
a foreign
corporation, a franchise tax cannot be 1
ed on a
domestic corporation engaged exclusively in interstate
commerce, even though measured only by 1
net income
from sources within the state, since such a tax represents
an unconstitutional burden on intersta
comrrerce iSee
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor (1
), 95·L. Ed. 573);
Philadelph:r.a-and Southern-Mail SteamshiP Comoan~ v.
Pennsylvania TIE86), 30 L.~ 1200, 1204; and 27 Am. Jur.
j22- 323).

6.

Retroactive Reduction of Taxes

There are some provisions in the
ral income
tax law which, if reflected in any federal
base employed
for California tax purposes, could present a problem in
respect to ta~es for which liability may
ve accrued prior
to t
enact:-:.2nt of the legislation provid
for the use
or such base. Such a provision, fo~ example, is that found
1n Section 17.?. of the lntern3l Revence Code of 1954, relating
to the deduction for net ot::erating losses, \.Yhich permits the
188
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carrying back of such a loss to each of the three t3xable
years preceding the year in which it occurs, and carrying
1 t for\..:ard to each or the five years follmJing. Insorar aa
this provision might apply so as to cause a reduction in any
California taxes that may have~previously vested in the
State, there could be a violation of Section 31 of Article IV
of the State Constitution, which prohibits the Legislature
from making gifts of public money for private purpose3
(see Estate of Stanford v. Widber (1899), 126 Cal. 112;
and Allen v. Franchise!!! BO~a-(1952), 39 Cal. 2d 109).
Ralph N. Kleps
Legislative Counsel
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Dear Mr. Deddeh:
QUESTION
Does the Legislature have power, by statute, to
incorporate federal law by reference into California's
Personal Income Tax Law?
OPINION
The Legislature has power, by statute, to incorporate existing federal law by reference into California's
Personal Income Tax Law. However, the Legislature may not
incorporate future federal laws into California's income
tax structure.
ANALYSIS
This question raises the possibility of an improper
delegation of legislative power.
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The cases hold that the Legislature is vested with
a generally nondelegable power to make laws for the State of
California (see, for example, 13 Cal. Jur. 3d, Canst. Law,
Sec. 104, p. 198, et seq.: and Sec. 3, Art. III, Sec. 1,
Art. IV, Cal. Canst.}, and the courts have held that the
Legislature is generally prohibited from providing for the
automatic incorporation by reference of the future amendments of the laws of any other jurisdiction. As the court
stated, in Brock v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 291, 297:
" • . • It is, of course, perfectly
valid to adopt existing statutes, rules or
regulations of Congress or another state, by
reference; but the attempt to make future
regulations of another jurisdiction part of
the state law is generally held to be an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. " (Emphasis added.)
In the cases, it was frequently stressed that the
delegation of legislative power to others would be upheld if
the discretion of the administrative officers charged with
administering the laws were controlled and guided by adequate
rules or standards prescribed therefor (see, for example,
Tar12ey v. Mcclure, 190 Cal. 593, 600). However, more recent
cases indicate that the need is usually not for "standards"
but for "safeguards" to protect those affected by administrative action (Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 381, 382).
Moreover, whether the incorporation of future
federal laws into this state's Personal Income Tax Law would
involve an invalid delegation of legislative power must be
determined under the terms of California's Constitution (see
Sandstrom v. Cal. Horse Racing Board, 31 Cal. 2d 401, 412),
and Californi~Constitution has been under a gradual
process of revision since 1966 (see Prop. 1-a, Ballot
Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Tuesday, Nov. 8, 1966).
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Much of the task of recommending to the Legislature
the necessary changes in the Constitution was delegated
to the Constitution Revision Commission, which was created
pursuant to an Assembly concurrent resolution in 1963 (Res.
Ch. 181, Stats. 1963). In its report to
Joint Committee
on Legislative Organization on February 15, 1966, on the
proposed revision of seven articles of
California
Constitution, the commission stated as follows, at page 24,
with respect to the delegation of legislative power under
the proposed new constitutional provisions:
I

" • • • The word 'provide 1
the
sense 'The Legislature may provide'
indicates a power which may be delegated. On
the other hand the word 'prescribe,' used in
the sense that something 'shall be prescribed'
••• indicates a power which may not
delegated."
We think that the courts would give considerable
weight to the meaning accorded to "provide and "prescribe"
by the Constitution Revision Commiss
construing the
new provisions of California's Constitution (see Van Arsdale
v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 249;
v. City of
Oakland, 263 Cal. App. 2d 414, 421).
constitutions of
none of those states which presently incorporate current
and future federal income tax law by reference require the
Legislatures of the respective states to "prescribe" income
tax laws.
11

The Constitution Revision Commission was terminated,
effective March 4, 1974 (Joint Rules Committee Resolution
No. 57, 1973-74 Reg. Sess.}, and a new group was formed to
study the revision of Article XIII of the State Constitution,
the article which deals primarily with tax matters. This
group, call the "Constitutional Revision
Force on
Article XIII," did not have the same status as the
Constitution Revision Commission, in that the task force
was not created pursuant to resolution or other official
legislative action. However, the report of the task force
was printed as an Appendix to the Senate Daily Journal for
May 14, 1974, and in the Assembly Journal
May 16, 1974,
commencing at page 13237, to express "the intent of the
drafters of this revision and of the Legislature in adopting
it" Cat page 13238 of the Assembly Journal).
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On page 13272 of the Assembly Journal, the task
force proposed the following language with respect to
income taxes in subdivision (a} of a new Section 26 of
Article XIII of the State Constitution:
(a) Taxes on or measured by income
may be imposed on persons, corporations
or other entities as prescribed by law."*
(Emphasis added.}
11

On the same page of the Assembly Journal, the task
force provided the following comment:
Sections 26(a) and 26(b} are intended
to consolidate existing Section 11 (which
authorizes the Legislature to impose income
taxes) with the pertinent portion of existing
Section 1 3/4 which exempts interest from
State and local bonds from income taxes."
11

Thus, unlike the Constitution Revision Commission,
the task force did not speak of the distinctions to be drawn
between "provide" and "prescribe." Instead, the task force
merely stated that it was intended to "consolidate"--but
not necessarily change--an existing constitutional provision.
The language in subdivision (a) of Section 26, as
set forth above, was subsequently approved by the voters
without change as a part of Proposition 8 on the ballot for
the General Election held on November 5, 1974. However, the
precise meaning of the former constitutional provision on
income taxes still remains somewhat obscure.
From the time of the adoption of the Constitution
in 1879 until its repeal in 1974, former Section 11 of Article
XIII provided as follows:
"SEC. 11. Income taxes may be assessed
to and collected from persons, corporations,
joint-stock associations, or companies resident or doing business in this State, or any
one or more of them, in such cases and amounts,
and in such manner, as shall be prescribed by
law."
(With emphasis again being added.)

*

The same material is contained in the Appendix to the
Senate Daily Journal for May 14, 1974, which was printed
as a separate publication.
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The above provision was not
by the
courts to determine whether the Legis
delegate
the power to impose an income tax. However, we do note that
constitutional amendments were twice
upon the ballot
to accomplish that purpose and were
each time
(Prop. 14, Ballot Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Nov. 8, 1966; Prop.
4, Ballot Pamphlet, Gen. Elec., Nov. 5,
8}.
income
With respect to the provision
taxes then before the convention which
Sacramento
on September 8, 1878, some of the
seemed aware of
the general rule that the Legislature
inherent
power to impose an income tax, even
a constitutional
authorization therefor, while others were not so sure that
a constitutional authorization would
unnecessary (see
Debates and ~oceedin<js of the
Convention of
the State of Californ1.a,
• .;;..:.,=..;:;...;;;;;..;;;...;,..;;.;~~-, 9 4 7; see also
Delaney v.Lowery, 25 Cal. 2d 561, 568;
Drug, Inc.
v. Johnson, 13 Cal. App. 2d 720, 739,
a discussion
the Legislature's inherent power to
The convention did not reach
a distinction was intended between
as used in the income tax provision.

of whether
"prescribe, 11

However, cases construing
constitutional
ions decided prior to the time
Constitutional
Convention met in 1878 held that "pres
indicated a
nondelegable legislative power (see Exline v. Smith, 5 Cal.
112, 113; see also People v. Provines,
• 520, 526),
and it would generally be presumed that
framers of the
Constitution intended to use "prescribed" in this restricted
sense (see Emery v. San Francisco Gas
28 Cal. 345, 360) •
It has been held that the courts will
to other sections
of the Constitution in which a word is used in order to
determine its meaning in the section at
sue (Miller v.
Dunn, 72 Cal. 462, 466).
Moreover, after the Constitution
1879 was
adopted and prior to the commencement
constitutional
revision in 1966, the courts continued to make a distinction
between "provide" and "prescribe" in constitutional provisions (see People v. Johnson, 95 Cal. 71, 474, 4.75; Slavich
v. Walsh, 82 Cal. App. 2d 228, 232-235).
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Therefore, whether or not it was necessary to
insert an authorization into the Constitution of 1879 to
enable the Legislature to impose an income tax, the
Constitutional Convention saw fit to insert such a provision. With respect to the original provision and the new
provision drafted by the Constitutional Revision Task Force
on Article XIII, we think it is the duty of the courts to
give effect to these provisions, if reasonably possible
(Smith v. State Board of Control, 215 Cal. 421, 429). Moreover, since the provisions of the Constitution are mandatory
and prohibitory (Sec. 26, Art. I, Cal. Const.), it has been
stated that when the Constitution prescribes a course to
be followed, all statutes must be consonant therewith
(see County of El Dorado v. Meiss, 100 Cal. 268, 274; Allen
v$ State Board of Equalization, 43 Cal. App. 2d 90, 93).
Therefore, it will be the duty
courts to
construe a provision authorizing an income tax, as "prescribed,~~ rather than as "provided," by law, and, as noted
earlier, these two terms are intended to have a distinct
meaning in the Constitution of 1879 and in at least those
portions of the newer Constitution drafted by the Constitution
Revision Commission. We think it would be difficult for the
courts to give these terms a different meaning in another
of the Constitution even though the latter part was
drafted by the Constitutional Revision Task Force on Article
XIII. This is especially true where, as here, both drafting
groups merely made recormnendations to ·the Legislature on
proposed constitutional revisions, and the Legislature would
be presumed to know the meaning placed upon "provide" and
"prescribe" by the earlier drafting cormnission (see Rosenberg
v. Bump, 43 Cal. App. 376, 394).
On this basis, it is our opinion that the same
interpretation will be placed upon "prescribed," as used in
subdivision (a) of Section 26 of Article XIII, as is placed
upon that term in the Constitution of 1879 and in the earlier
revised portions of the newer Constitution. Under this
interpretation, income tax laws enacted pursuant to this
provision would have to be "prescribed" by the Legislature
and could not be generally delegated to Congress with
respect to future changes in federal laws.
Therefore, with respect to the specific question
presented, we think that the Legislature has power, by
statute, to incorporate existing federal tax laws into
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California's Personal Income Tax Law. However, since the
Legislature must "prescribe" this state's income tax laws,
the Legislature could not incorporate future changes in
federal statutes. Morever, we think it would be necessary
to amend the Constitution to implement a program to incorporate future federal laws into the Personal Income Tax Law.
Very truly yours,
Bion M. Gregory
Legislative Counsel

~J~~ct,W~,
By
v

Christopher J. Wei
Deputy Legislative Counsel

CJW:jm
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APPENDIX H

REPORT ON INCOME TAX CONFORMITY AND "PIGGYBACKING"
UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION

Professor Gary T. Schwartz
UCLA Law School
April 9, 1980
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INTRODUCTION
In this Report I consider two related questions:

Whether

it would be constitutional for California to adopt a statute
conforming its income tax's base to the federal tax base in an
"open-ended" or "ongoing" way;* and whether it would be constitutional for Congress to accept the invitation tendered by
Congress in the Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 1972, as
amended.

One of my conclusions will be that there is a high

probability that the California Supreme Court would affirm the
constitutionality of an open-ended conformity statute.

However,

as for participation in the federal program, I will conclude that
strong arguments can be advanced both in favor of and in opposition
to constitutionality, and that there is no obvious method for
reliably predicting which set of arguments the California Supreme
Court would find the more persuasive.
Most of this Report consists of a long exposition of the
relevant case law.

This exposition aspires to be as straight-

forward and "neutral" as possible, so that the reader can make
up his own mind as to what the proper legal inferences are.

To

this extent, much of the Report is quite deliberately "dull."
Part II consists of my own effort to utilize the law exposited
in Part I in order to analyze the California constitutional
questions.
~e

Report also makes clear that whatever constitutional

*There is no doubt whatsoever that a California "date of
enactment" conformity statute would be valid. See pp. 33-38,
infra. California's constitution does not contain any New York-like
prohibition against incorporation by reference. See p. 12, infra.
199

ii
doubts there may be about either conformity or "piggybacking"
could be cured by an appropriate amendment to the state constitution.

While conformity initiatives have been defeated in

California in the past, the voting has been reasonably close;
and a number of states, including New York and Colorado, have
been successful in amending their constitutions so as to
authorize open-ended conformity.
A final point.

Part II makes reference to certain policy

judgments which the California Legislature could plausibly render.
It should be make clear at the outset that these are judgments
to which I myself would not necessarily subscribe.

Were I a

legislator, I do not know how I would vote on the conformity issue.
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A.

CASE LAW EXPOSITION

DELEGATION IN GENERAL:

THE BANALITY OF STANDARDS AND THE

POSSIBLE RELEVANCE OF "SCOPE"
The typical delegation case deals with a legislature's
delegation of authority to an administrative agency which has been
created by the legislature.

When the federal Congress engages in

such a delegation, the question arises of whether that delegation
is consistent with Article I of the federal Constitution, vesting
federal lawmaking authority in Congress itself.
legislature attempts such a delegation,

When a state

correlate question

concerns the permissibility of that delegation under the state
constitution.
At the federal level, the relevant legal doctrines are
relatively clear.

The formal rule is that Congress can delegate

if, but only if, it provides the agency with meaningful standards
or an "intelligible principle" for guiding agency decisionmaking.
See Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).

In fact,

however, in any number of cases the federal Supreme Court has found
particular delegations constitutional even though the standards
set forth by Congress are highly nebulous.
Thus such standards as "just and reasonable," Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v.
United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930), "public convenience, interest,
or necessity," Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage
Co.,

289 U.S. 266 (1933), and "unfair methods of competition,''

Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), have been held
sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standard.

Given this

pattern of court decisionmaking, scholars can fairly enough argue
201
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that Congressional delegations to federal agencies are valid
even in the absence of a clearly "intelligible 11 standard.

See

K. Davis, 1 Administrativ.e Law Treatise 177 (2d ed. 1978).
Indeed, in all of American constitutional history, there are
only two Supreme Court cases, both of them decided in the judicially
aggressive year of 1935, which have found particular delegations to
federal agencies to be beyond Congress's power.

Panama Refining Co.

v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), invalidated provisions
of a New Deal measure authorizing the President to prohibit the
shipment of "hot oil" in interstate commerce.

In fact, the legis-

lation in question did contain standards for Presidential decisionmaking

the "intelligibility" of which seems

clearly sufficient

in light of both earlier and later Supreme Court decisions.

For

this reason, the Panama holding is presently understood either as
no longer stating good law or as being severely limited to its
particular facts.

SeeK. Davis, supra, at 175.

Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935),
invalidated key provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act
which had delegated to a new federal agency the authority to establish
comprehensive codes of conduct governing all businesses subject
to Congress's commerce clause powers.

Especially since the

Schecter Court was unanimous, the Court's holding must be taken
somewhat seriously.

In truth, the standards set forth in the Act

(like the standards in Panama) seem to pass constitutional muster.
What was distinctive about the Schecter delegation--and what thus distinguishes the Schecter case from other delegation cases--is the
extensiveness or "scope" of the legislature's delegation.
K. Davis, supra, at 176.

See

The federal agency was being given
202

3

sweeping powers to regulate wide-ranging aspects of the
interstate economy.

At least in this sense the statute did indeed

involve "delegation running riot," 295 U.S. at 553 (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).

Insofar as Schecter has not been overruled, it

implicitly stands for the federal principle that the "scope" of
the delegation is a variable to be taken into account in ruling on
the delegation's constitutionality.
~fuat

about state constitutional doctrines on delegation?

One scholar has observed that the anti-delegation rule possesses
far more vitality within state constitutional

than it does at

the federal level.

This observation

See K. Davis, supra, at 204.

does not really apply to California, however.

Prior to 1939,

California courts frequently enough intervened to invalidate the
state legislature '·s delegations to state administrative agencies.
See, e.g., People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624 (1881).

But leading

California Supreme Court opinions in 1939 and 1940 not only
liberalized California delegation law, but set the stage for later
and more drastic liberalizations.
Brock, 13 Cal. 2d

Jersey Maid Uilk Products Co. v.

620, 91 P.2d 577

(1939), affirmed a state

statute conferring on the state Director of Agriculture the power
to designate marketing areas for the milk industry and to establish
"stabilization and marketing plans"

in local areas.

And Ray v.

Parker affirmed, against delegation challenge, additional aspects
of state's anti-Depression agricultural legislation. 15 Cal. 2d
275, 101 P.2d 665 (1940).

So far as I know, in the years since.

JerseyMaid and Ray not a single California statute delegating powers
to an administrative agency has been held unconstitutional on grounds
203
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of an insufficiency in the standards guiding the delegation.

(But see

Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd., 11 Cal.
3d 801, 523 P.2d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1974).) Illustrative of
cases finding particular delegations permissible are Sunset
Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 7 Cal. 3d 64, 496 P.Zd
840, 101 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1972); City and County of San Francisco
v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 236, 347 P.2d 294, 1 Cal. Rptr. 158
(1959); and Stoddard v. Edelman, 4 Cal. App. 3d
443, hearing· denied (1970).

544, 84 Cal. Rptr.

As for the meaninglessness of the

ostensible requirement that the Legislature set forth standards
that provide meaningful guidance, consider Holloway v. Purcell,
35 Cal. 2d 220, 217 P.2d 665 (1950), in which the Court rejected
a challenge to a state statute delegating to the Highway Commission
the authority to determine the location of highways running between
termini designated by the Legislature.

The only standard which

the statute evidently set forth as to highway location was that
the Commission make use of "such terms ancl conditions as in [the
Commission's] opinion will best subserve the public interest."
One cannot imagine a "standard" more vacuous than "public interest".
Surely an agency would never be given legislative instructions
to ignore or subvert the public interest; and obviously

the "public interest" goal is wholly nonoperational in the "guidance"
it 5s capable of giving.

Yet the Supreme Court, in a bland opinion

auLhored by Justice Traynor, indicated that "public interest"
provided a "sufficiently definite primary standard" which an administrative agency could be asked by the Legislature to "specifically
apply."

(For a comparable U.S. Supreme Court holding, see Avent v.

United States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924).)

204

5

The effective bankruptcy of the "sufficient standard" aspect
of California's trad2tional rule on the legality of delegations
has been explicitly recognized in the California Supreme Court in
its recent, path-breaking opinion in Kugler v. Yocum, which is
discussed below.
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B.

DELEGATION BY CONGRESS OF FEDERAL LAWMAKING AUTHORITY TO THE
STATES:

THE RELEVANCE OF CONFORMITY AS A JUSTIFYING PRINCIPLE

In one dramatic situation, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded
that the federal interest in conformity between federal and state
law can constitutionally justify a substantial delegation of
federal lawmaking authority to the states.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 13,

any act committed on a federal territory which would violate a
criminal statute of the state in which the territory lies is ipso
facto a criminal offense against the United States.

Section 13

(which was enacted in 1948) thus "assimilates" even criminal
statutes of a state which may be enacted by the state subsequent
to 1948.

In United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.,S. 286 (1958), a

defendant was prosecuted in 1955 for certain sexual conduct on a
federal air force base in Texas which was contrary to a Texas
penal statute that had been enacted in 1950.

The issue the United

States Supreme Court addressed was whether § 13 His constitutional
insofar as it makes applicable to a federal enclave a subsequently
enacted criminal law of the state in which the enclave is situated."
Id. at 286.
tionality.

By a 7-2 vote, the Court ruled in favor of constituThe dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Douglas

and concurred in by Justice Black, highlights the difficulty of
the delegation issue.

The Douglas dissent begins by recognizing

Congress's Article I authority to regulate federal enclaves.
Douglas then reasoned that this authority
call[s] for the exercise of legislative judgment;
and I do not see how that requirement can be
satisfied by delegating the authority to the
President, the Department of the Interior, or, as
in this case, to the states. . . . Congress can
206
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adopt as federal laws the [existing] laws of a
state . . . Congress can, I think, adopt as
law govern~ng an enclave, the state law
governing speeding as it may from time to time
be enacted. The Congress there determines what
the basic policy is. Leaving the details to be
filled in by a state is analogous to the scheme
of delegated implementation of congressionally
adopted policies with which we are familiar in
the field of administrative law. But it is
Congress that must determine the policy for that
is the essence of lawmaking. Under the scheme
now approved a State makes such federal law,
applicable to the enclave, as it likes, and that
law becomes federal law, for the violation of
which a citizen is sent to prison. . . . Here
it is a sex crime on which Congress has never
legislated. Tomorrow it may be a blue law, a
law governing usury, or even a law requiring
segregation of the races on. buses and in
restaurants. . . . [An accused] is entitled to
the considered judgment of Congress whether the
law applied to him fits the federal policy. That
is what federal lawmaking is. . . . There is some
convenience in doing what the Court allows today . . .
But convenience is not material to the constitutional
problem.
Id. at 297-99.
The opinion for the Court majority began by describing the
legislative precursors of § 13.

Earlier federal statutes had

adopted as federal law for enclave purposes only those state
statutes in effect at the time of the particular federal enactment.
But since Congress was committed to the goal of achieving "conformity"
between federal enclave law and state law, Congress was required
to reenact this "assimilation" statute in 1866, 1874, 1895, 1909,
1933, 1935, and 1944.

It was against the background of this

experience that Congress in its 1948 legislation attempted to
incorporate or assimilate even those state statutes enacted subsequent to 1948.
The Court's reasoning made clear the laudability of the
207

8

licy of "

which Congress had been pursuing.

It recog-

power to assimilate the state law, Congress
obvious

to renew such assimilation annually or

in

the law in the enclaves current with those

to

the states. 11

at 293-94.

of

Noting Congress's "123 years

policy of conformi·ty," the Court then

cone
thin its constitutional powers and
legis
discretion when . . . it enacts that
[conformity] policy in its most complete and
accurate form. Rather than being a delegation
by Congress of its legislative authority to the
states, it is a deliberate continuing adoption by
Congress
federal enclaves of such unpre-empted
offenses and punishments as shall have already been
put
effect by the respective states for their
own government. Congress retains power to exclude
a particular state law from the assimilative effect
of
Act. This procedure is a practical accommodation of the mechanics of the legislative functions of
state and nation in the field of police power where
it is especially appropriate to make the federal
regulation of local conduct conform to that already
established by the state.
Id. at 294.

The Court then referred to several other

federal statutes which in one way or another gave federal effect
to whatever state criminal rules were in effect at the state level
at the time of the statute's enactment.
A number of post-Sharpnack lower federal court opinions
reveal the varie

of ways in which the Sharpnack holding can

authorize a seeming delegation of federal lawmaking authority to
the states.

Wallach v. Lieberman, 366 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1966),

involved a personal injury which occurred in a federal post
office.

40 U.S.C. § 90 stipulates that a state's workers' compen-

sation law

1

to

uries within a federal building situated
208
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within that state.

In Wallach the personal injury victim--who

wi.shed to sue his employer in tort rather than merely claiming
under workers' compensation--argued that the federal statute,
insofar as it incorporated the state's workers' compensation law,
entailed

The Second

Circuit, relying on Sharpnack and noting the propriety of Congress's

•

policy of seeking conformity between federal and state law on all
federal properties, rejected this challenge.
United States v. Smeldome, 485 F.2d 1333 (lOth Cir. 1973),
affirmed 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which provides a federal penalty for
anybody managing or owning "an illegal gamb
business is in turn defined as a gamb

business"; such a
s employing a

minimum number of people, in business for a

number of

days, and in "violation of the law of a state or political subdivision in which it is conducted . .

ldome involved a

sports betting operation taking place in Colorado in seeming
violation of a Colorado gambling statute.

The defendant argued

that § 1955 was unconstitutional insofar as it delegated federal
lawmaking authority to the states.

The Tenth Circuit, relying on

Sharpnack, rejected this challenge, ruling that "[i]t is well
settled in the law that Congress may adopt as federal laws the
laws of a state, and such is not an unconstitutional delegation
of congressional authority."

Id. at 1345.

Curcio, 310 F. Supp. 351 (D. Colo. 1970)

In United States v.
a district court also

relied on a simple statement of the Sharpnack rule in affirming
the constitutionality of§ 892(B)(l)

of the Federal Consumer

Credit Protection Act, providing that if a particular extension
209

10
of credit is unenforceable under state law, this is "prima
facie evidence" that the credit extension is "extortionate"
and therefore in violation of federal law.

Smeldome and Curcio

suggest that the lower courts are giving the Sharpnack rule a
rather broad interpretation, allowing it to be applied even when
there has not been a convincing showing as to the federal need
for or interest in conformity.

However, in neither Smeldome nor

Curcio did the relevant state statute in fact postdate the federal
statute; and only in postdating situations is the problem of an
open-ended delegation explicitly and dramatically presented.
I should make clear that federal rules of the Sharpnack sort
deal only with the proper interpretation of the provisions in
Article I of the U.S. Constitution, conferring lawmaking powers on
Congress; the Sharpnack rule thus does not directly "apply" to
California.

However, both the status of the U.S. Supreme Court

and the quality of its reasoning in Sharpnack suggest that the
Sharpnack rule would probably be treated by California courts as an
influential out-of-state precedent.
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C.

NON-CALIFORNIA STATE LAW ON THE DELEGATION OF STATE LA-wMAKING
AUTHORITY TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:

A "SOFT" PROHIBITING RULE

In reading judicial opinions, one can easily enough identify
a "general rule" to the effect that state legislatures may r:ot
delegate lawmaking authority to the federal government (call this
"the Rule").

(See Annot., 133 A.L.R. 401 (1941), annotating

Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495 (1940), a case which
does clearly apply the Rule to a state statute professing to
require labeling of local fruit according to federal standards.)
The more one reads these opinions, however, the less solid one
understands the Rule to be.

Many of the cases--including most

of the recent cases--deal with tax conformity statutes.
these cases will be treated separately in

While

next section, it

suffices here to say that several of them reach an affirmative
result on the constitutional question, and

the single opinion

squarely invalidating a tax conformity statute comes from a jurisdiction whose constitution contains special language.
In recent years, many of the references to the Rule have come
sheer dicta.

See e.g .• State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wash. 2d

259, 501 P.2d 290, 301 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973);
State ex rel. Kirschner v. Urquhart, 50 Wash. 2d 131, 310 P.2d 261,
265 (1957); Calvert v. Capital Southwest CorP

441 S.W.2d 247, 264

(Tax Ct. Civ. App. 1969); State v. Dumler, 221 Kan. 386, 391, 559
P.2d 798, 803 (1977).

For a case that blends apparent dictum with

a very limited holding applying

th~

Rule, see State v. Williams,

119 Ariz. 595, 583 P.2d 251 (1978).
In the non-tax context, a number of the opinions announcing
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the Rule likewise turn out to contain peculiar features.

In 1935

the New York Court of Appeals, divided 4-3, held unconstitutional
a state statute which applied to the intrastate coal industry
whatever codes were developed for interstate coal by the federal
National Recovery Administration.
196 N.E.61 (1935).

Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y.290,

The majority chiefly relied, however, on a

particular provision in the New York state Constitution prohibiting
the incorporation by reference even of "any existing law"; the
purpose of this special provision, the majority indicated, is to
prevent the New York legislature from misunderstanding laws that
it otherwise might vote to pass. (For another New York holding
resting on this special constitutional prohibition, see People v.
Mazzie, 78 Misc. 2d 1014, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 307 (1974).) In Relegate
Bros. Co. v. Bayshore, 331 Pa. 255, 200 A.672 (1938), a unanimous
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a state statute incorporating
into Pennsylvania law whatever minimum hours might be fixed by
future federal NRA regulations for certain industries.

The Pennsyl-

vania Court was concerned not just with the Rule, however, but also
with the inequalities which the statute's delegation would produce
as among different classes of Pennsylvania employers.
In recent years, the largest number of cases dealing with the
Rule have concerned state statutes rendering it a state offense for
individuals to possess, without prescription, drugs that have been
given certain designations by the federal Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, exercising authority conferred on him/her by
Congressional statutes.

When these state laws were enacted, most

of the relevant federal statutes were already in place; the federal
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Secretary had made some designations, but others were to be made
by him in the future.

The Supreme Courts

Nebraska, North Dakota,

Georgia, and Michigan have all interpreted their statest statutes
as applying only to federal law and designations already in effect
when the state statutes were enacted.

State v. Workman, 186 Neb. 467,

183 N.W.2d 911 (1971); State v. Julson, 202 N.W.2d 145 (N.D. 1972);
People v. Urban, 45 Mich. App. 255, 206 N.W.

511 (1973); Johnston

v. State, 227 Ga. 387, 181 S.E.2d 42 (1971).

While all of these

interpretations were motivated by a desire to avoid a constitutional
ruling, only the Michigan opinion stated
statute,

out that the state

if not so interpreted, would be unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota
their statutes indeed open-ended, ruled

, finding
unconstitutional.

These Courts were only partly concerned
gation, however.

Their opinions chiefly

of due process or "fair notice."

As the

question of
Ys~~~~7

about the problem
Dakota Court

described the situation:
The list of hallucinogenic drugs was constantly
changing and at any given time it would be
necessary to consult the regulations of the
Secretary to determine whether or not a certain
drug came within the prohibi
of the state
statute.
State v. Johnson, 84 S.D. 556, 558, 173 N.W.2d 894
According to the Washington Court, "it
an

ave~age

895 (1970).

unreasonable to expect

person to continually research the Federal Register

to determine which drugs are controlled substances."

State v.

Dougall, 89 Wash. 2d 118, 570 rae. 2d 135, 138 (1977).
Over the years, Michigan courts have been especially interested
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in the Rule.

In Lievense v. Michigan UnemploY!Ilent Gomp. Comm'n,

335 Mich. 339, 55 N.W.2d 857 (1952), the Court considered a state
statute imposing certain burdens on each employer who "is liable
for any federal tax" under the federal unemployment compensation
program.

The Court indicated that if the statute applied to

prospective federal rulings on employer liability, the Michigan Act
would be unconstitutional on account of the Rule.

It therefore

interpreted the "is liable" clause to refer only to liability
existing under federal law at the time the Michigan statute was
itself enacted.

In Dearborn Independent, Inc.

1

v. City of Dearborn,

331 Mich. 447, 49 N.W.2d 370 (1951), the Court considered a state
statute requiring that all "official publications" of Michigan
cities be published only in newspapers "which shall have been
admitted by the United States Post Office Department for transmission as mail matter of the second class."

The Court, though

badly divided on another issue, unanimously ruled
unconstitutionally violated the Rule.
the Rule is less than absolute.

that the statute

However, even in Michigan

In People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305,

17 N.W.2d 193 (1945), a divided Supreme Court upheld a Detroit
ordinance attaching a local penalty to any violation within Detroit
of wartime federal price control rules.

The Court relied both on

the emergency created by wartime inflation and on the fact that
the ordinance
did not create new regulations and prohibitions
but merely added the city's enforcement sanction
to Federal laws and regulations which were
already applicable to the city and its inhabitants
during the emergency.
310 Mich. at 319, 17 N.W.2d at 197.
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For a contrary holding

15

on the (in)validity of such local add-ons to federal price
control, see City of Cleveland v. Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144,
60 N.E.2d 919 (1945).
there~

As Sell suggests,

cases upholding seeming delegations

of state authority to federal lawmakers.
must be carefully read.

However, these cases too

In James v. Walker, 141 Ky. 88, 132 S.W.

(1910), rehearing denied, 147 Ky. 647, 144 S.W. 744 (1912), the
Kentucky Supreme Court, divided 5-2, upheld a state statute
providing that officers of the State Guard in active service should
receive the same pay as officers with comparable grades in the
United States Army.

The majority relied, however, on a specific

provision in the Kentucky constitution indicating that
tion, equipment and discipline" of the state mili

"organiza-

shall conform

"as nearly as practicable" to the rules governing United States
armies.

(The dissent regarded officer compensation as beyond the

scope of "organization, equipment and disc
State, 12 Md. App. 655,. 280 A.2d 753 (1971)

line.")

In Mason v.

a Maryland

Court affirmed that state's version of the drug-designation
statutes described above;

the Court focused, however, on the

point that future designations by the federal Secretary were
adequately controlled by the standards contained in federal
statutes which were already in the books at the time the Maryland
statute was enacted.

A Colorado statute makes it unlawful for

any person to carry certain weapons if, within a stated previous
period, that person has been convicted of or has served time for
any "burglary, arson, or a felony involving the use of force or
violence or the use of a deadly weapon, or attempt or conspiracy
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to commit such offenses, under the laws of the United States of
America, the State of Colorado, or another state. 11
Tenorio,

In People v.

Colo. _ _ _, 590 P. 2d 952 (1979), the Colorado Supreme

Court saw fit to affirm the statute.

The Court agreed that "only

the Colorado General Assembly has the power to define crimes in
Colorado," and that "a fortiori, the General Assembly cannot be
delegated to any branch of another state's government or to the
Congress."

But the Court's assessment was that the General Assembly

had indeed done an adequate job of defining "the crime here charged. 11
According to the Court, the Assembly's intent, properly appreciated,
was merely to delineate a category of
crimes whose general nature, in the General
Assembly's judgment, was so serious that
perpetrators could not safely be allowed to
possess weapons in Colorado.
590 P.2d at 954-55.
The above review of the case law can be easily summarized.
In non-California decisions, delegations of lawmaking authority
from states to the federal government do seem somewhat disfavored.
But the case law is shaggy, full of qualifications, and lacking
in underlying basic explanation.

It is very doubtful that the

California Supreme Court--or indeed any California court--would
attach any significant weight to this unimpressive collection of opinions.

If anything, the cases strongly suggest that it is necessary to

consider a particular delegation in the context of the state statute
in which it is found; that is, the purpose of the particular statute
may well bear on the acceptability of the delegation.

If this is

true, then it makes special sense to bring together those cases
dealing with the propriety of state tax statutes conforming the
216
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state's income tax base with federal income tax standards.
cases are described in the next section.
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D.

NON-CALIFORNIA STATE LAW ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
DELEGATING TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE
STATE INCOME TAX POLICY:

1.

AN INCONCLUSIVE PATTERN

The Clear Efficacy of a State Constitutional Amendment
Delegation questions generally concern the proper interpre-

tatio~

of the state constitution; there is nothing in the federal

constitution which requires separation of powers at the state
level or which otherwise inhibits the state legislature from
delegating.

See Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park

Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79 (1930); Mann v. Powell, 333 F.Supp 1261,
1266 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
zation, however.

There are two exceptions to this generali-

If a statute delegates power over a federally

protected constitutional liberty--for example, the right to free
speech, or the right to vote free of racial discrimination--the
federal constitution can still be turned to as a protection
against the possibility of delegation-caused arbitrariness.

See

Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Sunset Amusement Co., v. Board of
Police Comm'rs 7 C.3d 64, 72-73, 496 P.2d 840, 844-45, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 768, 772-73 (1972).

However:

the opportunity to pay less

rather than more taxes is obviously lacking in federal constitutional statutes.

Secondly, if lawmaking powers are conferred on

private parties who in exercising those powers may well be pursuing their private economic interests, a special problem arises
as to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.

See

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); State Bd.
v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d 436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953).
However:

a delegation to Congress obviously creates no problems
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in this respect.
Any argument against a state's delegating its own income
tax authority to Congress is thus grounded exclusively in the
state~s

constitution.

oy

state,

Hence there is little doubt but that the

amending its constitution, can authorize the state's

adoption of an open-ended conformity policy.
the experience in at least four states.
I

This is shown by

The Colorado Constitution

was amended in 1962 to expressly authorize the Colorado General
Assembly to define that income which is subject to the state
income tax by reference to federal laws "whether retrospective
or prospective."

Art. X, § 19.

There have been no court chal-

lenges to the near-complete conformity legislation which the
Colorado General Assembly proceeded to enact.

(For a general

"chart" of state conformity measures, see P-H State & Local
Service

~

1002. * )

When Kansas was considering a conformity

statute, the Kansas Attorney General released an opinion doubting
the constitutionality of an open-ended conformity statute; in respons
to this opinion, Kansas ratffied an amendment to the state
Constitution explicitly endorsing an open-ended conformity practice.
Art. XI.§ 11.

The later Kansas statute providing for full

conformity has been assumed valid.
Conformity Income Tax Act:

(1968).
tion

See Cordes, The Kansas

Part I, 17 U. Kan. L

Rev. 147, 149

Under a 1959 amendment to the New York state Constitu-

the New York legislature, in imposing any income tax,

*~Vhat is impressive is how many states (more than 20) have
adopted open-ended conformity for either personal or corporate
income tax purposes.
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may define the income on, in respect to or by
wnich such tax or taxes are imposed or measured,
by reference to any provision of the laws of the
United States as the same may be or become
effective at any time or from time to time and
may prescribe exceptions or modifications to any
such provision.
Art. 3,

§

22. The later New York statute defined New York gross

income as the taxpayer's "federal adjusted income as defined in
the laws of the United States for the taxable year, with the
modifications specified in this Section."

A New

court has

given effect to the obvious meaning of the state's constitutional
provision by affirming an open-ended conformity enactment,
Garlin v. Murphy, 51 Misc. 2d 477, 273 N.Y.S. 2d 374 (1966).
1966 amendment to the Nebraska constitution provides
an income tax is adopted by the Legislature, the
adopt an income tax based on the laws of the Uni
Art. VIII, § lB.

A

"[w]hen
may

s

States."

After this amendment came into effect, the

Nebraska legislature exercised its powers by enac

a state

income tax statute which incorporated federal statutes, rules,
and regulations "as the same may be or become effective, at any
time or from time to time, for the taxpayer year."

In Anderson v.

Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967), the constitutionality
of this statute was considered by the Nebraska Supreme Court.
noteworthy dictum, the Court indicated that absent

In

constitu-

tional amendment, the statute would entail an unconstitutional
delegation.

But since this element of constitutionality would

have been found only in the Constitution of the state and since
the amendment had altered the state's Constitution in this respect,
the Court agreed that the statute resulted in no constitutional
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violation.

But the Anderson taxpayer then asserted an ingenious

fallback position:

that the Nebraska statute's delegation

violated the "republican form of government 11 guarantee set forth
in the enabling legislation admitting Nebraska to the United
States,

While regarding this as a "case of first impression,"

the Court concluded that the state statute was not lacking in
republicanness, since the statute "does not constitute a waiver
I

of the sovereignty of the state nor an abdication of its functions."
The Court's reasoning on this point weakens the force of its
delegation dictum.
2,

In the Absence of Specific Constitutional Amendment
Only one state court has actually

invalid~,ted

a state

conformity statute on constitutional delegation grounds.

A

Minnesota statute provided that individual gross income for state
income tax purposes "means the adjusted gross income as computed
for federal tax purposes as defined in the laws of the United
States for the taxable year, with the modifications specified in
this Section."

A federal law promulgated subsequent to this statute's

amendment·permitted the exclusion from income of sick pay which an
employee might receive, an exclusion which would not have been
otherwise allowed by Minnesota law.

In invalidating the

Minnesota conformity statute, the Minnesota Court discussed
general delegation doctrine.

Federal adjusted gross income, it

argued, is
an artificial concept created solely by Federal
statute. . . . The amounts which are to be
included or excluded in the determination are
numerous and subject to change. Many of these
221
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are based on political and social rather
considerations. The same political
considerations which are of significance
to
tax policy are not necessarily of
significance to the state's tax collection
scheme. . . . The basic objection [to delegation]
derives from the principle that laws should be
made by elected representatives of the people
responsible to the electorate for their acts.
Wallace v. Commissioner of Taxation, 289 Minn. 220, 225-26,
4 N.

2d

88, 591 (1971).

It is noteworthy, however, that

specific language in the Minnesota Constitution, alluded
to by the Wallace Court in the heart of its opinion, that
seemingly takes an especially strong stand against taxation
According to Article X, § 1, "the power of taxation
1 never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away."
extent to which the Wallace result was influenced by this
explicit language cannot be reliably ascertained.
Cheney v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 239 Ark. 870, 394
S.W.2d 731 (1965), dealt with a state statute which appropriated
Arkansas' income tax law--for purposes of ascertaining
Arkansas's taxable share of the overall income of an interstate
lroad--the.allocation formulae developed (or to be developed) by
the United States Interstate Commerce Commission.

Insofar as the

statute sought to appropriate prospective I.C.C. formulae, the
Court found it an unconstitutional delegation.

But what seems to

be the key to the Court's holding is its (correct) perception that
the I.C.C., in adopting an allocation formula, does not think about
problem of the taxation of income at all; rather, these
fonuulae"are designated [by the I.C.C.] for use by interstate carriers
~

[only] to assure uniformity in reporting for rate-fixing purposes."
239

. at 871, 394 S.W.2d at 732.
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Cheney is thus by no means

22a

a holding on the issue of tax conformity.

In at least five jurisdictions,

open-ended

or

ongoing

conformity measures of one sort or another have been judicially
affirmed as against delegation challenge.

The earliest holding is

Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 94 Conn. 47, 108 A. 154 (1919)
aff'd. 254 U.S. 113 (1920).

At the time Connecticut imposed an

excise tax on a corporation's (apportioned) net income--that net
income "upon which income such company i& required to pay a tax to
the United States."

The company's precise argument was that

Connecticut could not constitutionally compel it to disclose to
state tax officials its federal tax return.

In rejecting this

argument, the Court discussed the delegation issue generally.
The federal Income Tax Law . . . is a domestic
statute. No delegation of legislative authority
is involved in adopting its definition of net
income. It is a matter of convenience to taxpayers
and economy to the state not to set up a separate
standard in another administrative establishment
for the measurement of taxable net income. No
constitutional privilege of corporations is
violated by requiring the production.[by the
plaintiff of its] return to the collector of
internal revenue.
94 Conn. at 64, 108 A. at 160-61.

In appealing the state court's

opinion to the United States Supreme Court, the taxpayer complained
only about the apportionment aspect of the Connecticut tax.

The

United States Supreme Court's affirmance of the state court ruling
therefore had no reason to discuss the delegation question.
Underwood Typewriter was followed in First Federal Savings
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142 Conn. 483, 115 A.2d 455 (1955).
oration business tax imposed on certain
a

percent tax on net income derived from

cut operations.

The Connecticut Act accepted the definition

s income as set forth "in the federal corporation net income
enforced on
to

last day of the income year"; it granted
exempt by federal law or by the regulations

of internal revenue from the federal corporation net
tax"; and it prescribed that in determining net income,
tions from gross income should be allowed, with certain
tions, in accordance with federal law in effect in the partiincome year.

The Connecticut Court regarded all of this as

not a delegation of legislative power but an
incorporation by reference of the federal law
into the state law . . . The state legislature..
and not the Congress has selected net earnings
as the base for determining the amount of this
tax and has fixed the rate to be paid on that
tax base. As a matter of convenience to the
taxpayer and economy to the state, the legislature
has adopted some of the standards employed in the
federal corporation net income tax law.
Conn. at 493, 115 A.2d at 459-460.
Maryland's 1967 income tax statute provides that the basis
state income tax purposes is the adjusted gross income of the
individual taxpayer under federal law, or the taxable income of a
corporate taxpayer under federal law.

(The Act then specifies

variations on this income base and provides for a range
of exemptions, exclusions, and deductions similar to, but
not identical with, those in the Internal Revenue Code.)

In

Katzenberg v. Comptroller, 263 Md. 189, 282 A.2d 465 (1971), the
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Supreme Court was asked to consider the constitutionality
f the statute, along with a number of other issues as to the

tatute s

interpretation.

On the constitutional question,

Court, relying on Underwood Typewriter, succinctly held that
"the state's adoption of the federal definition of income does
not constitute a delegation of legislative authority."

263 Md. at

200, 282 A.2d at 470.
The language

a Pennsylvania statute suggested that the

purpose of the statute was to impose not an income tax on corporations, but rather a tax on the privilege of doing business in
Pennsylvania.

The "excise tax" which it established was measured

in terms of the corporation's net income for the year "as returned
to, and as ascertained by the federal government."

In rejecting

the taxpayer's delegation argument, the Court found the following
analysis dispositive:
Net income as ascertained is the base upon which
the tax is measured, not the tax itself. How it
is fixed by the federal authorities is of no concern
to the taxing officers of the Commonwealth nor to
its statute. The rate of the income tax may vary,
or the method of its calculation, but as a base, it
is unvarying.
Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theaters, Inc., 345 Pa. 270, 272,
27 A.2d 62, 63 (1942).

In a curious aside, however, the Court

indicated that if the state's tax were an income tax rather than
a corporation privilege tax, the delegation issue would become
more difficult.

What the explanation is for this differential

in difficulty the Court's opinion does not make clear.
A New Jersey tax statute "conforms" to a particular feature
of federal income tax law.

Under that statute, a "Green Acre"
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exemp

can go to landowners who are "nonprofit

or

[s] . . . authorized to carry out

es

[are] qualified for exemption from

1

Section 50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
it happens, the New Jersey Constitution seemingly proeven

incorporation by reference of other statutes; but
f

inion in Township of Princeton v. Bardin,
557

that

3

A~2d··

776--. (1977), a New Jersey court

ition runs only against the incorporation

of other New Jersey statutes, and hence does not apply to the
by reference of a federal statute.

In discussing

delegation question, the Court first approved of the general
cy underlying the New Jersey measure.
The federal statute, and the attendant regulations
are readily accessible to those organizations which
would be interested in seeking the . . . exemption.
Certainly, such applicant organizations have become
familiar with (the federal statute] in their annual
dealings with the Internal Revenue Service. It would,
as a practical matter, be far less confusing to such
applicant organizations to know that the term
"nonprofit organization" means the same thing for
purposes of both the federal income tax statute and
our . . . Act.
N.J. Super. at 569, 371 A.2d at 782-83.

The Court then

considered and rejected the argument that the statute involved
an improper delegation of lawmaking power to Congress, insofar as
the statute even professed to incorporate any future changes in
law.

The Court first noted that if federal law were

changed, the New Jersey Tax Commissioner had the power to issue
an order temporarily "freezing" the preexisting rules, thereby
the legislature time to reconsider the New Jersey statute's
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feature.

But the Court went on to rule that even
possibility, the New Jersey statute was

legislature is always free to amend
s
'
t to reflect its desire to maintain the previous language
50l(c)(3) for New Jersey purposes."

f

147 N.J. Super.

571, 371 A.2d at 776.
until last the most articulate rejection of a

•

claim.

In 1949 the legislature of the Alaskan territory

enac
to 10 percent of the total income tax that would be payable in the
year to the United States . . . without the benefit

same taxab
of

deduction of the tax payable hereunder to the territory."
considering the delegation question, the Ninth Circuit first

advanced this assessment:
[E]ven if we were to hold the attempted incorporation
by reference of amendments to the Internal Revenue
Code to be adopted in the future were an invalid
delegation, yet as of this day and hour appellant has
not been affected by any such amendments, for there
have been none.
Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805, 815 (9th Cir. 1950).
Yet the Court went on to recognize that given the logic of the
10 percent provision in the Alaskan Act, the Court could not avoid
discussing the constitutionality of the ongoing delegation, since
that delegation was essential to the logic of the legislative scheme.
If the federal income tax requirements were changed
substantially by future amendments, it would be
impossible, administratively, to calculate the
Alaskan income tax merely by dividing the tax shown
on the federal return by 10.
Id. at 816.
227

27

The Court s

cuss

proceeded as follows:

c
any invalid
attempted. There are of course many
held attempts by a legislative
incorporate provisions into its enactments
to future acts or amendments by other
, to be invalid. Where it can be said
t to make the local law conform to
elsewhere is not a mere labor-saving
legislature, but is undertaken in order
uniformity which itself is an important
proposed legislative scheme, there are
a number of precedents for an approval of this sort
of thing. Reciprocal and retaliatory legislation
falls in
category. . . . Similarly, the efforts
of the states to take advantage, in their inheritance
tax laws, of the 80 percent credit provision in the
federal
relating to the Estate Tax . . . have
been
out by simple reference to the federal
estate tax law. . . , . Perhaps the best known
instance of action by Congress encompassing within
its regulation the laws of states, then or thereafter
enacted, was the Conformity Act.
. There, also,
making a procedure in the common law action conform
to that prevailing in the states was a prime object
of the legislation.
The effort
the Alaska legislature to make its
territorial income tax machinery conform to the
federal act, and to preserve and to continue such
conformity, makes sense. It makes for convenience
to the taxpayer and for simplicity of administration.
. . . A similar coordination has been recommended
by students of income tax problems for adoption by
the states generally. Since the attainment of this
uniformity was in itself a major objective of the
Alaska legislature, in enacting the local law [on
conformity], the Alaska legislature, which alone
could make this decision, was itself acting, and
was not abdicating its functions, nor, in our opinion,
making an invalid delegation to Congress.
Id. at 816-17.

(In a footnote, the Court.went on to note that

Alaska's insistence on excluding the state income tax deduction
which federal law itself allows serves to "somewhat impair" the
"intended adminis
requires each

simplicity of the Act" insofar as it
who itemizes deductions to recompute his
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tax for purposes of making the final 10 percent calculation.
. at 817 n * 15 -. )
the various ways in which the Mullaney Court frames the
sue, it is a bit pointless to argue about whether Mullaney
contains holding or merely dictum.
s

Certainly, one can at least

that Mullaney includes a strong discussion supporting the

cons

ty of an ongoing delegation.

At the time of

Alaska was, of course, a federal territory, and arguably
delegations by a federal territory to the federal Congress are
less troublesome than delegations to the Congress by a sovereign
state.

The Minnesota Supreme Court in Wallace relied on this

point in distinguishing Mullaney; but the text of Mullaney does not
suggest that the Ninth Circuit regarded the point as in any way
relevant.

Of course, in the interim since Mullaney, Alaska has

become a state whose own state court possesses final ·authority to
exposit state constitutional law; hence the

~1ullaney

opinion merely

represents the view at one time of a court whose views are no
longer authoritative.

After statehood, however, the Alaskan

income tax was reconsidered by that state's Supreme Court.

As it

happened, the only disputed issue in Hickel v. Stevenson, 416 P.2d
236 (Alas. 1966), related to how the Act should be interpreted in
particular circumstances.

But in considering this question, the

Alaskan Court indicated that the criterion for a proper interpretation was whether the interpretation would achieve the goals of the
Alaskan statute as set forth in Mullaney--that is, the goals of
convenience to the taxpayer and simplicity in administration.
While Hickel does not contain an explicit constitutional review,
by implication it endorses the Mullaney analysis.
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Maine

Court has also discussed what amounts to
sue

egation
tax

a sympathetic manner--although no precise
was before the Court.

Under the Maine income

which became effective in 1969, the taxable income in
computed on the basis of the taxpayer's "federal adjusted
as

in the laws of the United States."

sue

The

Tiedemann v. Johnson, 316 A.2d 359 (Me. 1974),

twas when a certain capital gain had been "realized."

In

s context the Court observed:
We conclude that, by adoption of the federal adjusted
gross income as the standard for "entire taxable
income" of a Maine individual, the Legislature
intended to resolve, a priori, semantic conflicts
such as those suggested by the bare words of the
statute. As evidence of this intent, the Legislature
did not undertake creation of a unique or complicated
income tax scheme. Nor did it provide the vast
administrative machinery which would be necessary to
supply the interpretation and investigative functions
of the Internal Revenue Service.
3

A.2d at 364.

See also the discussion of avoiding taxpayer

confusion in City National Bank of Clinton v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n,
251 Ia. 603, 617, 102 N.W.2d 381, 389 (Iowa 1960).
In four jurisdictions, delegation challenges to conformity
statutes have been rejected by interpreting the statute as incorporating only federal tax laws ineffect at the time of the statute's
enactment.
In fact, the (proposed) statute considered by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court in Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 540, 64 A.2d 322
(1949), was quite explicit on this point.

In affirming that the

legislative proposal would not violate the state constitution, the
Court found that proposal's incorporation feature "will greatly
ilitate

s

of the act if passed."
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95 N.H. at

30
A.2d at 323.

There is no dictum in the case on the

an ongoing delegation.
Santee Mills v. Query,

122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202 (1922),

e South Carolina income tax statute required persons and
corporations to pay a state tax defined as one-third of their
income tax.

The Court evidently construed the statute

only to federal income tax law as it existed at

•

time the South Carolina tax statute was enacted.

The tenor

the language in the Court's opinion suggests that the Court
would have had difficulty with a state statute incorporating
federal law in an ongoing way.
Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930), dealt
th a 1929 Georgia income tax measure stipulating that net income
taxable by the state should be initially equated with the taxpayers
net income vis-a-vis the federal government; that the tax payable to
the state would ordinarily be one-third of the tax payable to the
ted States; but that if the taxpayer's state net income is
modified either upwards or downwards pursuant to certain modifications provided for in the Georgia statute, the state tax should
itself be adjusted upwards or downwards in a proportionate one-third
way.

The Court considered a number of objections to the Georgia

statute, and rejected them all.

One of the objections concerned

delegation, insofar as the Act seemingly gave Congress power over
the state tax matters.

In rejecting this challenge, the Court

interpreted the Georgia Act as
in no way [undertaking] to make future federal
legislation a part of the law of this state upon
that subject. When a statute adopts a part or
all of another statute, domestic or foreign,
general or local, by specific and descriptive
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reference
statute as

to, the adoption takes the
exists at the time.

.E. at

Having interpreted the statute

the Court concluded that the delegation objections
are

merit."

The Court's opinion is not clear as to what

e "merit" of the objection would have been had the
provided for continuing conformity.
ThoEPe v. Mahin, 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969), dealt
the

linois income tax conformity statute, passed in 1969.

statute provided that Illinois net income "is computed for
by taking the adjusted gross income from the federal
tax return," with certain adjustments, deductions and
exemptions provided for in the state statute.

Also, § 102, the

"construction" section of the state statute, specified that
any term used in this Act shall have the same
meaning as when used in a comparable context
in the United States Income Tax Revenue Code of
1954 and other provisions of the statutes of the
United States relating to federal income taxes
as such Code and statutes are in effect on the
-date of enactment of this Act.
In considering the delegation challenge to the Illinois Act, the
Court focused on § 102; noting that § 102 limited itself to
federal law "in effect at the date of enactment" of the Illinois
t, the Court found this section entirely constitutional as an

incorporation-by-reference.

But the Court also noted that "there

some scholarly opinion, as well as case law from other
jurisdictions, that the legislature could adopt a statute providing
that future modifications of the Code would have consequences in
and application of the Act."
0 A.2d at 6

43 Ill. 2d. at 49,

It is unclear whether the Court's "date of
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enactment" interpretation for § 102 carries over to the statute's
conforming reference to federal adjusted gross income.

The

Court seems to assume that it does; but that latter provision's
explicit reference to the taxpayer's actual "federal income tax
return" makes such an interpretation difficult.
Whatever the general advantages of interpreting statutes to
avoid constitutional questions, the particular interpretations in
Santee Mills, Featherstone, and Thorpe seem misguided.
Thorpe, see the discussion in the paragraph above.

As for

In Santee Mills

and Featherstone, the "one-third" provision of the state statute
seems inconsistent with a ruling that would not allow the taxpayer
simply to consult his federal tax return for the particular year
in making his one-third calculation.
evaluation in Mullaney.)

(Compare the Ninth Circuit's

For practical reasons of this sort, it

may be that the "date of enactment" holding in Featherstone has
since been ignored in Georgia.

See Head v. McKenney, 61 Ga. App.

552, 556, 6 S.E.2d 405, 407 (1939), in which the Court, in
quoting from Featherstone, interestingly edits out its "date of
enactment" language, and then describes the Georgia tax assessment
process as follows:
The State Revenue Commission, in assessing the
tax against McKenney, merely adopted the Federal
method of calculating his net income under the
Federal statute as the State's method of
accomplishing that result, and properly assessed
the tax due to the State as one-third of the
amount which he had paid to the United States.
Such adoption was not a delegation to the Federal
authorities of the State's power to tax.
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THE DELEGATION OF STATE LAWMAKING AUTHORITY
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
of

A THIN BUT NOT UNINTERESTING RECORD

legality of delegations from the state

to the federal government, negative language can be
two early California Supreme Court decisions.

In the

30's, however, there is a state Court of Appeal holding which

a de

In the 1940's, the Supreme Court again used
to a delegation; but a 1960's Supreme Court

gave emphatic application to a delegating statute without
licitly discussing the constitutional question.

There is also

interesting inheritance tax statutory precedent.
1.

Of the two early Supreme Court opinions, the first is

the Matter of Burke, 190 Cal. 326, 212 P. 193 (1923).

Subsequent

to Congress's enactment of the Volstead Act on prohibition, California
voters approved by referendum the Wright Act, which professed to incorinto California law all of the pertinent penal provisions of
Volstead Act.

In Burke, the California Supreme Court's chief

lding was that nothing in the California constitution prohibited
what amounted to an incorporation-by-reference.

The particular

assertion was made that the Wright Act was invalid on grounds
it professed to include into California law any amendments to
the Volstead Act which Congress might enact in the future.

The

responded to this assertion by saying:
It may be conceded that this provision [of the Wright
Act] is not valid, although we do not decide it, since
it is not involved. The only effect of putting that
provision into the statute would be, at most, t~at the
provision itself would be void, leaving the remainder
of the Act valid. It is not such a component part
of the Act itself as would be necessary to require us to
hold that it invalidated the entire Act.
0 Cal. at 328

121 P. at 194.
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. 2d 291, 71 P.
's

(1937),

30's agricultural
govern-

ment

ustment Act.

The Supreme Court, having

California legislation in other respects, reviewed
s

of

Cali

statute which professed to adopt

every regulation "heretofore or hereafter made"
of Agriculture, "when and insofar as
standard specified in and for this Act."

On the

"heretofore" matter, the Court concluded that the state statute
'tvas '

ct

valid" insofar as it merely adopted existing federal
continued:

"But the attempt to make future regula-

tions of another jurisdiction part of the state law is generally
ld to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers."
documentation, the Court merely referred to Burke, a South
opinion (Santee Mills, seep. 30
note.

), and a law review

The Court then reasoned on as follows:

11

We do not believe

it appropriate to consider whether [this section] of the Act
constitutes an unlawful delegation of power in this respect, for
the reason that this section is not involved in the proceedings
herein."

(This was because under the California statute future fed-

regulations were to be given effect in California only if the
California Agriculture Director held hearings and rendered a
finding that any new federal regulation was consistent with
California policy.) "The decisions upholding the so-called
retaliatory license or tax measures, in which some foreign law
contingency on which they become operative, are ample
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for the present legislation."

9 C.2d at 298, 71 P.2d

2

By

, neither the language in Burke nor that in
up to very much.

tum rather than holding.
ellation is excessive.

At most, the language contains
And perhaps even the "dictum"
Given the context of the full sentence

appears, the "concession" in Burke seeks to be merely
a concession arguendo--an assumption for the sake of argument.
the Brock language does not even profess to be as an expression
of the Brock Court's own view; rather, it merely entails that
t's description of what a limited number of other authorities
had previously said.
2. Intervening between Burke and Brock is the Court of Appeal
decision in In Re Lasswell, 1 Cal. App. 2d 183, 36 P. 2d 6 78 (1934).
Lasswelldealt with provisions of California's Industrial Recovery Act
incorporating the federal codes of regulation developed or to be developed by the federal N.R.A.

The statute declared as its policy that

"the State of California [should] cooperate "Y7ith and assist the
national government in promoting the rehabilitation of trade in
industry and eliminating unfair competitive practices.

II

The federal program applied to businesses operating in interstate
commerce; the California law applied, in a complementary way,
to that intrastate commerce which the federal legislation did not
cover.

A Court of Appeal affirmed the California statute against

the delegation challenge.
We have before us state and federal acts, both of
which recognize a nation-wide business collapse
and its resultant trail of human misery. Both state
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attempting to rehabilitate the
produce. . . . The incidental
the
legation of code prescription
of the United States on the ground
state
is a sovereign state
and the President is in this state a foreign official does not greatly impress us. The correlative
rights of state and nation are of great importance,
but we are a nation not an alliance of foreign
states,
our President is not a foreign potentate. .
If ever there could occur a state of
facts
ustifying, even demanding, co-operative
effort
tween the state and the nation, as prothe law under consideration here, we
the principle underlying this case. The
one and the patient is but one; how
logical that the curative agents must not conflict.
Only confusion could result if one code were fixed for
produce entering interstate commerce and another code
for produce entering intrastate commerce.
1 Cal. App. 2d. at 203-04, 36 P.2d at 687. Lasswell thus sets
forth a dramatic holding to the effect that state delegation to
federal authorities can be constitutionally justified by the
need for state-federal collaboration in dealing with a particular
societal problem.

In this regard, Lasswell is commended in Mermin,

"Cooperative Federalism" Again:

State and Municipal Legislation

Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future Federal Requirements: I,
57 Yale L.J. 1, 12-13 (1942).
The "authority" of the Lasswell holding should not be overstated, however. Lasswell is, of course, only a Court of Appeal
opinion.

Moreover, the Lasswell opinion is weakened by its failure

to allude to the Supreme Court's previous discussion of the delegation issue in Burke.
suggest that the

And other aspects of the Lasswell opinion

Lass"~;vell

Court may have insufficiently appreciated

the integrity of the non-delegation doctrine.

In another of its

holdings, the Lasswell Court approved the statute's massive deledelegation of authority to an administrative agency.
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counterpart of this state delegation was held unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Schecter.
3.

1940's Supreme Court opinion is Palermo v. Stockton

Theatres, Inc., 32 Cal. 2d 53, 195 P.2d 1 (1948). California's
Alien Land Law of 1920 and 1923 prohibited

aliens not qualifying

for U.S. citizenship from owning or leasing land in California-unless the aliens' rights in these respects were protected by
treaty.

A 1911 treaty between this country and Japan entitling

Japanese to own or lease land in the United States worked to trigger
the Land Law's treaty proviso.

Particular Japanese nationals leased

land in California in 1935 for a 10-year period.

In 1940, the 1911

treaty was abrogated by the United States, and the owners of the
land sought to void the lease.

A Court of Appeal ruled that the

Alien Land Law referred to treaties only as they existed in 1920
and 1923; hence the repeal of the treaty in 1940 did not deprive
the Japanese nationals of their property rights.

In reaching this

holding, the Court indicated--citing Brock and Burke--that there
is "grave doubt whether our legislature could constitutionally
delegate to the treaty-making authority of the United States" the
power to determine California law "with respect to future acts."
The California Supreme Court, in affirming the Court of
Appeal's holding, adopted all of that Court's opinion, including
this delegation passage.

32 Cal. 2d at 60, 195 P.2d at 5.

But it is clear from the paragraphs which the Supreme Court added
(as a supplement) to the Court of Appeal opinion that the Supreme
Court had an even stronger reason for giving the Alien Land Law
a narrow interpretation.

Unless that Law was construed as compat-

ible with the particular lease, the Supreme Court would have been
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required to launch a full enquiry into the constitutionality of
the Alien Land Law itself, insofar as it discriminated against
aliens.

It was chiefly to avoid this constitutional dispute that

the Court subscribed to the "static" interpretation of the Land
Law recommended by the Court of Appeal.

(That Court's opinion,

it can be added, relied on the precedent of the federal Assimilative Crimes Act concerning federal enclaves, an Act which at the
time the opinion was released applied only to state criminal laws
in effect at the time the Act had been (re)enacted.

But as we

know, in 1948 Congress amended the Act to render its delegation
open-ended in character--and this amendment was later endorsed
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sharpnack.

Presently, therefore,

the federal precedent works to dispel the "doubt" to which the
Palermo language refers.)
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4.
of Pub

The 1960's case is Eden Hemorial Park Ass'n v. Department
Works, 59 Cal. 2d 412, 380 P.2d 390, 29 Cal. Rptr. 790

(1963), in which the California Supreme Court willingly applied a
state statute which effectively delegated lawmaking ?owers to the
effectin~

however, in

this application, the

Court did not explicitly discuss the statute's constitutionality.
Federal grant-in-aid programs frequently raise problems as
to the relationship between the powers of state and local governments under state lav1 and the requirements set forth by federal
law for participation in the federal programs.

Recognizing the

potential for problems of this sort in the federal-aid highway
program in the 1930's, the

Ca~ifornia

Legislature enacted a

statute which, as amended, now appears as § 820 of the State and
Highway Code.
State Assent to Federal Statutes, Rules and
Regulations.
The State of California assents to the prov~s~ons
of Title 23, United States Code, as amended
and supplemented [and] other Acts of Congress
relative to federal aid. . . . All work done
under the provisions of Title 23 or said other
Acts of Congress relative to highways shall be
performed as required under Acts of Congress
and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. Laws, rules, or regulations of this state
inconsistent with such laws, or rules and regulations of the United States, shall not apply to
such work, to the extent of such inconsistency.
For delegation purposes,

§

820 is a very strong statute.

It "assents" in advance to the invalidation of any state laws or
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policies which may come into conflict with a federal highway
program regulation, whenever that regulation is itself promulgated.
As it happens, I am
infrequent.

advi~ed

that conflicts of this sort have been

But in the interesting Eden Park case, § 820 turned

out to be decisive.

Under the California Health and Safety Code

(§ 8560, 8560.5), state and local agencies are forbidden from

exercising eminent domain powers against cemetery property for
purposes of constructing any street or highway.

Yet in 1960,

both federal and state highway officials determined that a
cemetery area near Los Angeles was the best location for a freeway
which was to be part of the federal Interstate System.

Section 107

of Title 23 of the United States Code reads as follows:
(a) In any case in which the Secretary is
requested by a State to acquire lands or
interests in lands . . . required by such
State for right-of-way or other purposes in
connection with the prosecution of any project
for the construction . . . of any section of
the Interstate System, the Secretary is
authorized, in the name of the United
States . . . to acquire, enter into, and take
possession of such lands or interests in lands
by purchase, donation, condemnation, or otherwise in accordance with the laws of the United
States . . . if
(1) the Secretary has determined either that
the State is unable to acquire necessary lands
or interest in lands, or is unable to acquire
such lands or interest in lands with sufficient
promptness; and
(2) the State has agreed with the Secretary to
pay, at such time as may be specified by the
Secretary an amount equal to ten percent of
the costs incurred by the Secretary, in acquiring
such lands . . .
(c) The Secretary is further authorized and
directed by proper deed . . . to convey any
lands or interest in lands acquired in any
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State under the prov~s~ons of this statute . .
to the State highway department of such State
or such political subdivision as its laws may
60 the California Highway Commission attempted to
the Eden Park property.

But a state Court, relying on

statutes referred to above, enjoined this state condemnation
State Highway Engineer then "requested" the
government to condemn the property on its own pursuant
to§ 107.

Under that section, the Secretary of Commerce proceeded

to condemn the land through federal proceedings and to deed it
back to the state.

But state highway officials were then sued

state court to enjoin them from constructing the freeway
through the cemetery property.
In its opinion

the California Supreme Court first affirmed

constitutionality of the federal § 107, concluding that it
seeks a reasonable balance between local and national needs with
respect to the interstate system,." and that it "does protect local
interests by requiring that the state request any action by the
Secretary pursuant to its terms."
394, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 794.

59 Cal. 2d at 418, 380 P.2d at

But at this point the Court was

required to consider a second challenge:

that given the state's

own cemetery statutes, the State Highway Engineer had no authority
under state law to'requese'federal action which would result in
a circumvention of those statutes.

The Supreme Court seemingly

agreed that the statutes could be interpreted as forbidding the
Engineer from making this request.

But the Court then concluded

that this implied prohibition was itself overridden by § 820.
That is, since

§

820 intended to "abrogate inconsistent state
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laws" for purposes of "planning and constructing federally
assisted state highways," § 820 superseded the state law
prohibition which would otherwise prevent the State Highway
Engineer from requesting federal intervention. 59 Cal. 2d at
419, 380 P.2d at 394-95, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 794-95.
That the state-law provision which § 820 was allowed to
override was no more than "implicit" in character weakens the
drama of Eden Park; and I should note again that the Court, in
applying § 820, did not explicitly consider its constitutionality.
Nevertheless, the Eden Park opinion surely suggests the Supreme
Court's sympathy with the California Legislature's conclusion
that the maintenance of state prerogatives (as expressed in
existing state laws and regulations) can properly be subordinated
to the need to comply with federal norms in order to secure
certain benefits available from federal sources.
It is noteworthy, by the way, that § 820 contains a useful
procedural mechanism.
Any major conflicts between the laws, rules,
or regulations of this state and any such
federal law, rules, and regulations which
have been resolved under this Section during
a calendar year shall be described in a
report which the department shall submit to
the Legislature no later than January 30 of
the succeeding California year.
With this information collected in the annual report, the Legislature
is in a position intelligently to consider how well the § 820 process
of collaboration is working, and to modify or create exceptions in
that section to the extent that the results it produces seem
unsatisfactory.
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s

"precedent" on California-to-federal
the Revenue and Taxation Code.
tance tax is described and imposed in

1.

§§

tax."

Sections 13441-13443 provide for an

According to

§

13441:

a Federal Estate Tax is
United States in a case
tance tax payable to this
than the maximum state tax
by the Federal State Tax
, a tax equal to the difference between
the maximum credit and the inheritance tax
payable
hereby imposed.
logic of § 13441 to its logical extreme:
If no inheritance tax is payable to the state
a case where a federal estate tax is payable
to the United States, a tax equal to the maximum
state tax credit allowed by the Federal Estate
Tax law
hereby imposed.
These provisions, which date back to 1943, have been explained
as follows (in R. Bock, 1980 Guidebook to California Taxes, at 359):
The estate tax (sometimes called "pickup tax") is
imposed
order to obtain for the state the
maximum benefit from the federal credit for state
inheritance tax. . . . The state thus collects a
tax which would otherwise go to the federal government,
and the
combined state and federal tax is not
increased since the additional state tax is offset
by the
tional credit against the federal tax.
It is c

gic and purpose of these provisions that
des for is of an "ongoing" sort.

de

been part of California law since 1943, they

the provis
have never
an impermiss

Though

j

ly challenged on grounds that they entail
gation.

Of course, the provisions are in a
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way rendered invulnerable by the nature of their operation:
they do not subject any California estate to even a penny of
additional aggregate taxation.

(For that matter, they do not

result in any California estate paying even a penny less in
aggregate taxation.)

Under §§ 13441-43, the basic "winner" is

the state of California, which receives higher tax revenues than
it otherwise would receive; the basic "loser" is the federal
treasury, which can receive somewhat less revenue from an
individual estate than it otherwise would receive.

And federal

lawmaking authorities have made no effort to contest the state
strategy which the California provisions manifest.
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THE DELEGATION OF LAWMAKING AUTHORITY
TO ANOTHER:
_

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF KUGLER

__,___ _ _ _ _ _ _............_ _ _.;..___._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____;_>

c . 3d

5

4~

0,

tr. 553 (1971), dealt with the Tahoe
p

, to which the California Legislature had
powers to comprehensively regulate land use in the Lake
cons

the constitutionality of the delegation,
Court simply held that the "standards" in
were sufficient to provide guidance to

Agency in carrying out its land use responsibilities.
sent

es,

is interesting about the Agency is that

is a bi-state
act.

For

authorized by a Congressional interstate

The Agency s board consists of ten members, five chosen

ifornia officials, but the other five by Nevada officials.
approving the Cal1fornia Legislature's delegation, the Court
not advert to the fact that a full half of the Agency's
s were representatives of another jurisdiction.

ecially insofar as ElDorado can be regarded

But

in.the·e~ntext.

f·Kugler v. Yoeum (see below), implicit in the silence of the
Dorado opinion is the following three-step logic:

An interstate

is an appropriate way--if not the only way--for dealing
problem at hand; bi-state membership is essential to
an interstate undertaking; the nature of the problem to be
o

thus jus
po

es on reciprocity.

conferring Cali

i

In return for California's

lawmaking powers on Nevada officials, the
agreed to lodge Nevada lawmaking authority

s

c

es California's extra-jurisdictional delegation.

0

s.

This further emphasizes the extent to
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which the mutuality of the problem warrants a mutual solution,
with the whole of the Agency's effective powers being greater
than the sum

its California and Nevada parts.

Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 445 P.2d 303, 71 Cal. Rptr.
687 (1968), contains the most recent discussion by the California
Supreme Court on the specific subject of inter-jurisdictional
delegations.

Indeed, given its reasoning, Kugler stands as the

most important case in California law on the general question of
legislative delegations of all sorts.

Kugler dealt with a City

of Alhambra ordinance* which provided that in all future years
Alhambra firemen should be paid salaries comparable to firemen
salaries in the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles.
In understanding the reasoning of the Kugler majority, it is
useful to begin with the position taken by the Kugler dissent.
Justice Burke, joined by Justice McComb, would have found
an invalid delegation, insofar as the ordinance

would strip from Alhambra's city council its
discretion to determine one end of the wage
scale (the minimum), and delegate that discretion
to the governing bodies of two outside public
agencies which are entirely without responsibility
to the City of Alhambra, its employees, voters,
or taxpayers. This seems to me to offend democratic
principles in addition to the basic requirements
of the City's charter.
69 C.2d at 385, 445 P.2d at 312, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
The majority's reasoning can be broken down into several

*I simplify here somewhat. The ordinance was a proposed
initiative which had received the needed number of signatures
but which the City had refused to place on the ballot on grounds
of the alleged illegality of its delegation.
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delegation doctrine really requires is that
resolve the truly fundamental issues."
elution" will take the form of "standards"
the

lature to guide decisions rendered by others.
"fundamental issues" can be resolved even
setting.
fundamental issue?

on

To a large extent,

legislature chooses to perceive or

t the problem at hand.
cit

The Alhambra lawmakers had

as "fundamental" the "issue" of parity

tween Alhambra

s and Los Angeles wages.

So long as this

be regarded as the fundamental issue, then Alhambra's
have indeed decided it, and later events in Los Angeles
County which actually determine particular wage levels
regarded as mere matters of application.
(3)
sue

Alhambra's designation of parity as the fundamental
quite reasonable.

Alhambra lawmakers may recognize

will be unable to recruit firemen if their wages are
than those in Los Angeles.

Also, Alhambra officials may

eciate that Los Angeles officials may "possess a superior
lity" to review firemen wages in other jurisdictions and to
the resear

needed for an appropriate salary determina-

legation doctrine should take into account the "practical
necessi

s" of governmental processes.

1

te

Alhambra face serious problems in gathering the
appropriate for the formulating of proper

c

c

For example, smaller

S,
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(5)

What the delegation doctrine calls for is not "standards"

as such but

"safeguards."

doctrine

And an enlightened delegation

concerned with 'the degree of protection

against arbitrariness."

nrf an external private or governmental

body is involved in the application of the legislative scheme,
it must be an agency that the legislature can expect will reasonably perform its function."
71 Cal, Rptr, at 694.
that Los Angeles

69 Cal. 2d at 382, 445 P.2d at 310,

Alhambra lawmakers can reasonably assume

ty and County have no interest in paying

their firemen excessive or unnecessarily high wages.

This

assumption provides the necessary "safeguard" and the assurance
of ''reasonable performance."
(6)

The Court's general delegation philosophy is set forth

in an eloquent concluding paragraph.
Doctrinaire legal concepts should not be invoked
to impede the reasonable exercise of legislative
power properly designed to frustrate abuse. Only
in the event of a total abdication of that power
through failure either to render basic policy
decisions or to assure that they are implemented
as made will this Court intrude on legislative
enactment because it is an "unlawful delegation,"
and then only to preserve the representative
character of the process of reaching legislative
decision,
69 Cal, 2d at 384, 445 P.2d at 311, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
While Kugler itself dealt with a local ordinance, its
discussion of the delegation problem operates at a very general
level; it is clear, therefore, that Kugler principles apply to
delegations by the state legislature as well as delegations by
local governments.

For a case so holding, see Martin v. County of

Contra Costa, 8 Cal. App. 3d 856, 87 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1970).
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tin a state statute provided that employees of the Municipal

:.=;;;;;,..;;;.=

Contra

t

ts (for whose salaries the state is responsible)

same remuneration as the County chooses to pay its

receive

own employees in comparable positions.

The Court of Appeal,

applying Kugler, concluded that the statute was plainly constitutional.

The Court interpreted the Martin statute as contemplating
review of the implementation of the statute by the

lature.

8 Cal. App. 3d at 862, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 890.

This

review afforded a "safeguard" in the Kugler sense.
Given the level of generality of Kugler's discussion of the
delegation question, there should be no question but that Kugler
applied, at least in a general way, to delegations by the state
to federal officials.

This is proven rather conclusively by an

example of a lawful delegation which the Kugler opinion volunteers:
If [a California] statute provides that salaries
are to be adjusted to future changes in the cost
of living, the legislature must designate a body,
such as the United States Department of Labor,
which may be expected to reasonably perform the
function of ascertaining the cost of living.
69 Cal. 2d at 382, 445 P.2d at 310, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
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II.

A.

ANALYSIS

OF THE DELEGATION
Any choice by the California Legislature to adopt a general

rule of complete open-ended conformity, or to participate in the
Federal-State Tax Collection Act (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6361-65),
would entail a very substantial delegation.

First of all, either

choice would involve a decision to conform the state's income tax
I

to federal income tax norms.

At least four sorts of decisions

ordinarily go into the calculation of taxable income.
The first set of decisions rests on what can be called pure
tax logic.

An example:

if long-term capital gains merit special

tax treatment, this is partly because inflation would otherwise
overstate the taxpayer's true gain, and partly because without
special treatment a gain that has materialized over a considerable
period of time would be unfairly and excessively taxed in one
year only.

While federal law provides that one year of ownership

of capital gain for special long-term treatment, California lawmakers have concluded that only five years of ownership merits
full long-term treatment (Revenue & Taxation Code§ 18162.5).
California's opportunity to render its own decisions on pure tax
matters of this sort would be eliminated if it opted for complete
conformity.*

*I use existing California tax rules to illustrate the
differences between U.S. and California tax perspectives. Using
existing rules as illustrations is, however, an imperfect enterprise. After all, existing California rules could be overridden
by a mere incorporation-by-reference (not just by an open-ended
delegation). Conversely, even in an open-ended conformity regime,
existing California rules could be protected by attaching specific
modifications to the conformity rule. See page 64, infra.
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Tax rules are o
mo
c
of

designed to either stimulate or

general
gains may

Thus the special treatment of
so be intended to encourage the process

tal formation.

The state perspective on the control of

general economy may well be different from that of the
perspective.

(Indeed, the economic literature emphasizes

macroeconomic planning is best or at least most frequently
at the national level.)

If a state does accept

lete conformity, it would be depriving itself of the opporty of influencing macroeconomic policy by way of any state
income tax rules it might enact or amend.
Many income tax rules amount to so-called "tax expenditures."
is, rules on credits, deductions, and the non-taxability of
rms of income may well be intended by the Legislature to serve
as subsidies to various classes of persons and to various focms
of activities; these subsidies are often designed to achieve a
certain allocative effect.

Thus the solar energy credit introduced

into California law in 1976 and then revised in 1977 and 1978
(Revenue & Taxation Code §§ 17052.5, 17055) is obviously intended
to encourage property owners' investment in solar energy projects.
The charitable contribution deduction in both state (Revenue &
Taxation Code § 17214) and federal law is evidently designed, at
least in part, to encourage donations to approved charities.
However, California's maximum for charitable contributions (20%
of adjusted gross income) (Revenue & Taxation Code § 17215) is
much less than the federal 50% maximum; California has thus chosen
to place meaningful limits on the extent of its subsidy to
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charitable giving.

California's opportunity to make up its

own mind on matters of this sort would be eliminated by a
conformiEy policy.

camp

Finally, income tax law is designed to achieve the goal of
equity among taxpayers--"horizontal equity," to use standard tax
parlance.

The renters' credit provided for in California law

(Revenue & Taxation Code § 17053.5) can easily be understood in
equity terms.

Whatever the justifications may be for allowing

income tax deductions for property taxes and interest payments,
the truth remains that these deductions provide homeowners with
enormous tax benefits.

The renters' credit is designed to at

least alleviate the inequality between owners and renters that
the tax rules otherwise engender.

California's opportunity to

render equity judgments of this sort would be expunged were it
to elect full conformity.
To be sure, the state could attach certain "modifications"
even to an open-ended conformity statute; and the federal Act
recognizes state interests in a limited number of areas where it
was obvious to Congress that the state's perspective differs
from the federal perspective.

But limited exceptions of this

sort apart, modifications and open-ended conformity would require
state lawmakers to abandon the enterprise of state income-tax
policymaking.

The "social" as well as the "economic" aspects

of this policymaking were referred to in Wallace in invalidating
Hinnesota's

conform~ty

statute.

Even if the state does decide to conform or to participate
in the federal program, however, important state prerogatives
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ec

tax po

would be preserved.

of the § 6

Under piggybacking,

2(a)(2) options it elects, the participat-

state would retain full authority to set the general level
of the state income tax burden.

The extent of this burden is

one of the most important features of income tax policymaking.
so

by choosing option§ 6362(a)(2)(A) rather than§ 6362(a)(2)(B),
state would retain full authority over the state income tax

rate structure.

If the state does retain this power, then it

reserves for itself the authority to determine the progressivity
of the state income tax--that is, the extent to which the tax
attempts to achieve the so-called goal of "vertical equity."
And under conformity without piggybacking, the statute obviously
retains full control both over tax burden and over progressivity.
In these respects, however, California presently stands in
a rather special situation, given the pendency of Proposition 9.
In the absence of Proposition 9, the above comments on the preservation of state authority over tax burden and rate structure
are accurate.

If Proposition 9 passes, however, the California

Constitution would prevent the California Legislature from raising
any tax rate above 50 percent of what that rate is now.

Under

Proposition 9, therefore, the only power the state Legislature
would retain over the level of tax burden is the power to reduce
that burden to less than 50 percent of its present level; and the
Legislature could affect the progressivity of the state income
tax only by reducing particular rates to less than 50 percent of
their current levels--not by raising any rates to above that
point.

Proposition 9, by vastly curtailing the discretion which
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the state Legislature would otherwise possess under the federal
enhances the extent to which the adoption
would work a state-to-federal delegation.
another way, however, Proposition 9 diminishes the
legation.

By reducing tax rates to no more than 50 percent

of their present levels, Proposition 9 would proportionately
monetary effects of all tax rules on includability
and deductability, decision-making power over which the Act
would exclusively assign to the federal government.

By depriving

these rules of at least half of their practical impact,
Proposition 9 would to some extent mollify the delegation
objection.)
Discussed above is the extent to which a decision in favor
of full conformity would delegate state lawmaking powers.

But

if California chooses not only to conform but also to participate
in the federal program, this latter choice would seemingly enhance
the delegation in a dramatic way.

For under the Act, administra-

tion of the income tax would become exclusively (or almost exclusively) a federal responsibility.

In the first instance, the

basic responsibility for auditing taxpayer returns would rest with
the federal government.

(Note, however, the observation by

Professor Stoltz that, while a "cursory reading of the statute
might result in the . . . conclusion that the law prohibits
supplemental state audit activity," this reading is "mistaken";
"it is clear from the legislative history that Congress did not
intend to prohibit supplemental state auditing efforts.

Thus a

state with a high level of audit activity could continue such
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as a supp

to the federal effort."

Col

See Stoltz &

of State Income Taxes, 1977 Duke L.J.

However, even under Stoltz's view of the Act, any state
would be wholly "supplemental" or advisory in nature.)
the Act all decisions as to whether to initiate
proceedings would evidently be rendered by federal
tax litigation, either initiated by the government or by the taxpayer in seeking a refund, would take place in
court rather than in state court.

Section 636l(b).

officials, and those officials alone, would have the
power and responsibility "to represent state interests" in all
administrative and judicial proceedings.

Section 636l(d)(l)(a).

securing enforcement, only those civil and criminal penalties
provided for by federal law could be resorted to.

Section 636l(a).

Any penalties which state law might profess to provide for taxpayer
lations of the state tax would be regarded as an impermissible
form of "double jeopardy."

Section 6362(f)(6).

The federalization of the administration of the state income
tax which these various provisions would affect suggests that a
state's decision to participate in the federal program would
amount to a colossal delegation of a sort unprecedented (so far
as I know) in American federal history.

Not only state legislative

power, but state executive and judicial power, would all be
transferred to the federal government.

(Note, however, that the

special constitutional rules on the delegation of state judicial
power all pertain to statutes which remand seemingly judicial
matters to administrative agencies for primary decisionmaking.
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Under the
state

Act, matters which are presently decided by
would be submitted
government.

of

tead to the judiciary

There is thus no abandonment of the

taxpayer's right to a judicial decision--the right which those
special rules seek to vindicate.

While the delegation of state

judicial powers to the federal government should certainly
II

assessing the extent and the implications of the

overall delegation, it does not seem to raise any independent
delegation question.)
The above paragraphs have attempted to evaluate the character
of the delegation which full conformity or piggybacking would
constitute.

But enormous benefits would also result from decisions

to conform or to piggyback. * Many of those benefits would accrue
to individual taxpayers.

Under conformity, taxpayers would secure

welcome advantages in terms of the reduced time (or monetary cost)
involved in preparing state income tax returns.

And in addition

to tax preparation savings, the process of tax planning would also
be simplified, insofar as this planning would now need to reckon
with only one set of income tax rules.
State government also would reap substantial savings.

A

conformity policy would greatly reduce that administrative burden
on the state bureaucracy which is presently engendered by the
differential between state and federal tax rules.

Moreover, given

the provisions in the federal Act as amended, participation in the
Act would enable the state to achieve further savings by way of
*These benefits are well described in the general literature
on conformity, and I describe them only briefly here.
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the elimination of the costly state personal income tax
administrative apparatus.
Benefits would also be achieved by way of conserving the
resources of the state Legislature itself.

Since the Legislature

has in the past recognized the obvious advantages of conformity,
substantial amounts of legislative effort have been expended in
reviewing changes in federal income tax law and in determining
which of those changes the state, in the name of conformity, should
choose to adopt.

Adoption of an open-ended conformity rule would

liberate the state Legislature from this burden on its energies.
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B.

TF~

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DELEGATION
tances of this sort, where a delegation achieves

enormous benefits but also deprives the state of important authority, how should the California analyst think about the constitutional question?

My basic assumption here is that Kugler v. Yokum is the

•

relevant judicial authority.

While Kugler immediately deals with

a municipal ordinance, the Kugler discussion of delegation is
deliberately couched at a level of generality which makes it
seemingly relevant to delegations of every sort.

That Kugler

principles apply to delegations by the state is thus obvious
enough from the Kugler opinion itself, and has since been verified
by Martin.

Those Kugler principles are explicitly concerned with

the problem of inter-jurisdictional delegations; and an example
which the Kugler opinion explicitly advances (a state statute
giving effect to future changes in the cost of living as determined
by the federal Department of Labor) makes it sufficiently clear
that Kugler can be applied to delegations from the state to the
federal government.

To this extent Kugler takes precedence over the

language in Burke and Brock--language which was, after all, no more
than dictum (if that), and which was challenged from an early date
by the strong Court of Appeal holding in Lasswell. In any event,
the Rule that state delegations to the federal government are per
se invalid seems to be exactly the kind of "doctrinaire" delegation
concept which the Kugler opinion inveighs against.
Assuming that Kugler applies, what results does it suggest?
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are two alternatives to consider:

an open-ended

statute; and participation in the federal program.
the important

tial point is that each of these alterna-

seems to comply with the Kugler criteria for a valid deleKugler allows the legislative body to determine what
the "fundamental issue" is and then endorses whatever delegations
result

the legislature's resolution of that issue.

In

reviewing both the general advantages of conformity and the addiadvantages of piggybacking, the California Legislature
c_ould reasonably conclude that the "fundamental issue" for personal income tax purposes is whether the state should approve of
conformity and accept the federal invitation--whether the multiple advantages of conformity justify the reduction in state
authority.

In Kugler itself, the Court agreed that Alhambra could

characterize the "fundamental issue" in terms of whether the
advantages of compensation parity outweighed the corresponding
loss of city discretion.

Especially if the Legislature's vote

rests on the basis of an adequate deliberation (a good legislative
record would be helpful in this regard), the Legislature will have
rendered decision on the fundamental issue and to that extent
discharged its Kugler obligations.
Kugler does suggest that a legislature's resolution of the
fundamental issue must meet minimum standards of reasonableness
or responsibility.

But certainly the advantages of conformity

and also of piggybacking are substantial enough to confirm the
plausibility of a legislative decision which seeks to obtain them.
Kugler requires that if an "external governmental body" is implicated
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in a legislative scheme, the legislature must be able to expect
that

11 reasonably perform its function."

Certainly

the Legislature could possess this expectation vis-a-vis the
federal government.

If Alhambra can reasonably assume that Los

Angeles City and County will not pay their firemen excessively,
so California can reasonably assume that federal authorities
have no incentive either to develop oppressive income or deduction
rules or to foolishly fritter away the income tax base. *

If

Alhambra can recognize the greater information-gathering resources
of Los Angeles City and County, so the California Legislature could
reasonably place confidence in the general income-tax sophistication
of Congress and the Internal Revenue Service.
As noted in Part I-D, there are a number of judicial decisions
upholding open-ended state tax conformity statutes.

These decisions

validated conformity because of the benefits they perceived conformity as achieving:

"convenience to the taxpayer" and "economy to

the state" (or "simplicity of administration").

The recognition

of these benefits in this cluster of cases provides support for
the Kugler idea that· the Legislature, if it votes in favor of
open-ended conformity, will have rendered a responsible judgment
on the fundamental issue.

(The only complication is found in

Mullaney's suggestion that "labor saving" on the part of the
Legislature should not count as a legitimate benefit.

On this

complication, see the discussion of Sharpnack below.)

As for the

*Compare Cheney, p. 22, in which a state legislature sought
to utilize--for income tax purposes--a formula worked out by the
I.C.C. for quite different rate regulation purposes.
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of

tate

costs which would
imp
Supreme

8

if
Streets and

's Eden Park opinion is

it may well be sensible for the state to forsake some
to secure the benefits available from

i

States

Court's decision in Sharpnack

Kugler argument in favor of open-ended conformity.
--~~---holds,

in

with Kugler, that the advantages of con-

or parity can justify an open-ended inter-jurisdictional
In

there had been a longstanding Congres-

policy of conforming federal enclave law with the law of
state in which the enclave was located.
ence

Given all its experi-

th incorporation-by-reference measures, Congress could

(according to the Court) reasonably take the small additional leap
involved in approving an ongoing delegation.

In like manner, the

ifornia Legislature has long displayed a strong interest in
conforming the state's income tax laws with those of the federal
government.

Russell Bock's 1980 Guidebook to California Taxes is

lpful in revealing the extent of that interest.

The text of

that Guidebook reveals that most existing California personal
income tax rules do indeed conform (or at least adequately "compare")
to federal tax rules.

And Bock's SUliiiD.ary of 1979 California income

tax legislation (at pages 7-9) verifies that the clear majority
of all the income tax measures which the Legislature enacted in a
seemingly typical year were motivated by the Legislature's general
concern

conformi
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The Sharpnack analogy contains one complication, however.
The Congressional experience described in Sharpnack revealed an
undeviating practice of past conformity.

But with respect to

income tax law, the California Legislature, while it has usually
chosen to conform to the federal model, in any number of significant particulars has declined to conform (either by failing to
act or by acting in a nonconforming way).

•

As for this complica-

tion, however, the state Legislature is clearly entitled to
reflect, in a retrospective and comprehensive way, upon the
lessons of its experience.

And as it considers the state's

income tax in its existing whole--as it reviews the pattern of
state-federal deviations which its individual decisions (or
indecisions) have produced--the Legislature could plausibly conclude
that the process of state lawmaking has not been successful in
producing benefits commensurate with that process's taxpayer and
institutional costs.

If the Legislature's resulting decision to

conserve on its own labor (by way of open-ended conformity) rests
on a reasonable finding that its labor has not been productively
expended in the past, then the goal of "labor saving"--that is,
of deploying the Legislature's scarce resources to their maximum
public advantage--seems commendable rather than illicit in
character.
For all of these reasons, however, a Kugler analysis,
reinforced by Sharpnack, seemingly supports the legality of an
open-ended delegation, and even of piggybacking.

There are,

however, two objections to consider.
The first concerns the possibility of state legislative
oversight.

Oversight is certainly one form of "safeguard" for

a delegation; and Kugler makes clear that safeguards are essential
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Under "mere" ongoing conformity, the
undoub
e i
tax

should) set up a formal

e

significant changes

federal

and to develop a policy analysis of each of those
the

of the information and analyses which this

contribute, the Legislature would be in a good
to cons
p

whether any modifications of its conformity

are

(See the discussion above of the report-

"safeguard"
statute in Martin.)

Streets & Highways Code § 820 and of the
But the situation is very different if

es to participate in the federal piggybacking proAs a matter of formal law, a decision by a state like
ifornia to participate woulci. be reversible, so long as the
state makes up its mind within the deadline which the federal
t stipulates.

Practically speaking, however, such a decision

to participate may well be irreversible.

Once a state, in joining

the federal program, dismantles its personal income tax bureaucracy,
would be extremely difficult for the state legislature to withdraw from the program if the legislature should undergo any change
of heart.

Thus a state's acceptance of the federal piggybacking

invitation may well be effectively permanent in character.

Kugler

requires courts to consider the "practical necessities" of
governmental processes.

Here, a "practical" evaluation suggests

that the state Legislature may have little ability to act should
it later determine that a particular new federal tax rule is
obnoxious to state policy or that its original decision to
ticipate in the federal program seems no longer supportable.
From a delegation perspective, all of this is disturbing.
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The second objection concerns the "scope" or extensiveness
of the delegation
le

law?

question.

Is "scope" relevant at all in

is uncertain.

The extreme breadth of the

Schecter statute seemingly influenced the Schecter Court in its
ruling of unconstitutionality.

Yet, faced with a statute of

moderate breadth in Sharpnack, the Supreme Court simply ignored
concern for scope expressed in Justice Douglas's dissenting

•

opinion.

Kugler is the fountainhead of contemporary California

law, and Kugler, in stating delegation standards, pays no heed
to scope.

But the actual ordinance which was before the Kugler

Court--dealing only with firemen compensation--was obviously
rather narrow in scope.

Perhaps it is best to assume that if

the scope of a delegation is sufficiently extreme, then scope has
at least some bearing on the constitutional question.
The scope of the delegation under an open-ended conformity
statute is doubtless broad.

Yet it does not seem at all extreme

when compared to the federal NRA, ruled on in Schecter.

Note,

however, that a piggybacking delegation contains additional and
distinctive elements of breadth.

Piggybacking, like conformity,

would transfer tax-law policymaking to the federal government; but
piggybacking, unlike conformity, would also transfer near-complete
authority over the administration of the state's income tax.
("Administration" in this context includes prosecutorial authority,
judicial authority, and the authority to establish a schedule of
sanctions and penalties.)
Even as for the transfer of tax-law policymaking, there is an
additional important point to make--which is that under ongoing
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not under piggybacking) there would be a meaningful
state control on the absoluteness of
the record in other jurisdictions shows, a
California could easily combine a general rule of ongoing

tate

with at least a limited number of "modifications" which
le of taking strong interests into account.

Modifi-

sort could, for example, enable California to adhere
its

t policy on the solar energy credit, on the renter's
on the low ceiling on charitable contributions. *

t,

Of

course, the power to modify would also provide a legislative outlet
ongoing policy reviews of new federal tax rules, as described
at page 63.

The modification feature of an open-ended conformity

statute thus enables the state to qualify its delegation of policypower in a way that confirms the assessment that this delegation
something less than extreme.

A state would possess no similar

modifying ability, however, should it undertake to piggyback.
The assessment of the two objections thus leads to the
llowing conclusions.

There is very good reason to believe that

an open-ended conformity statute would be held constitutional £y
the California Supreme Court.

Open-ended conformity fully complies

th the Kugler criteria, and the delegation, while much wider in
scope than the delegations ruled on and described in Kugler, could
effectively safeguarded by a formalized process of legislative
, and kept under control by a legislative willingness to

*It would be not easy--though perhaps not impossible--to handle
California's differential treatment of capital gains by way of a
c
ty modification.
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consider at least a limited number of modifications.
decision could also be supported by Kugler.

A piggybacking

But here the "scope"

of the delegation seems more extreme, insofar as it both excludes
the state's power to "modify" and remits full judicial, administrative, and sanction-setting authority to the federal government.
Also, a Kugler consideration of the "practical necessities" of
governmental operations suggests the probable absence of the

•
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of effec

legislative review of the continuing
legislative decision.

tances, the
one

In these

prediction that can claim to be candid

recognizes that the Supreme Court could easily rule
on piggybacking--either extending Kugler to affirm the
s participation in the federal program, or interpreting
and thereby invalidating that participation.
added uncertainty concerns the character of the "scrutiny"

ch the Supreme Court would give to any California decision to
iggyback.

For purposes of applying Kugler, should piggybacking

e compared to the present California situation, or should it be
ared instead to the intermediate possibility of open-ended
conformity without piggybacking.

The calculation of the benefits

of piggybacking--as well as the calculation of the delegation
triments--importantly depends on what the basis for comparison
Yet I find little in Kugler that offers guidance as to how
undertainty should be resolved.

Of course, since no state

yet chosen to participate in the federal program, there has
been no opportunity to secure any judicial views on delegation
doctrine in this vexing application.

By contrast, as Part l-D

has shown, we do have case law on open-ended conformity statutes.
While the courts' opinions have hardly been uniform, neither have
they been unsympathetic to the conformity cause.

Several have ruled

favor of the constitutionality of ongoing conformity; and the
only contrary holding may have rested on that state's peculiarly
restrictive constitutional language.)
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C.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
of

cone

ions, reported above, is that it

very

that the California Supreme Court would find constitutional
an open-ended tax conformity rule adopted by the state Legislature.
reaching this conclusion, I am mindful of a contrary prediction
expres

in an Opinion of the Office of Legislative Counsel, dated
19

1959.

I am right

recognizing the 1968 Kugler as the outstand-

ing California authority on the delegation question, then it
follows that the Legislative Counsel's 1959 Opinion has simply been
superseded by later judicial developments.

It also may be proper

to mention that the Legislative Counsel's Opinion seems rather
selective in its methodology.

In discussing California law, for

example, that Opinion refers to the Supreme Court's language in
Brock, Burke, and Palermo; but it does not mention the strong
Court of Appeal holding in Lasswell.

As for out-of-state law,

it refers to early opinions like Santee Mills and Featherstone,
which had indicated doubts on the delegation question; but it does
not mention an early case like Underwood Typewriter, which had
sustained an open-ended conformity statute.

The Opinion disparages

the Ninth Circuit's sympathetic discussion of delegation in
Mullaney on grounds that the discussion was mere dictum.

Yet in

referring to the California Supreme Court's more negative language
in Brock, Burke, and Palermo, the Opinion fails to indicate the
quite limited role which that language played in those three
Court opinions.

Moreover, the Opinion does not even mention the

U.S. Supreme Court's Sharpnack decision, even though that decision
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program, even as so revised, creates any problems

--- 's

constitution.
contemplated by the Federal-State Income Tax

llection Act possesses important elements of similarity with
the programs hypothesized above.

Nevertheless, under that Act

the tax in question is emphatically a state tax.

It is conceived

as a state tax by the entire text of the Act itself; the

•

state retains the authority to determine the tax's overall burden
perhaps even the tax rate structure; and of course the Act
gives the states full choice as to whether to participate in the
program in the first place.

The state thus possesses much more

authority under the Act than it would possess under the revised
hypothetical program; and exactly because of the extent of that
authority, a state constitutional question arises as to the extent
to which the state has relieved itself of other authority.

There

is irony in this of course--but it is irony of the sort that
recurs in constitutional reasoning, especially in this complex era
of Cooperative Federalism.
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APPENDIX I
PROPOSITION 14 ON THE NOVEMBER 8, 1966 STATEWIDE BALLOT

PERSONAL INCOM!!_TAXES.. Legillative Constitutioul Amendment.

14

thorizes Legislaturt- to providP for rPporting and
taxes b~· ref~rence to provisions of tht'
Umtt•d States and may prescribe exceptions and modifications
p~r;onal .ineomt>

(This amendment -proposed by Assembly Constitutional 'Amendment .No. 18; 1965-· Regular
Session, d6es not expressly amend, any existing
section of the Constitution, but adds a: new section thereto; therefore, the provisions thereof are
printed in BLACK-FACEO TYPE to indicate
that they are NEW.)

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO

. ARTICLE XIII

•

•

. he.. li}. The Legi.sla.ture may simplify the
nportinjr a.nd . collection of Califonaia pei"'IOIal
General .&:na:J.ysfl by the Legislative Counsel
.A "Yes"vote on this measure is a' vote to authorize the r~egi.~lature to incorporate federal ]a\\"S
which ruay be l'nacted in the futl:u.'t', as well as i.'tistin:g federal laW!!, into California's law in the reo.
porting and collection of California personal in·
eo me ta.:x:es; and to permit the amount of income
tax compuW under federal law to be used i.u. re:pc.rting a.ncl collecting California personal income

There are now 54 differences
eral law· and the state law-this
make the two laws the same. m''""'"''l
iatration can be achieved without
tiona! costs as returm will be easier
Terify. Furthermore, it will be
those who are not reporting
Th6 vast majority of tbe
law and the state income tax
now-but the few differences
the problem area we seek to
taxe11.
A "No" vote is a vote to dell;y the Legislature eonstitutional amendment.
We are not giving away our
this authority.
For further details see below.
neeessal')" chang~s in our tax
We simply say tl:!at the present
eomputing ineome .is.
Deta.il.ed Analysis by the Legislative Counsel
This measure, if approved by the voters, would be incorporated in our
add Section 11~ to Article XIII to perll!it the Legis- the future the Legislature
lature, in the rep<Jrting and collection of the state particular n~w ft>tlt>ral law
personal income tax, to incorporate provisioilfl of our state tinRncial structure and
the federal law as they may be enacted or amended that change. Thus our own
in the future, as well as to incorporate existing retain the power to write oHr
provisions o! federal law, so as to make any of those will truly rdh:ct the economy
provision3 apply to the reporting and collection of her taxpayers. Every year the
state Income taxes. The federal law so incorporated time and effort prc,cessing- bill~
would be made subject to exceptions or mooifiea- most recent changes iD. federal
California.
_tion.~. if any, that the Legislature may prescribe.
Th~ State Assembly conducted a
The measure would specifi•!ally permit the inelnaion of a reference to the amount of any federal tax of our tax structure ana tllis
on, in respect to, o!' measure by, personal ineome the recommendations they
which is computed under any provision of federal already adopted the system and
law. This would permit the amonnt of ineome tar State Bar Association Committees
computed under federal law to be used in report- this action.
Vote YES for simplicity.
in~r and collecting California personal income
MILTON MARKS,
taxes.
.Assembly Committee
Argument in Favor o! Proposition :No.l4
ment Organization
At last! Here is a proposal to make our income
NICHOU.S C. PETRIS, Ll'VHrlfllifi
tax easier to figure out.
',
Assembly Committee
A YES vote on this proposition will allo\Y the
and Taxation
Legislature to adopt federal income tax laws as
Argument Against Proposition
much as practical !or our own state income tax·
A ''No" vote on Proposition 14
purposes. This means we will be able to use the
talculations made for federal tax purposes in ou r~sponsibility on the part
state tax form. We would not accept. the higbe officials.
<Pr•Jposition 14 would authorize th€
!eJPral tax rates.
Under present Ia'v we make all the at1Jition T~~lature-made up of your elected
and subtraction8 nece~sary for the feJeral. .ta·· tives in Sacramento--to ab<lieate
form and then go through the same proee;;s a! th<>ir responsibility for
over again for the state tax return.
the income tax ~ must pay to
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the Ab>ie!!Wicy

47th District
California Legislatur'!l

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
ARTICLE XIII
Sec. 11%,. (a) Except as urrnmxom
division (e), the Legislature may simplify
reporting and collecting of California
personal income taxes, notwithstanding
ether provision of this Constitution, by

present law we
subtractions, and computations
the federal tax form and
entirely different process
return. For those who hire
prepare their forms, this
There are now
the federal law and
posal will ease administration
as returns will be easier to
This will simplify the
mize on the size of the form.
The,vast m•m,av
federal income
tax law are similar nnw-~rmr
ferences that do exist are
we seek to simplify with
amendment.
We are not giving a,;ay
to make n~sary changes
in the future. We simply

3
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APPENDIX I

(continued)

PROP. 4 (1968)
Arrument Agalnst PropoaiUon No. .f.
California voten should vote NO on Proposition 4 for the following rea&Ollll:

•

Proposition 4 benefits the rich at the expense of middle and lower income families.
Under the guise of conformity, federal exemptions, which are much lower than the
State's could easily be adopted resulting in a
major downward shift of the tax burden
from the wealthy to the middle and lower
income groups. In addition, with full conformity to federal law, Proposition 4 would
mean an automatic tax windfall of up to
$100 for persons owning stock.
Proposition 4 discriminates against veterans and military personnel. Proposition 4
would remove the California tax law which
now provides that the first $1,000 of military
pay (active duty, reserve duty, and retired
persons) is exempt from the state income
tax. All of these citizens would lose that
benefit if California conforms to federal tax
laws.
Proposition 4 would mean that federal tax
law would automatically become state law.
Why should California taxpayers shift the
responsibility for enactment of state tax laws
to the federal government f Only 38 out of
435 members of the House of Representatives
and only 2 of the 100 members of the Senate
are elected by Californians. The practice of
adopting federal law "by reference" as this
measure proposes, could spread from tax
laws to automatic state adoption of many
other federal laws.
Californians would be giving up most of
the responsibility of the state government.
Dilution of accountability for tax legislalation will not best serve California's taxpayers. Rt>sponsibility for increases in your
state income tax should not be divided between Sacramento and Washington. The
legislative body spending the tax dollar
should be solely answerable to the electorate
for levying the tax. This is the best assurance
that your elected representatives will carefully balance the interests of taxpayers and
the beneficiaries of state appropriations.
A NO vote on Proposition 4 will protect
the spendable wages of the lower income
families living and working in California.
A NO vote on Proposition 4 will protect
the tax right of veterans and military personnel living and working in California.
A NO vote on Proposition 4 will assure
all Californians that our tax laws will be
made by California legislators, not by elected
representatives from other states.
We do not see how this proposal will do
anything for the ordinary taxpayer. Its implications are too serious to be put into our
Constitution. I urge all Californians to vote
NO on Proposition 4.
RICHARD J. DOLWIG
California State Senator
12th Senate District
JOHN J. MILLER
California State Assemblyman
17th Assembly District
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Senate Constitutional Amendment

No. 31

Introduced by Senator Mills '

January 23, 1980

Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 31-A resolution to
propose to the people of the State of California an
. amendment to the Constitution of the state, by adding
Section 26.6 to Article XIII thereof, relating to taxation.
LEGISLATIVE; COUNSEL'S DIGEST

N
--.J
U1

SCA 31, as introduced, Mills. Income tax.
The existing California Constitution provides that the
California Legislature may impose income taxes.
.
This measur.e would authorize the Legislature to simplify
the reporting and collecting of state personal income taxes by
incorporating federal law into state law.
Vote: %. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.
1
Resolved by the
2 the Legislature
3 Regular Session
4
1978~
5 each of the two houses
6 hereby proposes to
people of the State
7 that the Constitution of the state be amended by adding
8 Section 26.6 to Article XIII thereof, to
26.6. Notwithstanding anv
9
10
Constitution,
11
taxes
3
l

!~:"

1-(j
1-(j

tt:l

f§
H

~

>.

y

ACA 42

C.'.LlFUH:"-:1:\. LEClSLATUflE-b79-3U REGuLAR SESSION

Assembly Constitutional Arnendment

No. 42

Introduced by Assemblyman Naylor

March 29, 1979

HEFERRED TO COMMI'ITEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION

1\.)

Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 42-A resolution
to propose to the people of the State of California an
amendment to the Constitution of the state, by ,adding
Section 26.5 to· Article XIII t~e~eof, relating to taxation.
.

~

0'\

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

ACA 42, as introduced, Naylor (Rev. & Tax.). State taxes.
Existing provisions of the California Constitution provide
for state taxes on, or measured
income which
be
on persons,
or
by law,
taxes.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

•

·-2-

Resolved by the Assembly, the Senate concurririg, That
the Legislature of the State of California at its 1979-80
Regular Session commencing on the fourth day of
December, 1978, two-thirds of the members elected to
each of the two houses of the Legislature voting therefor,
hereby proposes to the people of the State of Cdifornia
that the Constitution of the state be amended by adding
Section 26.5 to Article XIII, to read:
SEC. 26.5. The Legislature may provide for the
imposition of taxes based upon taxes imposed by the
government of the United States. It shall not be an
improper delegation of the legislative power for the
Legislature to prospectively incorporate into such taxes ·
subsequent amendments to the federal tax.
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tx.1

zt:;j
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upon taxes
States.
This measure would
the Legislature may
for the imposition of taxes based upon taxes imposed
the government of the
States
provide
it shall not be an improper
for
to
taxes subsequent
21
no.
13·

(

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-l97HO REGULAR SESSION

ASSEMBLY BILL

•

No. 1445

Introduced by Assemblyman Naylor

March 29, 1979

REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION

An act to add Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 17041)
tu, to add Section 19252.5 to, to repeal Chapter 2,
(commencing with Section 17041), Chapter 2.1 (commencing'
with Section 17062), Chapter 3 (commencing with Section
17071), Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 17321), Chapter
~ 5 (commencing with Section 17051), Chapter 8 (commencing
~ with Section 17681), Chapter 9 (commencing with Section ·
17731), Chapter 10 (commencing with· Section 17931),
Chapter 13 (commencing with Section 18031), Chapter 14
(commencing with Section 18151), Chapter 15,( commencing
Section 18241), and Chapter 16 (commencing with
18351) of, Part
of Division 2 of
and
ion Code,
to taxation, to take
mediately, tax levy.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 1445, as introduced, Naylor (Rev. & Tax.). Personal '
income taxes.
Law impose
Existing provisions of the Personal Income
a tax on taxable income derived from sources
California at
rates, authorized

:J:;I

"0
"0
tr.1

§
H

:X:
t"1

as a

as a tax
its effective
Fiscal
of the

of

do enact as follows:

its

such household, ofor stepdaughter of
of a son or daughter of
but if
son, stepson,
14
or descendant i~ married at
close of
taxpayer's taxable year, only if
taxpaxer is entitled to
16 a credit
the taxable year for such
under
17054; or
ll

AB 1445

•_-5-

-4-,

l
2

N
00

w ut cunsntute an
3 emergency to
by reducing
4 revenues to an amount insufficient to meet authorized
5 state expenditures, the Franchise Tax Board shaH adjust
6 the rate in Section 17041, subject to subdivision (b).,
7
(b) The Franchise Tax Board shall adjust the tax rate
8 in Section 17041 by an amount which would result in a
9 rate from which revenues shall be derived in an amount
10 which is sufficient to provide funds for approved state
ll appropriations. Such adjustment shaq be applied equ3:lly
12 to all income groups.
)
13
(c) The Franchise Tax Board shall make no changes to
14 credits authorized by this part.
15
(d) Any rate adjustment under this section shall apply
\ 16 only with, regard to taxable years commencing in the
17 calendar year in which changes to the federal Internal
18 Revenue Code of 1954 occur.
19
17045.
the case of a joint retur-n of a husband and
under Section 18402, the tax imposed by Section
l shall be twice
which would
income were cut

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

AB 1445

a
spouse:
I)
the tai'payer
remarried at any time before
close of the taxable year; or
( 2)' Unless, for the taxpayer's taxable year during
which his spouse died, a joint return could have been
made under the provis~ons of this part (without regard to
subdivision (c) of Section 18402).
17053.5. (a) For taxable ·years beginning after
December 31,.1975, in the case of qualified renters, there
shall be allo'wed G,redits against the tax computed under
this part, minus all other credits provided for in this part
except the credit provided in Section 18551.1 (relating to
withholding credit) and the credit provided in ~ection
17061 (relating to excess tax credit). The credit shall be
in the amount of thirty-seven dollars ( $37).
Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this section a
husbai1d and wife shall receive but one credit under this
section. If the hu:;band and wife file separate returns,
mav be taken
or equally divided between

8-

10

II
12
13
l

l

A

~

' .
! :- ~

Hi
7
18
19

I

term ''qualified
does not mcmae an
( i)
changes made to
( 2) of subdivision
9
whose principal
of residence is with any lO (c) of this section by the 1977-78 Legislature shall
person who claimed such individual as a dependent
ll applied· with. respeCt to taxable years beginning on
for income tax purposes.
12 January 1, 1979, and thereafter ..
The term "·qualified renter" does· not include an
SEC. .3. Chapter 2.1 (commencing with Section
13
individual who has heen granted or whose spouse has 1 14 17062) of Part 10 of Division 2 of the Revenue and
granted the homeowners' property tax exemption - 15 Taxation Code is repealed.'
·
durl·:g: the taxahle yt'ar. This paragraph shall not apply in ~ 16
SEC. 4. Chapter.3 (commencing with Section 17071)
case of an individual whose spouse has been, granted
17 of Part 10 of Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code
homeowners' property tax exemption if each spouse
18 is repealed.
maintained a separate residence for the entire taxable
SEC. 5. Chapter, 4 (commencing with Section 17321)
19
10 ofDivision·2 the .Revenue and
Code
is
·
-.
is a nonresident for any
21
claim the
set forth
5
2

AB 1445

-8-

l 18241) of Part 10 of Division 2 of the Revenue and
2 Taxation Code is repealed.
3
SEC. 13. Chapter 16 (commencing. wlth Section
4 l 8351) of Part 10 of Division 2 of the Revenue and
_
5 Taxation Code is repealed.
6
SEC. 14. Section 19252.5 is added to the Revenue and
7 Taxation Code, to read:
8
19252.5. The Franchise Tax Board shall prescribe
9 returns for the computation of taxes under this par~
lO
ll

12
13
. 1-t
15
16
17
]8
19
20
21
N
22
co
0
23

which incorporate the federal income taxes of the
taxpayer as the first stage of such computations.
SEC. 15. This act provides for a tax levy within the
meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into .
immediate effect However, the provisions of this act '
shall be applied in the computation of taxes for taxable
years beginning on or after the first day of the calendar
year in which this act becomes effective provided the
effective date is more than 90 days prior to the last day
of the calendar year. If the effective date is 90 days or less
prior to the last day of the calendar· year, the provisions
of this act shall apply in the computation of taxes for
taxable years beginning on or after the first day of the
calendar year following the effective date.

0

•

"

by Assemblymen Naylor,
Bergeson,
Brown, Filante, Frazee,
Kelley, Moorhead, Nestande, Nolan,
ing, and Wyman
Beverly, Craven,
(Coauthors:
Nejedly,
Robbins, and
March 11, 1980
.,
HEFEHRED TO COMMITTEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION
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2 Taxation
is
SEC. 2 L Section 2
this act shall become
4
if Proposition 9 on
ballot
the .......... .,.,.,.

5
6 state.

on June 3, 1980 is adopted by the people

22. This act provides for a tax levy within the
meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go
9 immediate effect. However, the provisions of this act
lO shaH be applied in the computation of taxes for taxable
11 years beginning on and after January 1, 1980.
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CALIFOHNIA LEGISLATUHE-1979-80 REGULAR SESSION

ASSEMBLY BILL

--revised--

No. 3209

Introduced by Assemblymen Naylor, Johnson, Imbrecht,
Hallett, Bergeson, Dennis Brown, Filante, Frazee, Hayden,
Ivers, Kelley, Moorhead, Nestande, Nolan, Statham,
Stirling, and Wyman
(Coauthors: Senators Ayala, Beverly, Craven, Johnson,
Maddy, Nejedly, Nielsen, Rains, Robbins, and Speraw)
March 11, 1980
.,
y
'ij

REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION
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An act to amend Sections 17041 , 17054, and 17063 of, to add
Section 17039 to, to repeal Sections 17063.1, 17063.2, 17063.3,
17064, 17064.5, 17064.6, and 17064.7 of, and to repeal Chapter
3 (commencing with Section 17071), Chapter 4.5
(commencing with Section 17490), Chapter 5 (commencing
with Section 17501), Chapter 8 (commencing with Section
17681), Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 17731), Chapter
10 (commencing with Section 17931), Chapter 13
(commencing with Section 18031), Chapter 14 (commencing
•vlth Section 181.1)1), ChBpter 15 (commencing with Section
18241), and Chapter 16 (commencing with Section.l8351) of,
the Revenue and Taxation Code, relating to taxation, to take
effect immediately, tax levy. ·
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 3209, as
income tax.

Naylor (

&

Tax.).

Personal

>.

z

ll

19

u'"''''--'l'-'

of

do

as

21 required pursuant
22 subdivision (

the

23
24

means taxable
the federal income
1954:
7
( 1) Less any amount of interest received with

the ,United States Government,
8 to obligations
9 included in taxable income as computed for purposes
the federal income tax,
( 2) Less
12
1
5

16

the extent poss
ustment
(5) of

and
27 a manner that the
28 adjustments except by
29 or schedule.
30

31
32
33
34

n (a,,

the
need
to the

•
l

18351) of

10

Division 2

the

2 Tax at ion Code is repealed.

SEC. 21. Section 2 of this act shall become opmalive
only it Proposition 9 on the ballot for the statewide
5 election on June 8, 1980 i., adopted by the people of this
3
4

6 4a+e

7
SEC. 22. This act provides for a tax levy within the
8 meaning of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into
9 immediate effect. However, the provisions o.f this act
10 shall be applied in the computation of taxes for taxable
11 years beginning on and after January 1, 1980.
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APPENDIX N (continued)
of California

or

Franchise Tax Board

ndum

FRANCHISE TAX BOARD FISCAL
ANALYSIS OF AB 3209-revised

Hon. Robert W. Naylor
Member of the Assembly
State Capitol, Room 4160
Sacramento, CA 95814

Date

File No.:

July 25, 1980
114 :AND :jlb

Telephone:

(-8-) 438-0144
(916) 355-0144

William G. Mackey
AB 3209-Request for Information

This is in response to your request for a revised financial analysis of
AB 3209, based on the printed bill, the proposed amendments attached to
your letter, and discussions with Dan Nauman and James Patterson.
The revised revenue effect of the bill, by detail of significant differences,
is shown on Table 1.
The estimated net change in tax liabilities is shown on Table 2.
Questions concerning these tables should be directed to Allan Desin,
Director of our Research and Statistics Bureau, at (916) 355-0144.

p~~
Acting Executive Officer
Attachments
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TABLE 1
AB 3209 - Financial Analysis

(Data in Millions)
Income Year Change in
Tax Liability in 1981 Dollars
1981
1982
1983

•

-$77
-204
-20
-20

Interest & Div}dend Exclusion
CA.pital Gains.l
Capital Gains from Regulated Invest. Cos.
Sub-Chapter "S"
Net Operating Loss Carryover~/
¥Jlitary Exclusion
Political Contribution
Gas Tax
Charitable Contribution
Income Averaging
Preference Tax Exclusion
Subtotal

-$77
-97
-20
-20
0
+4
+2
+29
-25
-26
-20
-$250

-$77
-153
-20
-20
-25
+4
+2
+29
-25
-26
-20
-$331

-50
+4
+2
+29
-25
-26
-20
-$407

Interaction
Total

-5
-$255

-4
-$335

-3
-$410

On a fiscal year basis, the estimated revenue effect of the bill in 1981 dollars
is as follows:
1981-821_/
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85

-$340 Million
-355 II
II
-410 "
"
-410 "
"

~/ Capital Gains phase-in schedule:

1981 income year - the 1-5 year holding
period is eliminated and $3,000 loss limitation is allowed. The 1982
income year exclusion is raised to 55%, the 1983 income year exclusion raised
to 60%.

~/ Net operating loss carryover has $50 million in accrued losses for 1981
income year. We do not know how long it will take for the full $50 million
loss to be realized. The two-year phase-in is conjectural.

1_/ Assume 100% of 1981 income year effect felt in 1981-82 and 25% of 1982
income year effect also felt in 1981-82.
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AB

AGI Class
Under $5,000
$5,000 - 10,000
10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 30,000
30,000 - 40,000
40,000 - 50,000
50,000 - 100,000
100,000 And Over
Totals

- Distribution
Tax Burden
Income Year Constant Dollars
(Data in Millions)

Current Law
Distribution
Total/
Tax..!.
of Burden

AB 3209 Effect
Other I
Effect~
Effectg-1

Tax Mode}

-

$3
71
576
1,012
1,039
831
1,701
2,101

1.0%
7.8
13.8
14.2
11.3
23.2
28.7

$7,334,

100.0%

.

$1
-1
-12
-24
-32
-33
-94
-126
-$321

.. ·
Total
Effect

-$2
-5
-9
-8
-8
-22
-35

$1
-3
-17
-33
-40
-41
-116
-161

-$89

..,$41Q_

*

=

Tax

--.

$4
559
979
999
790
1,585
_h940

.1%
1.0
8.1
14.1
14.4
11.4
22.9
28.0

i§, 924

100.0%

68

rv
\.0

Ul

Less than $.5 million.

*
~/

Based on 1978 income year data aged to 1981. Includes variable growth rates for different
sources of income and deductions, based on historical trends adjusted for current law.
(As an example, deductions for property taxes were adjusted to reflect the effect of
Proposition 13.) Estimates of future CPI changes for indexing of brackets, exemptions and
standard deductions were provided by the Department of Finance.

I Copy of complete Tax Model output attached.
I
~ Based on federal data.
Includes Capital Gains from Regulated Investment Companies, Net Operating
~

Loss Carryover, and Net Operating Losses for Sub-Chapter "S" corporations. Analysis of federal
data indicate that 39% of Sub-Chapter "S" net loss tax benefits accrue to taxpayer with
adjusted gross income greater than $100,000 after offsetting other income by this
Sub-Chapter "S" loss.
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AMENDED IN SENATE JUNE 9, 1980
AMENDED IN SENATE APRIL 14, 1980

SENATE BILL
''-~----'-

-------·---

No. 1931
--'0""~-===============

Introduced by Senator Marz Garcia
(Principal coauthor: Assemblyman Naylor)
(Coauthors: Senators Ayal~ Beverly, Craven, Johnson,
Maddy, Nejedly, Nielsen, Nimmo, Rains, Robbins, and
Speraw)
(Coauthors: Assemblymen Dennis Brown, Filante, Frazee,
Hallett, Hayden, Imbrecht, Ivers, Johnson, Kelley,
Moorhead, Nestande, Nolan, Statham, Stirling, and
Wyman)
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\D
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March ll, 1980

§

""

'H
~

An act to amend Sections 17054 and 17063 of, to add Section
1?039 to, to repeal Sections 17063.1, 17063.2, 17063.3, 17064,
17064.5, 17064.6, and 17064.7 of, and to repeal Chapter 3
(commencing with Section 17071), Chapter 4.5 (commencing
with Section 17 490), Chapter 5 (commencing with Section
17501), Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 17681), Chapter
9 (commencing with Section 17731), Chapter lO
(commencing with Section 17931), Chapter 13 (commencing
with Section 18031), Chapter 14 (commencing with Section
18151), Chapter 15 (commencing with Section 18241), and
Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 18351) of, the
Revenue and Taxation Code, relating to taxation, to take
effect immediately, tax levy.

"

0

'

4

sources wltnm thls state.
relating to the computation of taxable
would revise the Personal Income Tax
fine taxable income to mean, with
taxable income as computed for purposes
income tax
repeal various provisions
taxable income.
to the computation
would also create an income tax credit, as
semor citizens.
bill would take effect immediately as a tax levy, but it
be applied in the computation of taxes for taxable
on and after January 1, 1980.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes.
State-mandated local program: no.
N
1.0
-.]

T1w people of the State of California do enact as follows:

5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12

14
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

32

which
required pursuant to
( 3) and
(a), and shall prepare the tax return in sucn a manner
that the taxpayer need not make such adjustments
by reference to the appropriate table or .,._.,,u .....
SEC. 2. Section 17054 of the Revenue
Code is amended to read:
17054. In the case of individuals computing their
under Section 17041 or Section 17048, the following
credits for personal exemption may be deducted from the
tax imposed.
(a) In the case of a single individual, or a
indi.vidual making a separate return a credit of
twenty-five dollars ( $25).
(b) In the case of a head of household, a
spouse (as defined in Section 17046), or a uu."u"'"
wife making a joint
a credit of
one spouse was a resident for the
other spouse was a nonresident
the
portion
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is
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Hevenue and

6.
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Code is

and
~
Code is repealed.
8. Section 17064.5 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code is repealed.
SEC. 9. Section 17064.6 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code is repealed.
SEC. 10. Section 17064.7 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code is repealed.
SEC. ll.
3 (commencing with Section 17071) 1
of Part 10 of Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code J
is repealed.
(commencing with Section
SEC
Chapter
2 of the Revenue and
17490) of
7.

28
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37

Part
Code is repealed.
act
24 meaning Article
immediate effect
26
applied
the computation
taxes
27 years beginning on and after January 1,
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Code is repealed.
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APPENDIX P
SUBCHAPTER E-COLLECTION OF STATE XNDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAXES
Sec.

6361. General ru lea.
6362. Quallfled State Individual Income
taxes.

Sec.

6363.

State

63M.
636:5.

Rt>gulaUiln!l.

:t,greernents;

dure~~

Definition~

other

proce-

and special rules.

1911 Amendm~nt. Pub.L. 92.{112, Title
111 I 202(a), Oct. 20, 1972, 56 Stat. 936,
aaded subchapter E.

§ 6861. General rules
(ft.) Collection and .sdmlnlstratfon.--·Jn !.he <~a.!<e o• &.ny Statu wl1ld1 hart
in ~:ttect h.ll «1\reem<:nt with the SecJ~tary <mlc;r.c) lPto nndn r,cr.tlc•n 63\.:1,
the ~ecretary or his delegate shall collect and administer the qualified
Stale individual Income taxes of such State. AH provisions of this sub·
title, subtitle G, and chapter 24 relating to the C(•lle.ctlon and RdmlnlstraUon of the taxes imposed by chapter 1 on the incomes ot individuals (and
all clvU and criminal sanctions provided by this subUtle or by title 18
ot the United States Code with respect to such coll<CcUon and administration) P.hall apply to the collect.lou and ail mlnl~l cation (lr qua.U£Jed
St11.te individual Income taxes as If such taxes were ho posed by c\•apter l,
except to the extent that their application is modified by the Secretary
or his delegate by regulations necessary or appropriate to reflect the provisions of this subchapter, or to re!lect differences in the taxes or differences In the situations in which llabllity for such taxes arises.
(b) Civil proceedlngs.-Any person shall have, with respect to a qualified State individual Income tax (Including the t:urrent collection thereof),
the same right to bring or contest a civil action and obtain review thereof,
In the same court or courts and subject to the same requirements and procedures, as he would have under chapter 76, and under title 28 of the
United States Code, If the tax were imposed by section 1 (or were for the
current collection of the tax imposed by section 1). To the extent that
the preceding sentence provides judicial procedures (Including re\·lew procedures) with respect to any matter, such procedures shall replace judicial procedures under State law, except that nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed in any way to affect the right or power of a State
court to pass on matters involving the constltutiou of that State.
(c) Transfers to States.(1) Prompt transfers.-Any amount collected under this gub·
chapter which Is apportioned to a qualifif:d State lndh·ldual Income
tax shall be promptly transferred to the State on the basis ot estimates by the Secretary or his delegate. In the case of amounts collected under chapter 24, the estimated amount due the State shall
be transferred to the State not later than the close of the tl1ird business day after the amount Is deposited In a Federal Reserve bank. In
the case of amounts collected pursuant to a return, a declaration of
estimated tax, an amendment of such a declaration, or otherwise, the
estimated amount due the State shall be transferred to the State not
later than the close of the 30th day after the amount is received by
the Secretary or his delegate.
(2) Adjustments.-Not less often than once each fiscal year
the difference between collections (adjusted for credits and refunds)
made under this subchapter during the preceding fiscal year and the
transfers to the States made on account of estimates of such collections shall be determined, and such difference shall be a charge
against, or an addition to, the amounts otherwise payable.
(d) Speclnl rules.( 1) United States to represent State interest.( A) Ceneral rule.-In all administrative proceedings, and in
all judicial proceedings (whether civil or criminal). relating to
the administration and collection of a StatP. quallCied Individual
Income tax the Interests of the State Imposing such tax shall be
represented by the United States in the same manner in which
the Interests of the United States are represented in correspondIng proceedings involving the taxes Imposed by chapter 1.
(B) Exceptions.-,.-Subparagraph (A) shaH not apply t~
{1) proceedings in a State court involving the constitution of that State, and
(11) proceedings involving the relaUonshfp between the
United States and the State.
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(2) Allocation or overpayments and underpayments.-If the combined aroou:nt collected In respect of a qualified State Individual ln. come tax for any period and the taxes imposed by chapter 1 for such
period with respect to the Income or any individual Is greater or less
than thH. corablned amount required to be paid for such period the
collected amount shall be divided between the accounts for 'such
taxes on~ the ·basis of the respective amounts required to be paid.
(S) 1• fns.Uty ot ad.mlnistratll'e determlnations.-Admin!stratlve
determinations or the Secretary or his delegate as to tax llabllltles
ot, or rerunds owing to, individuals with respect to quallfled State individual lnco.me taxes shall not be reviewed by or enforced by any
oftlcer or employee or any State or political subdivision or a State.
Added Pub.I,. !12- 512, Title II, f 202(a), Oct. 20, 1972, 86 Stat. 936.
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6362. Qall.litied State individual income taxes
(a) Quall1ied State individual income taxes defined.-For purpOSE!S o[

this subchapter·--.
.
(1) In gcneral.-The term "quallfied State indivldu.allncome tax"
means-(A) a quautied resident lax. and
(D) a qualified nonresident tax.
(2) Qualified resident tax.-The term "quautied resident tax"
means a tax Imposed by a State on the income of individuals who are
residents ot such State which is elther(A) a. tax based on taxable Income which meets the requirements of subsection (b), or
(B) a tax which is a percentage ot the Federal tax which
meets the requirements of subsection (c),
and which. in addition, meets the requirements or subsections (e)
and (f).
.
(S) Qualified nonresident tru~:.-The term "qualified nonresident
tax" means a tax which is Imposed by a State on the wage and other
business Income of individuals who are not residents of such State
and which meets the requirements or subsections (d), (e), and (f).
(b) Qualirled resident tax based on taxable lncome.(1) In general.-A tax meets the requirements of this subsection
only It it is Imposed on an amount equal to the Individual's taxable
Income (as defined In section 63) for the taxable year, adjusted(A) by subtracting an amount equal to the amount of his
interest on obligations of the United States which was included
In his gross Income for the year,
(B) by adding an amount equal to his net State income tax
deduction for the year, and
(C) by adding an amount equal to hls nel tax-exempt Jn.
come for the year.
(2) Pennitted adjustments.-A tax which otherwise meets the
requirements of paragraph (1) shall not be deemed to fall to meet
such requirements solely because It provides for one or more ol the
following adjustments:
(A) There Is Imposed a tax on the amount taxed under section 56 (relating to the minimum tax for tax preferences).
(B) A credit determined under rules prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate Is allowed against such tax for income tax
paid to another State or a political subdivision thereof.
(S) Net State income tax deductlon.-For purposes of this subsection and subsection (c), the term "net State income tax deduction" means the excess (if any) of (A) the amount deducted from
income under section 164(a) (3) as taxes paid to a State or a political subdivision thereof, over (B) amounts Included In income as
recoveries or prior Income taxes paid to a State or a political subdivision thereof which had • been deducted under section 16 4 (a) ( 3).
(4) Net tax-exempt income.-For purposes of this subsection and
subsection (c), the term "net tax-exempt income" means the excess
(l! any) o[-

(A) the interest on obligations described in section 103 (a)
( 1) other than obligations or the State and its political subdivisions, and
(B) the interest on obligations described in such section or
the State and its political subdivision which under the law or the
State Is subject to the individual income tax Imposed by the
State, over
the sum or the amount o! deductions allocable to such interest which
ls disallowed by application of section 265, and the amount of the
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proper adjustment to basis Rllocable to such obligations which Is
required to be made for the ta.xable year under sectlon 1016(a) (5)
or (6).
(c) Qunllfled rt>sfdent tax whittt Is a percentage of the Fede:rnl tro::.(1) In general.-A tax me.:!ls the requirements of this subsection
only If It Is Imposed as a specified percentage of the excess of the
taxes imposed by chapter 1 over the sum of the credits allowable
under part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 (other than the credits
allowable by sections 31 and ~3).
(:Z} Required adjustment ·A fl1)' meets Uw ~c~ulrPmcnt~ <•f lhlrsubsectlon only if the JiabllHr lo•· tax is decrcr,:.;cci. by <lle d{<cH·a~;r. In
such liability which would result from excluding from gross income
an amount equal to the Interest. on obligations or the United States
which was Included in gross Income for such year.
(8) Permitted adjustment:J.--A tax which otherwise meets the
requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not be deemed to fall
to meet such requircmentll solely because It pJ·ovJdes for both of the
following adjustments:
·
(A) the liabUity for tax In Increased by the Increase In such
liability which would. result from Including as an item of gross
Income an amount equal to the net tax-exempt income for the
year, and
(B) tb& llab1Uty for tax Is increased by the Increase in such
liability which would result from Including as an item of gross
Income an amount equal to the net State income tax deduction
for the year.
(4) Further pennitted adjustment.-A tax which otherwise meets
the requirements ot paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not be deemed to
fall to meet such requirements solely because a credlt determined
under rules prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate is allowed
against such tax for income tax paid to another State or a political
subdivision thereof.
(d) Qualified nonresident tru:.(1) In general.-A tax Imposed by a State meets the requirements
of this subsection only if It has the following characterlstics(A) such tax is Imposed by the State on the wage and other
business Income of Individuals who are not residents of such
State,
(B) such tax applies only with respect to wage and other
business ln~me derived trom sources within such State,
(C) such tax a.ppliea (lnly ff 25 percent or more of the ludlvldual's wage and other business Income for the taxable year
Is derived from sources within such State,
(D) the amount of such tax Imposed with respect to any Individual who Is not a resident does not exceed the amount of tax
for which he would be liable under such State's qualified resident tax If he were a resident of such State and it his .taxable
Income were an amount equal to the excess of(1) the amount of his wage and other business income
derived from sources within such State, over
(li) that portion ot the nonbusiness deductions taken
into account for purposes of the State's qualified resident tax
which bears the same ratio lo the amount of such deductions as the Income referred to ln clause (1) bears to his
adjusted gross income, and
(E) the State has in effect for the same period a qualified
resident tax.
(2) Wage and other business income.-The term "wage and
other business income" mean&(A) wages, as defined In section 3401 (a).
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(B) net earnings from self-employment (within the meaning of section 140 2 (a)), and
(C) the distributive share or Income or any trade or business
carried on by a trust, estate, or electing small business corporation (within the meaning of section 1371 (a)) to the extent such
share (I) Is Includible in the gross income or the individual for
the taxable year, and (U) would constitute net earnings from
self-employment (within the meaning of section 1402(a)) if
such trade or busln~s were carried on by a partnership.
(e) Requh-ements relating to residence.-A tax Imposed by a State
meets the requirements of this subsection only if for purposes ot such

tax(1) Resident lndirldw\1.--An Individual (other than a trust 01'
estate) Is treated as a resident of such State with respect to a taxable year only f f (A) his principal place of residence has been within such
State for a period of at least 135 consecutive days and at least
30. days or such period are in such taxable year, or
(B) In the case of a citizen or resident of the United States
who Is not a resident (determined in the manner provided In subparagraph {A)) of any State with respect to such taxable year,
such Individual Is domiciled in such State for at least 30 days
during sue}). taxable year.
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to require or authorize
the treatment of a Senator, Representative, Delegate, or Resident
Commissioner as a resident of a State other than the State which
he represents in Congress.
(2) Esta.te.-An estate of an lndlv.1dual is treated as a resident
of the last State of which such Individual was a resident (within
the meaning of paragraph ( 1) ) before his death.
(3} Trusta(A) Testamentary tru.st.-A trust with respect to which a
deceased individual is the principal contributor by reason of
property passing on his death Is treated as a resident of the
last State of which such Individual was a resident (within the
meaning of paragraph ( 1)) before his death.
(B) Nontestamentary trust.-A trust (other than a trust
described In subparagraph (A)) is treated as a resident ot such
State with respect to a taxable year. only if the principal con·trlbutor to the trust, during the 3-year period endlng on tho
date of the creation of the trust, resided in the State for an
aggregate J:!Umber of days longer than the aggregate number ot
days be reSided In any other State.
{C) Special nlles.-For purposes or this paragraph(1) IC on any day before the close of the taxable year an
existing trust received assets having a value greater than
the aggregate value or all assets theretofore contributed to
the trust, such trust shall be treated as created on such
day. For purposes of this subparagraph, the value or any
asset taken into account shall be its fair market value on
the day 1t is contributed to the trust.
(li) The principal contributor to the trustee is the individual who contributed more (In value) of the assets contributed on the date of the creation of the trust (determined
after applying clause (i)) than any other individual.
(Hi) If the foregoing rules would create more than one
State of residence (or no State of residence) for a trust,
such trust shall be treated as a resident of the State determined under similar principles prescribed by the Secretary
or his delegate by regulations.
(4) Liablllty for ta."C on change of resldence.-With respect to
a taxable year, In the case of an individual (other than an Individual
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who comes Into being or ceases to exl'!t) who becomes a resident,
or ceases to be a resident, of the State, his liability to such State
for the resident tax Is determined by multiplying the amount which
would be his llablllty for tax (after the nonrefundable credits allowed against such ta.x) It he had been a resident of such State for
the entire taxable year by a fraction the numerator of which Is the
number of days he was a resident of such State and the denominator of which Is the total number of days In the taxable year. In the
case of an Individual who is treated as a resident of a State with
respect to a taxable year by reason of paragraph (1) (B), the pre·
ceding sentence shall be appJicd t•v ~nbstltutiug da)'~< of o(l)llldle
tor dayc of residence.
(5) Current collection of tax.-In applying chapter 24 (relating
to withholding) and section 6015 and other provisions relating to declarations of estimated Income (and amendments thereto)(A) In the case of a resident tax, an individual Is treated
as subject to the tax 1f he reasonably expects to reside in the
State for 30 days or more or ff such Individual Is a resident. ot
the State (wfthlll. the meaning of paragraph (1), ( 2). or ( 3)),
and

· (B) In the case of a nonresident tax, an Individual 1s treated
as subject to the tax If be reasonably expects to :receive wage and
other business income (within the meaning of subsection (d)
( 2)) for 30 days or more during the taxable year.
(f) Additional requlrements.-A tax imposed by a State shall meet the
requirements of this subsection only if( 1) State agreement must ba In effect for period conce:med.-A
State agreement entered Into under section 6363 !s In effect with
respect to such tax for the taxable period In question.
(2) State Jaws must contain certain provisions.-Under the laws
such State-(A) the provisions of this subchapter (and of the regulations
prescribed thereunder) as In effect from Ume to time are made
applicable for the period for which the State agreement is Jn
effect, and
(B) any change made by the State in the tax imposed by the
State wm not apply to taxable years beginning In any calendar
year for wbfch the State agreement is in effect unless such
cbange is enacted before November 1 of such calendar year.
(8) State laws tu'ing Income of individuals can only be of certain
kinds.-The State does ·not impose any tax on the Income of individuals other than·
(A) a qualified resld.ent tax,
(B) a quallfted nonresident tax, and
(C) a separate tax on income which Is not wage and other
business Income and which Is received or accrued by individuals
who are domiciled In the State but who are not residents of the
State within the meaning of subsection (e) {1).
(4) Taxable )'ears must colncfde.-The taxable years of individuals
under such tax coincide with taxable years for purposes ol the taxes
imposed by chapter 1.
(5} 1\larried indtrlduals.-A married individual (within the meanIng or section 143)·
(A) who files a joint return for purposes of the taxes im·
posed by chapter 1 shall not file a separate return for purposes
of such State tax, and
(B) who files a separate return for purposes of the taxes Jmposed by chapter 1. shall not file a joint return for purposes
of such State tax.
(6) No double jeopardy under State Jaw.-The laws of such
State do not provide criminal or civll sanctions for an act (or omission to act) with respect to a qualified resident tax or quaH!ied non-
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resident tax other than the criminal or clvll sanctions to which an
Individual is subjected by reason of section 6361.
(7) Partnerships, trusts, subchapter S corporatloiut, and other con•
duJt entittes.-Under the State Jaw the tax treatment of(A) partnerships and partners,
(B) trusts and their ben'eficiarles,
(C) estates and their beneficiaries,
(D) electing small business corporations (within the meaning of section 137l(a)) and their shareholders, and
(E) any other entity and the individuals having beneficial
lnteretlls therein, to the extent that such entity is .treated as a
conduit for purposes of the taxes imposed l.ty chapter 1,
shall correspond to the tax treatment provided therefor in the case
of the taxes Imposed by chapter 1.
(8) Members of Armed Forces.-The relief provided to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States by section 514 of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Clvll Rellef Act (50 U.S.C.App. sec. 574) is in
no way diminished,
(0) \Vithholdlng on compvnsatlon of employ~ of rallroads, motor
carriers, airlines, and water cnrrlers.-There is no contravention of
the provisions of section 26, 226A, or 324 of the Interstate Commerce
Act or of section 1112 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 with respect to the withholding of compensation to which such sections
apply for purposes or the nonresident tax.
Added Pub.L. 92-512, Title II, § 202(a), Oct. 20, 1972, 86 Stat. 938.

fi 6363.

State agreements; other procedures

(a) State agreement.-If a State elects to enter into an agreement

with the United States to have its individual income taxes collected and
administered as provided in this subchapter, 1t shall me notice of such
election In such manner and with such supporting Information as the
Secretary or his delegate may prescribe by regulations. The Secretary
shall enter into an agreement with such State unless the Secretary notifies
the Governor of the State within 90 days after the date or the filing of
the notice of the election that the State does not have a qualified State
individual income tax (determined without regard to section G362(f) (1)).
The provisions of this subchapter shall apply on and after the date (not
earlier than the first January 1 which is more than 6 months after the
date of the notice) specified for this purpose in the agreement.
(b) With<lrn.wal..
(1) By notificntlon.-If a State wishes to withdraw from the
agreement, it shall notify the Secretary or his delegate of its Intention
to withdraw in such manner as the Secretary or his delegate may prescribe by regulations. The provisions of this subchapter (other
than this section) shall not apply on or after the date specified for
this purpose in the notification. Except as provided In regulations,
the date so specified shall not be earlier than the first January 1
which Is more than 6 months after the date on whlch the Secretary
or his delegate is so notified.
(2) Dy change in state law.-Any change tn State law which
would (but for this subchapter) have the effect of causing a tax to
cease to be a qualified State Individual income tax shall be treated
as an intention to withdraw from the agreement. Notification by
the Secretary to the Governor of such state that the change In State
law will be treated as an Intention to withdraw shall be made by the
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Secretary In such manner as the Secretary or llls delegate shall by
regulations prescribe. Such notification shall have the same effect
as a notice under paragraph (1) of an Intention to withdraw from
the agreement received on the etrectlve date c;f the change in State
law.
(c) Trllll.Sitlon years.(1) Subchapter ceases to apply during ta.xpayf:r's year.-If the
provisions of this subchapter cease to apply on 11 day other than
the last day of the taxpayer's taxable year, tll~n amounts previously
paid to the United States on account of the state's qualified Individual Income tax for that taxable year (whdher paid by withholdIng, estimated tax, credit in lieu of rr.fnnd. or (•therwlse) shall br.
treated as ha.ving been paid on ac<:OUJJt of the State's Individual lncome tax law for that taxable year. Such amounts shall be transferred to the State as though the State had not withdrawn from the
agreement. Returns, applications, elections, and other torms previously flied with the Secretary or his delegate for that taxable year,
which are thereafter required to be filed with thll appropriate State
official shall be treated as having been filed wHb. tho appropriate
State Clf!lclal.
(2) Prevention of unintended ha.rdshlps or bentJfits.-The State
may by law provide for the· transition to a quaUfled State individual
lncoiDe tax or froiD such a tax to the extent nec~ssary to prevent
double taxation or other unintended hardships, or
prevent unintended benefits under State law.
(8) Adnllnlstratlon of snbsectlon.-The provisions of this subsection shall be administered by the Secretary or his delegate, by the
State, or jointly, to the extent provided In regula! Ions prescribed by
the Secretary or his delegate.
(d) Judicial revlew.(1) In general.-Whenever under this section the Secretary or
his delegate determines that a State does not have a qualified State
individual Income tax, such State may, within 60 days after the
Governor of the State has been noti!led of such acUon, ftle with
the United States court of appeals for the circuit
which such
State is located, or with the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, a petition for review of
copy of
the petition shall be forthwith transmitted by
ot the court
to the Secretary or bls delegate. The Secretary or his delegate
thereupon shall file In the court the record of
on
which he based his action as provided in section 2112 o£ title 28,
United States Code.
(2) Jurisdiction of court; revlew.-The court
have jurisdiction to affirm the action of the Secretary or h!a delegate or to set H
aside In whole or In part and to Issue such
as may be
appropriate with regard to taxable years which Include any part of
the period of lltJgatlon. The judgment of the
shaH be subject
to review by the Supreme Court of the United
upon certiorari
or certification as provided in section 1254 of
United States
Code.
(8) Stay of decislon.(A) If judgment on a petition to :review
determination
under subsection {a) Includes a determination that the State
has a Qualified State Individual income tax, then the provision&
of this subchapter shall apply on and after the first January 1
which Is more than 6 tnonths after the date
the judgment.
·(B) If judgment on a petition to review
determination by
the Secretary under subsection (b) (2) includes a determination that the State does not have a qualified State individual
Income tax. then the provisions of this subchapter (other than
this section) shall not apply on and aft~r the first January 1
which Js more than 6 IDonths after the date of the judgtnent.
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(4) Preference--Any judicial proceedings u:r:der tllls section shall
be entitled to, and, upon request of the Secretary t)r the St3.te, shall
. receive a preference and shall be heard and determined as expeditiously as possible. .
Added Pub.L. 92-512, Title II, I 202(a), Oct. 20, 1372, 86 Stat. 942.
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6864. RegulatlODIJ
The Secretary or hls delegate shall prescribe such regulations as u1a.y
be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this subchapter.
Added Pub.L. 92-512, Title II, I 202(a), Oct. 20, 1972, 86 Stat. 944.

§ 6365. Definitions and special rules
(a) State.-For purposes of this subchapter, the term "State" Includes
the District of Columbia.
(b) Governor.-For purposes of this subchapter, the te;:m "Governor"
Includes the Commissioner of the District of Columbia.
(c) Application of snbchapter.-Whenever thls subchapter begins to
apply, or ceases to apply, to any State ta."t on any January 1---,
(1) except as provided In paragraph (2), such cha.nge shall apply
to taxable years beginning on or after such date, and
(2) tor purposes of chapter 24, such change shall apply to wages
paid on or after such date.
Added Pub.L. 92-512, Title II, § 202(a), Oct. 20, 1972, So Stat. 944.
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APPENDIX Q
WITHHOLDING EXEMPTION (W-4 OR DE4) FORMS
ISSUE
The Franchise Tax Board has adopted a regulation (18811)
that requires employers to send to FTB their employees' withholding exemption forms (DE4, W-4 forms}, under certain condi
Does this regulation impose an unreasonable burden on California
employers?
POLICY ALTERNATIVES
After review of the arguments for and against this
regulation, the policy alternatives available to the Committee
appear to be:
1.

Do nothing--let the regulation stand.

2.

Request the FTB to reconsider this issue.

3.

Amend the regulation, by statute, to federal
conformity.

4.

Repeal the regulation by statute.

BACKGROUND
A study by the Internal Revenue
ce
uncove
growing number of taxpayers who submit false W-4 forms to
In one case a person claimed 99 dependents.
This has the effect of undermining the withholding sys
and causing a cash flow loss of revenue.
According to the Franchise Tax Board, information was
received as to the filing of 8,000 W-4's in 1978-79 that
claimed an exemption from withholding or appeared to c
excessive number of withholding allowances.
Of these,
mately 5,800 were fraudulent.
In an attempt to combat the filing of fraudulent wi
exemptions, both the Internal Revenue Service and the Franchise
Tax Board have adopted regulations requiring employers to
information to the appropriate tax agencies when the exemptions
claimed exceed certain levels.
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Employers are required to furnish copies of the W-4 and/or
DE4 to the respective agencies under the following conditions:
Form DE4 (State)
l.

an employee claims 20 or more exemptions or any
smaller number the employer has reason to believe
is excessive

2.

a full-time employee claims to be exempt from
withholding and the employee's salary computed
on a bi-weekly basis, exceeds $625

3.

an employee makes material alterations on the form
such as deleting language, defacing the certificate,
or providing information 'other than that requested

4.

an employee files a withholding allowance certiticate
which the employee admits is false

Form W-4 (Federal)
1.

an employee claims more than n,tne withholding exemptions or

2.

an employee claims exemption from income tax withholding
and his/her wages are more than $200 a week at the
time the employer receives their Forms W-4

Some employers have objected to these
on the
basis that they will erode positive relationsh
management and employees. Further, the State
ations are
criticized on the grounds that they are different than the
federal ones and particularly that the language " ... any smaller
number the employer has reason to believe is excessive" puts
the employer in the position of "judging" employees, which
they assert is an invasion of privacy of the employee and a
task which they find objectionable on the grounds that employers
are not equipped and should not be investigating the financial
affairs of their employees.
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